The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary by Bodansky, Daniel
The United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change: A Commentary
Daniel Bodanskyt '
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................ 453
II. BACKGROUND ................................................. 455
A. Overview of the Problem ....................................... 455
B. Global Warming: "The Evolution of an Awareness . ...................... 458
1. The Development of Scientific Consensus ........................... 458
2. The Climate Issue Comes of Age ................................ 460
3. Early International Responses .................................. 461
C. Prologue to the Climate Convention ................................. 471
III. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE FOR A
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE ......................... 474
A. Obstacles to Agreement ......................................... 475
B. State Interests and General Positions ............................... 478
1. OECD Countries ......................................... 478
2. Developing Countries ...................................... 479
C. The INC Sessions ............................................ 481
1. INC I: Chantilly, Virginia, February 4-14, 1991 ..................... 481
2. INC 2: Geneva, June 19-28, 1991 .............................. 484
3. INC 3: Nairobi, September 9-20, 1991 ........................... 487
4. INC 4: Geneva, December 9-20, 1991 ............................ 488
5. INC 5: New York, February and May 1992 ......................... 489
a. Part I February 18-28, 1992 .............................. 489
b. Extended Bureau Meeting: Paris, April 1992 ..................... 490
c. Part 1I: April 30-May 9, 1992 ............................... 491
IV. COMMENTARY ................................................ 492
A. Framework vs. Substantive Approach ............................... 493
B. Definitions (Article 1) ......................................... 496
C. Preamble, Objective, and Principles ................................ 497
1. Preamble ............................................. 497
2. Objective (Article 2) ........................................ 499
3. Principles (Article 3) ....................................... 501
t Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law; J.D. 1984, Yale Law School;
M.Phil. 1981, Cambridge University; A.B. 1979, Harvard College. The author attended the third
session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change (INC) as an observer for the International Council of Environmental Law (ICEL), and the
fourth session as an observer for the World Conservation Union (IUCN). He served as a special adviser
to the INC Secretariat from January to June 1992, and attended the final sessions of the negotiations
in that capacity. His research has been made possible by an International Affairs Fellowship from the
Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed are personal, and do not necessarily reflect those
of the INC Secretariat, ICEL, IUCN, or the Council on Foreign Relations. The author would like to
express his thanks to Sue Biniaz, Jo Butler, Charles Cowan, Joan Donoghue, Alia Jamal, Richard
Kinley, and Seth Osafo for reading all or portions of this article and providing comments and
corrections. They are, of course, not responsible for any remaining mistakes or misinterpretations.
Earlier versions of portions of this article appeared in Managing Climate Change, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.
L. 60 (G. Handl ed., 1993) and INC 3 & 4: Draft Convention on Climate Change, 22 ENVTL. POL'Y
& L. 5 (1992).
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 18:451, 1993
D. Commitments .............................................. 505
1. Classes of Parties ........................................ 506
2. General Commitments (Articles 4(1), 5, 6, and 12(1)) .................. 508
3. Specific Commitments on Sources and Sinks (Articles 4(2) and 12(2)) ......... 511
a. Targets and Timetables ................................... 512
b. Comprehensive Approach To Emissions Limitation ................. 517
c. Joint Implementation .................................... 520
4. Specific Commitments on Financial Resources and Technology Transfer ....... 523
a. Financial Resources .................................... 523
(1) Implementation Costs (Articles 4(3) and 12(3)) ............... 524
(2) Adaptation Costs (Articles 4(4) and 12(3)) .................. 527
(3) Other Costs .................................... 529
b. Technology Transfer (Articles 4(5) and 12(3)) .................... 529
5. Special Circumstances (Article 4(8)-(10)) .......................... 530
E. Institutions and Mechanisms for Implementation ......................... 532
1. Institutions ............................................ 532
a. Conference of the Parties (Article 7) .......................... 533
b. Secretariat (Articles 8 and 21(1)) ............................ 534
c. Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (Article 9) ....... 535
d. Subsidiary Body for Implementation (Article 10) ................... 536
e. Financial Mechanism (Articles 11 and 21(3)) ..................... 538
2. Mechanisms ............................................ 543
a. Communication of Information (Article 12) ...................... 543
b. International Review of Implementation (Article 7(2)) ................ 546
c. Multilateral Consultative Process to Resolve Questions Regarding Implementation
(Article 13) ....................................... 547
d. Settlement of Disputes (Article 14) ........................... 548
F. Final Clauses .............................................. 549
1. Amendments, Annexes, and Protocols to the Convention (Articles 15, 16, and 17) . 549
2. Voting Rights, Signature, and Ratification (Articles 18, 20, and 22) ......... 551
3. Entry into Force (Article 23) .................................. 551
4. Reservations and Withdrawal (Articles 24 and 25) .................... 552
G. Interim Arrangements (Article 21 and Resolution 1NC/1992/1) ................ 552
V. EVALUATION OF THE CONVENTION ................................... 554
Climate Change Convention
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, mankind injects approximately six billion tons of carbon into
the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels,' as well as a substantial
(although still uncertain) amount from deforestation.2 Since the advent of the
industrial revolution, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have risen
by more than twenty-five percent, from 280 to more than 350 parts per
million (ppm).' Scientists estimate that if current patterns of emissions
continue unchecked, the increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide, together
with parallel increases in other trace gases such as methane and nitrous oxide,
will cause an average global warming in the range of 0.2 to 0.50 C per
decade, or 2 to 50 C (3.6 to 90 F) by the end of the next century.4 Such a
temperature rise, more rapid than at any time in human history, could have
severe effects on coastal areas, agriculture, forests, and human health.
In response to this threat, the U.N. General Assembly established the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on
Climate Change (INC) in December 1990, with the mandate to negotiate a
convention containing "appropriate commitments" in time for signature at the
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992.'
The INC met six times between February 1991 and May 1992, and adopted
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Climate Change
1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT 11
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT] (reporting that best estimate for annual global fossil fuel
emissions in 1989 and 1990 is 6.0 + 0.5 billion tons of carbon).
For the convenience of the reader, a partial list of abbreviations used in this article is provided.
AOSIS Association of Small Island States
CANZ Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
COP Conference of the Parties of the Climate Change Convention
EIA Environmental impact assessment
GEF Global Environment Facility
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IEA International Energy Agency
INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LRTAP Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention
NIEO New International Economic Order
REIO Regional economic integration organization
SWCC Second World Climate Conference
UNCED U.N. Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
WMO World Meteorological Organization
2. Id. at 12 (estimating annual net flux to atmosphere of 1.6 ± 1.0 billion tons of carbon from
land-use change during the 1980s).
3. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT at xvi, table 1 (J.T. Houghton
et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter IPCC SCmENTIFIC ASSESSMENT].
4. Id. at xi. In 1992, the IPCC noted that the net rate of global warming is likely to be less than
was predicted in 1990 because of the effects of sulfates and ozone depletion, 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 1, at 25, but reaffirmed the major conclusions of its 1990 report, id. at 6.
5. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, G.A. Res.
45/212, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 71st plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, at 147-49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 45/212].
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Convention, or Convention) on May 9, 1992.6 The Convention was opened
for signature at UNCED, where it was signed by 154 states and the European
Community. 7 It requires fifty ratifications for entry into force.
To many, the Convention was a disappointment.8 Despite early hopes that
it would seek to stabilize or even reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by
developed countries, the Convention contains only the vaguest of commitments
regarding stabilization and no commitment at all on reductions.9 It fails to
include innovative proposals to establish a financial and technology clearing-
house or an insurance fund, or to use market mechanisms such as tradeable
emissions rights. Furthermore, it not only contains significant qualifications
on the obligations of developing cuntries,10 but gives special consideration
to the situation of fossil-fuel producing states."
Nevertheless, given the complexity both of the negotiations, which
involved more than 140 states with very different interests and ideologies, and
of the causes, effects, and policy implications of global warming, reaching
agreement at all in such a limited period of time was a considerable
achievement. In fact, the final text is significantly more substantive than either
the bare-bones convention advocated by some delegations or previous
framework conventions dealing with transboundary air pollution 2 and
depletion of the ozone layer.'3 While the Convention does not commit states
to specific limitations on greenhouse gas emissions, it recognizes climate
6. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 9, 1992, in Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of the Second Part of Its Fifth Session,
INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., 2d Part, at Annex I, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 851 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]. For discussions of the Convention by Western
scholars, see Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown et al., A Forun for Action on Global Warming: 7he U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4 COLO. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 103 (1993); Michael
Grubb, The Climate Chang Convention: An Assessment, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 540 (Aug. 12,
1992) [hereinafter Grubb, Assessment]; Philippe Sands, The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 1 REV. EUR. COMMUNrrY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 270 (1992). For developing country
perspectives, see Mick Kelly & Sarah Granich, A Step in the Right Direction?, TI'MPO (Int'l Inst. for
Env't & Dev./Sch. of Envtl. Sci., U. of E. Anglia), Sept. 1992, at 1; R.K. Pachauri, The Climate
Change Convention: What It May Mean for the Poor, NETWORK '92 (Centre for Our Common Future,
Geneva), Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 14.
7. 154 Signatures on Climate Convention in Rio, June 13, 1992 (UNCED press release). As of
May 1993, an additional seven states had signed the Convention, and nineteen states had submitted
instruments of ratification, including Canada, Australia, and China. The first state to ratify the
Convention was Mauritius, on September 4, 1992. The United States ratified the Convention on October
15, 1992. U.N. Treaty Office, New York.
8. See, e.g., Pachauri, supra note 6, at 14 (characterizing Convention as "a very weak document
that belies the high expectations of concerned organisations the world over"); Kelly & Granich, supra
note 6, at 2 (calling Convention "[an] ambiguous document which will allow politicians to fiddle on as
the world steadily warms").
9. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2).
10. Id. art. 4(7).
11. Id. art. 4(10).
12. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10541,
18 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter LRTAP].
13. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No.
11097, 26 I.L.M. 1529 [hereinafter Vienna Ozone Convention]; see Grubb, Assessments, supra note
6, at 541; Sands, supra note 6, at 271.
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change as a serious threat 4 and establishes a basis for future action. First,
it defines as a common long-term objective the stabilization of atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases "at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system." 5 Second, to guide
future work, it sets forth principles relating to inter- and intra-generational
equity, the needs of developing countries, precaution, cost-effectiveness,
sustainable development, and the international economy." More importantly,
it establishes a process designed to improve our information base and reduce
uncertainties, to encourage national planning, and to produce more substantive
international standards should scientific evidence continue to mount that
human activities are changing the Earth's climate.
Part II of this article describes the background of the Convention. Part III
discusses the dynamics and history of the negotiations. Part IV provides a
commentary on the specific provisions of the Convention. Part V concludes
by briefly evaluating the Convention's significance in the developing corpus
of international environmental law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Problem
The greenhouse effect is a naturally-occurring phenomenon: certain trace
gases in the atmosphere absorb infrared radiation (heat) and reradiate it
towards the Earth, raising the Earth's surface temperature.17 In effect, these
gases trap heat in the atmosphere as does the glass of a greenhouse or a
blanket on a bed.tt By far the most important greenhouse gas is water vapor.
Other greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide (CO), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N20), and ozone (03). t9 Without this natural greenhouse effect, the
14. See Grubb, Assessments, supra note 6, at 540 ("Those who believe that continued and
accelerating human interference with the planetary heat balance is a matter of no real concern have
politely been shown the door.").
15. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.
16. Id. art. 3.
17. The wavelength at which bodies emit radiation depends on their temperature. The very hot sun
emits radiation primarily as visible light, while the much cooler Earth radiates in the infrared region
of the spectrum. The greenhouse effect is caused by the fact that the atmosphere is transparent to the
visible light from the sun, allowing it to strike and warm the Earth, but absorbs the infrared
wavelengths radiated by the Earth, reradiating them as heat into the atmosphere and towards the surface
of the Earth. See Gordon MacDonald, Scientific Basis for the Greenhouse Effect, in THE CHALLENGE
OF GLOBAL WARMING 123, 126-28 (Dean Edwin Abrahamson ed., 1989). See generally IPCC
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3; PANEL ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING,
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING: MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND THE SCIENTIFIC
BASE (1992) [hereinafter POLICY IMPLICATIONS]; STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING: ARE
WE ENTERING THE GREENHOUSE CENTURY? (1989); PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CLIMATE (Michael C.
MacCracken et al. eds., 1990).
18. However, unlike botanical greenhouses or blankets, which operate primarily by trapping air
and thereby blocking heat transfer by convection, the greenhouse effect results from the blocking of
radiative heat transfer. See POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 17, at 91.
19. R.T. Watson et al., Greenhouse Gasses and Aerosols, in IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra
note 3, at 1, 7. Until recently, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were regarded as greenhouse gases. Id. at
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Earth would be 330 C (60' F) colder and therefore uninhabitable for
humans.20
The vast expansion of human activities resulting from industrialization and
population growth has led to substantially increased emissions, and ultimately
to higher atmospheric concentrations of several greenhouse gases .21 These
increased emissions have upset the equilibrium between emissions of
greenhouse gases from natural sources on the one hand and removal of these
gases by so-called "sinks" on the other, which had kept atmospheric
concentrations relatively constant in pre-industrial times.22 Most climate
scientists believe that increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases will eventually produce an "enhanced" or "anthropogenic" greenhouse
effect.' However, the magnitude, timing, and geographical distribution of
this warming are highly uncertain, as are its impacts, which may include a sea
level rise of about sixty-five centimeters by the end of the next century,24 a
greater number of hurricanes, drought, and deforestation.'
Predictions of greenhouse warming are based primarily on computer
models of the atmosphere, and, thus far, have not been clearly confirmed by
direct temperature measurements. Although available records suggest a global
average warming of 0.3 to 0.6' C (0.5 to 1.1" F) since the late nineteenth
century, this temperature increase could be due to natural climate variability
rather than greenhouse warming.26 Waiting until the evidence is unambigu-
ous, however, may be tantamount to accepting a substantial degree of warming. 7
The two types of policy responses to the threat of global warming are
abatement and adaptation. 2 Although some warming may be inevitable
23-25. However, it is now believed that although CFCs do trap heat in the atmosphere, their warming
effect is offset by their depletion of stratospheric ozone, which is also a greenhouse gas. See infra notes
409-416 and accompanying text.
20. SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 13.
21. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at xvi. The primary anthropogenic source of
carbon dioxide is the burning of fossil fuels, but deforestation also injects a substantial amount of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere. Sources of methane are less well understood, but include rice farming and
cattle rearing, as well as landfills, biomass burning, coal mining, and natural gas production. See
generally id. at xv; Watson et al., supra note 19, at 1-33 (general discussion of sources and sinks of
greenhouse gases); 1992 IPCC SuPPLEmENT, supra note I, at 11-13 (same).
22. Carbon sinks include plants and trees, which sequester carbon through photosynthesis, and the
oceans, which take up carbon at the surface and store it at great depths. Other greenhouse gases are
removed from the atmosphere largely through atmospheric reactions. See generally Watson et al., supra
note 19 (on greenhouse gases and aerosols); POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 17, at 91-97.
23. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at xii. Carbon dioxide emissions are responsible
for somewhat more than half of the predicted warming; emissions of other trace gases such as methane
and nitrous oxide account for the remainder. Id. at xx.
24. Id. at xxix-xxx, 277; cf. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 17, at 142-43 (estimating range of
sea-level rise from 0 to 60 centimeters for doubling of pre-industrial carbon dioxide levels).
25. Cf. WORLD REsoURcES INsT., WORLD RESOURCES 1992-93, at 196 (1992) (discussing impacts
of rapid climate change).
26. T.M.L. Wigley & T.P. Barnett, Detection of the Greenhouse Effect, in IPCC SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 239; see also C.K. Folland et al., Observed Climate Variations and
Change, in IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 199.
27. Wigley & Barnett, supra note 26, at 253 ("Detection with high confidence is unlikely to occur
before the year 2000 .... [I]t may be well into the 21st century before we can say with high confidence
that we have detected the enhanced greenhouse effect.").
28. See generally POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 17. For a discussion of adaptation, see Paul
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because of past greenhouse gas emissions, reducing emissions or enhancing
sinks could mitigate additional warming. Alternatively, we could wait to see
what happens, and, if warming occurs, try to adapt to its adverse effects by,
for example, building sea walls to prevent coastal flooding, switching to more
heat-resistant agricultural crops, or using more air conditioners. Whether
abatement or adaptation is preferable depends on various factors, including the
relative costs of abatement adaptation measures (which are highly uncertain),
the likelihood of obtaining new information that will reduce uncertainties, and
the risk of catastrophe.
Because a vast array of human activities produces greenhouse gas
emissions, all countries contribute to the buildup of these gases. However, the
contributions of different countries vary markedly. At present, industrialized
countries are responsible for approximately three-quarters of global carbon
dioxide emissions; 9 the United States alone contributes nearly one-quarter
of the global total.3" Developing countries, with eighty percent of the world's
population, account for the remaining quarter.3" As developing countries
such as China, India, and Brazil continue to grow, however, their emissions
of carbon dioxide will increase dramatically. By some estimates, the carbon
dioxide emissions of developing countries will at least equal those of
developed countries by the year 2030.32 Assuming sinks cannot be dramati-
cally increased, stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases will require a two-prong strategy: first, limiting and reducing green-
house gas emissions from developed countries, which historically have
accounted for the bulk of emissions; and second, redirecting developing
countries into a low-emissions growth track involving more efficient use of
energy produced by "cleaner" technologies.
E. Waggoner, Now, Think of Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137 (1992); A. Dan Tarlock,
Now Think Again about Adaptation, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 169 (1992).
29. WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra note 25, at 210.
30. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENVrL. ANALYSIS, LIMITING NET GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Richard A. Bradley et al. eds., 1991).
31. When all gases are considered, the contributions of industrialized and developing countries to
the greenhouse effect are roughly equal in absolute terms. Still, industrialized countries have much
higher emissions than developing countries on a per capita basis. WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra note
25, at 209. For a discussion of different measures of greenhouse gas emissions, see Alternative
Indicators of Greenhouse Gas Emission, Group on Energy & Env't, OECD Doc. ENV/EC/EN(91)12
(Apr. 16, 1991); SUSAN SUBAK ET AL., STOCKHOLM ENV'T INST., NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
ACCOUNT: CURRENT ANTHROPOGENIC SOURCES AND SINKS (1992).
32. MICHAEL GRUBB, ENERGY POLICIES AND THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, VOLUME ONE: POLICY
APPRAISAL 43 (1991) [hereinafter GRUBB, ENERGY POLICIES]. Southern observers have bitterly disputed
calculations of the developing world's relative share of greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., ANIL
AGARWAL & SUNiTA NARAIN, GLOBAL WARMING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD: A CASE OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL COLONIALISM 1 (1991).
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B. Global Warming: "The Evolution of an Awareness"33 "
Awareness of the climate change issue developed rapidly over the past
decade. 4 As recently as 1985, when a major international scientific work-
shop was held in Villach, Austria," the U.S. participants went without
specific instructions. Within three years, the United States had promoted the
establishment of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to
provide a scientific and policy assessment of the problem, and had lobbied
successfully to chair a major working group within the IPCC. Less than four
years later, international negotiations on a climate change convention were
completed, and the U.N. Framework Convention was adopted and signed.
This evolution of awareness about climate change has been characterized by
three stages: emergence of a broad scientific consensus, growth in public and
political interest, and formulation of an international policy response.
1. The Development of Scientific Consensus
Although scientists have understood the general theory of greenhouse
warming for more than a century," widespread concern emerged only in the
last two decades. 7 This resulted from several scientific developments. First,
in the 1960s and 1970s atmospheric chemists conclusively established that
concentrations of carbon dioxide were in fact increasing. 8 Since 1958, when
33. William W. Kellogg, Mankind's Impact on Climate: The Evolution of an Awareness, 10
CLIMATIC CHANGE 113 (1987).
34. See generally Rafe Pomerance, The Dangers from Climate Warming: A Public Awakening, in
THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 17, at 259.
35. See generally Report of the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon
Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, Villach, Austria,
Oct. 9-15, 1985, World Climate Programme, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Doc. No.
661 (1986) [hereinafter Villach Report].
36. See Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of
the Ground, 41 LONDON, EDINBURGH & DUBLIN PHIL. MAG. & J. SC., 5TH SER. 237, 265-66 (1896)
(estimating that doubling of carbon dioxide would increase temperatures by 4 to 6* C).
37. See generally Jesse H. Ausubel, Historical Note, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CHANGING CLIMATE, Annex 2, at 488 (1983) [hereinafter CHANGING CLIMATE]; Melinda L. Cain,
Carbon Dioxide and the Climate: Monitoring and a Search for Understanding, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 75 (David Kay & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1983);
William W. Kellogg, supra note 33; Thomas F. Malone, The C0 2 Problem Revisited, in Villach Report,
supra note 35, at 30; Roger Revelle, Introduction: The Scientific History of Carbon Dioxide, in THE
CARBON CYCLE AND ATMOSPHERIC C0 2: NATURAL VARIATIONS ARCHEAN TO PRESENT 1 (E.T.
Sundquist & W.S. Broecker eds., 1985). In his lively history of global environmental science, Jonathan
Weiner describes the development of concern about global warming as "a slow Eureka." JONATHAN
WEINER, THE NEXr ONE HUNDRED YEARS: SHAPING THE FATE OF OUR LIVING EARTH 80-89 (1990).
38. In the early part of the century, it was widely believed that oceans absorbed the vast majority
of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide. WEINER, supra note 37, at 29-30. In 1957, Roger
Revelle and Hans Suess questioned this assumption in a landmark paper. Roger Revelle & Hans E.
Suess, Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of
Atmospheric C0 2 During the Past Decades, 9 TELLUS 18 (1957) (estimating that half of anthropogenic
emissions of carbon dioxide remain in atmosphere); see also LEIV LUNDE, SCIENCE OR POLITICS IN THE
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE? A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 62 (Fridtjof Nansen Inst. Rep. 8, 1991). For a fascinating account of the
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direct measurements first began, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations
have risen from 315 ppm to more than 350 ppm today. 9 Second, in the
1980s scientists began to focus on trace gases other than carbon dioxide that
trap heat and contribute to the greenhouse effect, chief among them methane,
nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).' In 1985, the global
warming effect of these gases was estimated to be roughly equal to the effect
of carbon dioxide,41 indicating that the problem was twice as serious as
previously believed.42
Third, as computing power grew, climatic models became much more
sophisticated and complex, increasing the credibility of global warming
predictions. Models of the atmosphere must take into account many factors,
including the heat-trapping characteristics of greenhouse gases, ocean and
wind currents, soil moisture, the reflectivity of the Earth's atmosphere and
surface to sunlight, and an array of feedback mechanisms. Early simulations
of the atmosphere were very crude, and did not come close to approximating
the complexity of atmospheric dynamics.43 The advent of supercomputers
permitted the development of more realistic general circulation models, which
represent the atmosphere in three dimensions' and in greater spatial detail,
and take better account of feedback mechanisms and ocean-atmosphere
interactions." Although a high degree of uncertainty still exists ,46 most
development of scientific knowledge about carbon dioxide, see WEINER, supra note 37, at 26-56.
39. Watson et al., supra note 19, at 6. Analyses of polar ice-cores indicate that concentrations of
carbon dioxide were only 280 ppm before the advent of the industrial revolution. Id. at 9; see also A.
Neftel et al., Evidence from Polar Ice Cores for the Increase in Atmospheric CO. in the Past 7wo
Centuries, 315 NATURE 45, 47 (1985).
40. Compare CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 37 (1983 National Academy of Science study
focusing exclusively on carbon dioxide) with IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3 (1990 report
discussing radiative effects of other trace gases). More recent evidence suggests that CFCs may not be
a net greenhouse gas. See supra note 19.
41. V. Ramanathan et al., Trace Gas Trends and Their Potential Role in Climate Change, 90 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES. 5547 (1985); see also James Gleick, Rare Gases May Speed the Warming of the
Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1985, at CI.
42. Pomerance, supra note 34, at 262.
43. S.H. Schneider, Climatic Limits to Growth: How Soon? How Serious?, in CARBON DIOXIDE,
CLIMATE AND SOCIETY 219 (Jill Williams ed., 1978). In 1978, most scientists were "generally
dissatisfied with the state of the art of climatic theory and modelling." Id.
44. See, e.g., Syukuro Manabe & Richard T. Wetherald, The Effects of Doubling the C02
Concentration on the Climate of a General Circulation Model, 32 J. ATMOSPHERIC ScI. 3 (1975)
(describing first attempt to calculate effects of carbon dioxide doubling using a three dimensional
model).
45. See Malone, supra note 37, at 31.
46. 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 30 (noting uncertainties due to limited spatial
resolution, as well as inadequate understanding of clouds (particularly their feedback effect), oceans
(includingpossible changes in circulation), polar ice sheets, and land surface processes and feedbacks);
see also PETER H. STONE & JAMES S. RISBEY, ON THE LIMITATIONS OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
CLIMATE MODELS (MIT Center for Global Change Sci. Rep. No. 2, 1990) (finding that results of
models are off actual observations by 200%); Peter H. Stone, Forecast Cloudy: The Limits of Global
Warming Models, TECH. REv., Feb.-Mar. 1992, at 32. A small but vocal minority still argue that the
uncertainties are too great to justify costly mitigation measures. See, e.g., S. Fred Singer et al., What
to Do About Greenhouse Warming: Look Before You Leap, I CosMos 28 (1991); Statement by
Atmospheric Scientists on Greenhouse Warming, Feb. 27, 1992 (press release, on file with author).
459
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climate scientists believe that general circulation models are now sufficiently
reliable to provide a basis for policy decisions.47
Finally, new studies in the 1980s indicated that the temperature record is
broadly consistent with global warming forecasts.4" In the mid-twentieth
century, such forecasts had had limited impact, given what appeared to be a
cooling trend.49 As recently as the mid-1970s, when a series of climatologi-
cal disasters drew attention to the climate change issue,50 scientists were still
split between "coolers" and "warmers," 5' and some feared the onset of
another ice age.52 Today, in contrast, a careful re-examination of the
historical data has produced a general consensus that the Earth is warming. 3
2. The Climate Issue Comes of Age
By 1985, these scientific developments had combined to make the theory
of greenhouse warming more convincing and urgent. In October of that year,
a scientific conference held in Villach, Austria concluded that "[a]lthough
quantitative uncertainty in model results persists, it is highly probable that
increasing concentration of the greenhouse gases will produce significant
climatic change. "' the conference statement recommended that since "the
understanding of the greenhouse question is sufficiently developed, scientists
and policy-makers should begin an active collaboration to explore the
effectiveness of alternative policies and adjustments."55
However, whether scientific evidence alone would have been sufficient to
spur the international community to action is questionable.56 Three additional
factors catalyzed governmental and public interest in global warming and
helped transform it from a scientific to a political issue. First, a number of
scientists acted as promoters, publicizing the threat of greenhouse warming
47. Thomas R. Stewart et al., Scientists' Agreement and Disagreement about Global Climate
Change: Evidence from Surveys 17 (April 1992) (research report by Center for Pol'y Res., State U.
of N.Y., Albany) (finding that most scientists do not believe that current uncertainties justify delay in
policy responses); GECR Climate Science Survey Shows Strong Agreement on Action, Less So on
Warming, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE REPORT (Cutter Info. Corp.), May 11, 1990, at 1
(reporting that 89% of scientists surveyed felt that, based on current knowledge, countries should take
steps to reduce carbon dioxide emissions).
48. Wigley & Barnett, supra note 26, at 254 (finding temperature record "consistent with the
results of simple model predictions of greenhouse-gas-induced climate change").
49. WEINER, supra note 37, at 73.
50. See Cain, supra note 37, at 82.
51. See NAT'L DEFENSE U., CLIMATE CHANGE TO THE YEAR 2000: A SURVEY OF EXPERT
OPINION (1978).
52. E.g., LOWELL PONTE, THE COOLING (1976); see Kellogg, supra note 33, at 121-23.
53. See JOHN GRIBBIN, HOTHOUSE EARTH: THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND GAIA 13-14 (1990);
WEINER, supra note 37, at 74; see also WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra note 25, at 205 (reporting that
1980's were warmest decade on record); Wigley & Barnett, supra note 26, at 245 (estimating global
average warming of 0.3 to 0.6* C (0.5 to 1.10 F) in last 80-100 years).
54. Villach Report, supra note 35, at 57 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 3.
56. See Klaus M. Meyer-Abich, Chalk on the White Wall?: On the Transformation of
Climatological Facts into Political Facts, in CLIMATIC CONSTRAINTS AND HUMAN AcTIvrrEs 61, 62
(Jesse Ausubel & Asit K. Biswas eds., 1980).
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through conferences, reports, and personal contacts.57 The 1985 and 1987
Villach Conferences and the 1987 Bellagio Conference helped to consolidate
the scientific consensus regarding global warming and to communicate that
consensus to policymakers.55 Second, the discovery of the ozone hole in
1987, which dramatically demonstrated that human activities can indeed affect
the global atmosphere, raised the prominence of atmospheric issues general-
ly. 9 Finally, the heat wave and drought of the summer of 1988 gave an
enormous popular boost to greenhouse warming proponents.60 In June, the
testimony of James Hansen, a NASA climate modeler, to the Senate Energy
Committee on the greenhouse effect made front-page news. 1 Although most
scientists believed it was unproven whether the hot weather was due more to
the greenhouse effect or to normal climate variability,62 the climate change
issue had emerged politically, even prompting President Bush to address it
during his election campaign. 3
3. Early International Responses
Just as concern about global warming was mounting, Canada sponsored
an international conference in Toronto 4.6  The Conference on the Changing
Atmosphere sought to bridge the gap between scientists and policymakers 5
57. See Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORG. 187 (1992).
58. Jill Jaeger, Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change 5, Villach, Austria, Sept.
28-Oct. 2, 1987 and Bellagio, Nov. 9-13, 1987, World Climate Programme, WMO Doc. WMOITD-
No. 225 (Apr. 1988) (summary of workshops).
59. Initially, public concern about global warming rode on the coattails of the ozone issue. See,
e.g., Robert E. Taylor, Policy Makers Spurred by Ozone Treaty, Considering Tackling 'Greenhouse'
Effect, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1987, at 26; see also Pomerance, supra note 34, at 263, 267. Concern
was also running high at the time about other international environmental issues, including acid rain,
deforestation, and loss of wildlife.
60. Pomerance, supra note 34, at 267-68. The heat wave was apparently worldwide, but was
particularly bad in North America. Cf. WEINER, supra note 37, at 88 (citing drought and heat waves
in Soviet Union and China). For a vivid description of the summer of 1988, see id. at 88-112.
61. Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988); Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has
Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TimEs, June 24, 1988, at Al, A14.
62. Richard A. Kerr, Hansen vs. the World on the Greenhouse Threat, 244 SCmNCE 1041 (1989);
John Maddox, Jumping the Greenhouse Gun, 334 NATURE 9 (1988).
63. See WEINER, supra note 37, at 94-95 (quoting Bush's statement that "Those who think we're
powerless to do anything about the 'greenhouse effect' are forgetting about the 'White House effect.'
As President I intend to do something about it."). At about the same time, England's Prime Minister,
Margaret Thatcher, gave a speech to the Royal Society in which she expressed concern about the
greenhouse effect, warning that we may have "unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system
of this planet itself." Nicholas Wood, Thatcher Gives Support to War on Pollution, THE TIMEs
(LONDON), Sept. 28, 1988, at 1.
64. See generally Proceedings of the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications
for Global Security, Toronto, June 27-30, 1988, WMO & U.N. Environment Program (UNEP),
WMO/OMM Doc. 710 (1989) [hereinafter Toronto Conference Proceedings]. The Conference Statement
appears in id. at 292, and is reprinted in 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 515 (1990) [hereinafter
Toronto Conference Statement]. The conference was a follow-up to the 1987 report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter BRUNTLAND REPORT].
65. Interview with Howard Ferguson, Toronto Conference Director, in Bolton, Ontario (Mar. 23,
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More than 340 individuals from forty-six countries, including two heads of
government, more than one hundred other government officials, and numerous
scientists, industry representatives, and environmentalists, attended the
conference.
Beginning with a dire warning that "[hiumanity is conducting an
unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate
consequence could be second only to a global nuclear war,"66 the Toronto
Conference Statement recommended as initial actions: (1) a twenty percent
reduction in global carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2005;67 (2)
development of a comprehensive global framework convention to protect the
atmosphere;6 and (3) establishment of a World Atmosphere Fund partly
financed by a tax on fossil fuel consumption in industrialized countries.69 In
addition, a number of other themes that later figured prominently in the INC
made early appearances in the Toronto Conference Statement, including the
"main responsibility" of industrialized countries to take measures to address
climate change, and its corollary, the need for transfers of financial resources
and technology from developed to developing countries.7 °
In many respects, the Toronto Conference Statement was the high water
mark of policy declarations on global warming. On the one hand, although the
conference was not officially governmental in nature (the government
participants attended in their personal capacities), it had far more status and
influence than other non-governmental meetings held before or since.? In
part, this was due to Canada's sponsorship and the substantial participation by
high government officials, including the Prime Ministers of Canada and
Norway. In part, the Toronto Conference came at the right time: it was an
"event waiting to happen."72 On the other hand, because of its non-govern-
mental character, the Toronto Conference Statement was not a negotiated
document. It was drafted by a committee composed mostly of environmental-
ists and discussed in less than a day. Flush with the success of the Montreal
Protocol,73 many participants did not fully appreciate the political difficulties
1992).
66. Toronto Conference Statement, supra note 64, at vii.
67. Id. at 296. It is often overlooked that the 20% reduction target is a global goal. If, as the
Toronto Conference Statement says, developing countries will need to increase their energy use
"significant[ly]," id. at 295, then industrialized states will need to reduce their emissions by more than
20% to offset these increased emissions.
68. Id. at 297.
69. Id. at 298.
70. Id. at 295; see also infra note 182 and accompanying text.
71. The conference's call for a 20% reduction in global carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2005
has been particularly influential. See, e.g., Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and
Climate Change, Nov. 7, 1989, para. 16, 12 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 624 (Dec. 13, 1989), reprinted
in 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 592 (1990) [hereinafter Noordwijk Declaration] (urging IPCC to
investigate feasibility of 20% carbon dioxide reduction target contained in Toronto Conference
Statement); Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, May 16, 1990,
para. 14(b), in Action for a Common Future: Report of the Economic Commission for Europe on the
Bergen Conference, U.N. GAOR, Prep. Comm. for UNCED, 1st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2(e),
at 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/I0 (1990) [hereinafter Bergen Declaration] (same).
72. Toronto Conference Proceedings, supra note 64, at vii.
73. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc.
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of addressing the climate change issue. Moreover, as with many new
environmental issues, environmental activists - who discovered and pushed
the issue - had a head start, while opponents in industry and government
took longer to mobilize.74 Following the Toronto Conference, the climate
change issue continued to attract substantial attention.75 Increasingly,
however, the discussions moved onto an inter-governmental track,76 where
agreement proved more difficult to reach and conference statements became
more carefully qualified. Indeed, as states became increasingly aware of the
stakes and uncertainties involved in the climate question, even states that had
initially supported a strong policy response became more cautious.
Not surprisingly, Western industrialized countries ("the North") became
actively engaged in the climate change issue first. With the most influential
environmentalist constituencies and the most climate research, they were
comparatively conscious of and informed about the issue. By contrast,
developing countries ("the South") had more immediate problems to worry
about, such as poverty, drought, famine, and war; to them, climate change
seemed very remote.' Although industrialized countries recognized from the
start the North-South dimension of the climate change issue and thus paid lip
service to the interests of developing countries, the South did not forcefully
express its own perspective until later in the process.
Within the West, most governments viewed climate change primarily in
scientific and environmental, rather than economic, terms. Western scientists
had long been active in climate issues, and-had collaborated internationally
through the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). As political interest
in climate change grew, they were joined first by environmental ministries,
who tended to take the lead, in developing and articulating positions at
international meetings.78 Other ministries, such as energy, transportation, and
No. 10, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
74. See James K. Sebenius, Designing Negotiations Towards a New Regime: The Case of Global
Warming, INT'L SECuarry, Spring 1991, at 110, 132 (noting that "the powerful coalitions that will arise
to resist major greenhouse action are now mostly asleep").
75. See Christine McGourty, Global Warming Becomes an International Political Issue, 336
NATURE 194, 194 (1988).
76. Once governments becameinvolved, non-governmental meetings became increasingly marginal.
Because this was not yet apparent in November 1988, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
failed to appreciate the significance of the first meeting of the newly-created IPCC and instead attended
an NGO conference held at the same time in Hamburg as a follow-up to the Toronto Conference. While
the IPCC continues to be the principal source of scientific information for government policymakers,
the Hamburg meeting has faded into obscurity. A similar process has characterized the work of the
Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG), which was established to carry forward the scientific
and policy assessments begun at the 1985 Villach meeting. By 1990, when the AGGG issued its report,
RESPONDING TO CLtMATE CHANGE: TooLs FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT (Jill Jdger ed., 1990), it was
largely overshadowed by the IPCC's report, WMO & UNEP, IPCC FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT (1990)
[hereinafter IPCC FIRsT AssESSMENT].
77. Confidential Interview with Latin American representative to the Second Committee of the
U.N. General Assembly, in New York (May 5, 1992) (remarking that in 1988 global warming still
seemed like science fiction to many people).
78. For example, the Noordwijk Ministerial was organized almost exclusively by the Dutch
Environment Ministry, with only minimal involvement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See infra
note 100. In some countries, such as Canada, the atmospheric service was part of the environmental
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finance, became involved only later. The United States may have been the
only Western country to view the climate change issue through a domestic
policy prism from the outset. After 1987, international environmental issues
were coordinated by a working group of the White House Domestic Policy
Council,79 in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
increasingly outmuscled by major domestic political players such as the
Departments of Energy, Interior, and Commerce, the Office of Management
and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers. This approach predictably
produced a policy position at odds with the positions of other Western
countries: the United States emphasized the potential economic costs of
response measures and argued for further research, while other Western states
tended to ignore the economic dimensions of the issue and supported
immediate action to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
In 1988, shortly before the Toronto Conference, governments took the
first step to address the climate change issue by requesting the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the U.N. Environment Programme
(UNEP) to establish the IPCC. ° The IPCC's mandate was to "provide
internationally coordinated assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential
environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change and realistic
response strategies. "' Earlier international assessments, which had been
organized by the scientific and environmental communities, were viewed with
suspicion in some governmental circles,8" where it was believed that they
reflected environmental activism rather than sound science. The IPCC, in
contrast, was a governmental (primarily United States) initiative, intended in
ministry and played a lead role even after climate change became a political issue. Thus the Toronto
Conference was organized the Atmospheric Services Division of Environment Canada.
79. See William Nitze, Improving U.S. Interagency Coordination of International Environmental
Policy Development, ENVIRONMENT, May 1991, at 10, 13. This approach was adopted after the
Montreal Protocol negotiations, where many White House officials felt that the State Department and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had moved too aggressively, without seeking adequate
involvement by other affected agencies. Early in the Bush Administration, the State Department briefly
regained responsibility for inter-agency coordination of the climate change issue, through its
chairmanship of a policy coordinating committee of the National Security Council. In late 1989, high-
level inter-agency coordination was transferred to the Working Group on Climate Change of the
Domestic Policy Council, chaired by the President's Science Adviser. Id. at 14. Working-level
coordination continued to be handled by the State Department.
80. Report of the Thirty-Ninth Session of the Executive Council 7, Geneva, June 1-5, 1987, WMO
Doc. 682 (1987); UNEP: Report of the Governing Council, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 25,
at 71-72, U.N. Doc. A/42/25 (1987); see also Report of the Fortieth Session of the Executive Council
74, Geneva, June 7-16, 1988, WMO Doc. 707 (1988). For general discussions of the IPCC, see Jack
Fitzgerald, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Taking the First Steps Towards a Global
Response, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 231 (1990); LUNDE, supra note 38.
81. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, G.A. Res. 53,
U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 133, 134, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988) [hereinafter G.A. Res,
43/53].
82. As Professor Bert Bolin, the Chairman of the IPCC, explained in justifying the establishment
of the IPCC: "Right now, many countries, especially developing countries, simply don't trust
assessments in which their scientists and policymakers have not participated." Quoted in Stephen H.
Schneider, Three Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ENVIRONMENT, Jan.-Feb,




part to reassert governmental control and supervision over what was becoming
an increasingly prominent political issue. 3
At its first meeting in November 1988,' 4 the IPCC elected Professor Bert
Bolin of Sweden, a highly respected climatologist, as chairman and established
working groups on science (chaired by the United Kingdom), impacts (chaired
by the Soviet Union), and response strategies (chaired by the United States).
The IPCC also adopted an expedited work schedule to allow preparation of
its First Assessment Report by October 1990, in time for the forty-fifth
session of the U.N. General Assembly and the eleventh World Meteorological
Congress.85
The climate change issue was raised in the U.N. General Assembly for the
first time in September 1988, when Malta requested the inclusion of an agenda
item entitled, "Declaration proclaiming climate as part of the common heritage
of mankind." 6 The Maltese initiative enjoyed widespread support, and in
December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the
establishment of the IPCC and urging governments, intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and scientific institutions to give
priority to the climate change issue.8 7 Most countries, however, felt that
Malta's invocation of the "common heritage of mankind" concept - which
had been applied previously to deep seabed mineral resources"8 and the
moon8 9 - was inappropriate in the context of climate. For this reason, the
final resolution instead refers to climate as the "common concern of
mankind. "90
83. Confidential Interview with U.S. Department of State official involved in the establishment of
the IPCC, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 1992). While some officials no doubt wished simply to slow
down the climate change issue, which they felt was hurtling out of control, others correctly felt that the
intergovernmental nature of the IPCC would ultimately increase the pressure for strong policy
responses, both by giving the IPCC's conclusions greater public prestige, and by giving governments
a greater sense of ownership and stake in the results. Ultimately this view was vindicated. Because even
skeptical countries such as the United States and Saudi Arabia participated fully in the IPCC (even
holding leadership positions), the IPCC's report was much harder for governments to ignore or question
than earlier scientific assessments.
84. See generally Report of the First Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Geneva, Nov. 9-11, 1988, World Climate Programme, IPCC Doc. 1 (1988)
[hereinafter Report of 1st IPCC Session].
85. Id. at 7.
86. Letter from Dr. Alexander Borg-Olivier, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Malta
to the United Nations, to Javier Perez de Cuellar, U.N. Secretary-General (Sept. 9, 1988) (on file with
author). The characterization of climate as "the common heritage of mankind" echoed Malta's 1967
introduction of the "heritage of mankind" concept to describe deep seabed mineral resources. See 1 D.P.
O'CoNNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 25 (I.A. Shearer ed., 1982).
87. G.A. Res. 43/53, supra note 81.
88. Declaration of the Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof,
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Dec. 17, 1970, G.A. Res. 2749, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 220.
89. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec.
5, 1979, art. 11(l), G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N. Doc.
A/34/664 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434, 1438.
90. G.A. Res. 43/53, supra note 81, para. 1 (emphasis added). Subsequently, the "common
concern of mankind" concept has gained increasing acceptance. See, e.g., Convention on Biological
Diversity, June 5, 1992, pmbl. para. 3, 31 I.L.M. 818, 822. See generally A.C. Trindade & David J.
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In 1989, discussions on the climate change issue continued to accelerate.
The IPCC working groups held frequent workshops and meetings. At the
inaugural meeting of the Response Strategies Working Group in February,
James Baker, in his first speech as Secretary of State, articulated the United
States' "no regrets" policy, calling for "prudent steps that are already justified
on grounds other than climate change."91 In March, the Netherlands, France,
and Norway jointly sponsored a summit in the Hague on global environmental
issues, attended by representatives of twenty-four countries, including
seventeen heads of state or government.9 2 The Hague Conference Declaration
made the radical suggestion that countries develop "new institutional
authority" to preserve the Earth's atmosphere and combat global warming.
The Declaration proposed that this new institutional authority involve non-
unanimous decisionmaking - in effect, a partial renunciation of sovereign-
ty.93 Although it was widely criticized and its radical proposal quickly
forgotten, the fact that heads of state were dealing with climate change
reflected the issue's coming of age. The Hague Conference was followed in
July by the Paris G-7 Economic Summit. There, the leaders of the seven
major industrialized countries "strongly advocate[d] common efforts to limit
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases" and endorsed the
concept of a "framework or umbrella convention on climate change. '194
Climate change was also discussed at the United States-Soviet summit in
Malta,9 by the Non-Aligned Movement at its September meeting in
Belgrade,96 and in the Langkawi Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads
of Government in October. 97
Attard, The Implication of the 'Common Concern of Mankind" Concept, in POLICIES AND LAWs ON
GLOBAL WARMING: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Torn Iwama ed., 1991); A.
Cangado Trinidade & D.J. Attard, Report on the Proceedings of the Meeting, in UNEP, THE MEETING
OF THE GROUP OF LEGAL EXPERTS TO EXAMINE THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CONCERN OF
MANKIND IN RELATION TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (David J. Attard ed., 1991).
91. James Baker III, Remarks before the Response Strategies Working Group, Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Jan. 30, 1989 (transcript on file with author). See infra note 294 and
accompanying text.
92. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were invited to the meeting initially, and neither
attended.
93. Declaration Adopted at the Hague, March 1989, reprinted in U.N. Doc. AI44l340-E11989/120,
Annex; 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 567 (1990) [hereinafter Hague Declaration]. See Edward Cody,
Global Environmental Power Sought, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1987, at A27 (quoting French President
Mitterand that Hague Declaration implies "the idea of renouncing a bit of national sovereignty," and
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Bruntland that "[t]he principles we have endorsed are in fact radical,
but anything less would not serve").
94. Economic Declaration from the Paris Economic Summit, Paris, July 16, 1989, paras. 40-41,
45, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1292, 1297-98.
95. David Lauter, In Policy Shift, U.S. Seeks Talks on Global Warming, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1989, at Al.
96. Final Documents of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Movement
ofNon-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, Sept. 4-7, 1989, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/44/551-S-20870, Annex
[hereinafter Ninth Conference of Heads of State].
97. Development and International Economic Cooperation: Environment, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.





Perhaps the most significant meeting in 1989, however, was the Noord-
wijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change in
November.9" Convened by the Netherlands. and attended by representatives
of sixty-six states, roughly divided among developed and developing countries,
the Noordwijk Conference was the first high-level political meeting focusing
specifically on the climate change issue.99 Although some governments were
beginning to become concerned about the economic implications of proposed
response measures, most still viewed the climate change issue primarily in
environmental terms." As a result, the Noordwijk Declaration was stronger
than succeeding statements, which have increasingly reflected the complex
international and domestic politics of the subject. It set forth a general aim of
limiting or reducing emissions and increasing sinks for greenhouse gases "to
a level consistent with the natural capacity of the planet," within a time frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 'to climate change. 1 It also
recommended that states initiate actions and develop and maintain effective
strategies to control, limit, or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 2
The Noordwijk Declaration recognized the North-South dimension of the
climate issue and included a number of provisions sought by developing
countries."3 Still, the deep reluctance of developing countries to take
measures to combat climate change was not yet fully apparent, perhaps
because developing countries tended to be represented by officials from their
ministries of environment rather than their ministries of development or
foreign affairs. Most participants at Noordwijk assumed that although
developing countries would need additional time and financial resources, they,
like developed countries, should be subject to requirements to reduce
98. See generally MINISTRY OF HOUSING, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND ENV'T OF THE NETHER-
LANDS, NOORDWIJK CONFERENCE REPORT (1989) [hereinafter NOORDWIK CONFERENCE REPORT].
99. The Hague summit had been more general in its orientation.
100. The Noordwijk Conference was organized by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Physical
Planning, and Environment, which issued invitations to other environment ministries. Interview with
Pier Vellinga, Dutch Ministry of Housing, Physical .Planning, and Environment, in Amsterdam (May
22, 1992). The statement by Saudi Arabia at the Noordwijk Conference is a revealing illustration of the
environmental orientation of many delegations. It characterized global warming as "a life or death issue
for considerable areas of the earth," acknowledged that there is "no argument" that the "main culprit"
for global warming is carbon dioxide, and recognized the need to move to non-greenhouse emission
energy production and consumption systems and to stabilize and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
Statement of Prince Fahad Bin Abdullah Al Saud, 2 NOORDWIJK CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 98,
at 35-37. By the end of 1990, in contrast, Saudi Arabia was stressing the uncertainty of climate change
and strongly opposed targets and timetables to limit carbon dioxide emissions.
101. This aim was eventually adopted as the long-range objective of the Convention. Compare
Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 71, para. 8 with Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.
102. The Convention would later convert this recommendation into what, together with reporting,
may be its central requirement: a legal obligation to formulate programs to limit emissions and enhance
sinks. Compare Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 71, para. 7 with Climate Change Convention, supra
note 6, art. 4(1)(b).
103. These included provisions on the principle of sovereignty, the need for international
cooperation and for resolution of the external debt problem, the responsibility of industrialized countries
to take the lead in initiating action to combat climate change, and the need for financial and technical
assistance, in part through the mobilization of additional resources. Noordwijk Declaration, supra note
71, paras. 6, 7, 11, 26.
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emissions and enhance sinks. The Noordwijk Declaration even set a forest
growth target,1" which, if implemented, would have had the greatest impact
on the South. It also recommended using existing financial institutions,
including multilateral development banks, to provide environmentally-oriented
assistance to developing countries '05 - a position very much at odds with
the South's later position in both the UNCED Preparatory Committee and the
INC.
While the differences between North and South still lurked in the
background at Noordwijk, the differences within the North were already in
full view. The disagreement was particularly acute on the question of whether
to set quantitative limits for greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, although the
Noordwijk Declaration recognized the need for industrialized countries to
stabilize their greenhouse gas emissions "as soon as possible, ""ee opposition
by the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union prevented conference
participants from agreeing on a specific date for stabilization (a "timetable")
or the level of emissions at which stabilization should occur (a "target"). 07
Instead, the Declaration merely noted the view of "many' 0° industrialized
countries that stabilization should be achieved "as a first step at the latest by
the year 2000," and encouraged the IPCC to analyze the options for limiting
or reducing carbon dioxide emissions."ee
The following year saw little progress on the issue of targets and
timetables; meanwhile, positions hardened. On the one side, the United States
adamantly opposed establishing quantitative limitations on its greenhouse gas
emissions, arguing that states should instead focus on developing national
programs and strategies consisting of concrete policy measures."0 In
contrast, many other industrialized countries adopted national targets and
timetables unilaterally."' In May 1990, the two sides locked horns at the
Bergen Ministerial Conference on Sustainable Development, with the same
general result as at Noordwijk."' The Bergen Declaration called for
stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, and "note[d]
with appreciation" the decision of some countries to stabilize carbon dioxide
emissions "at present levels" or to reduce them by the year 2000. However,
104. Id. para. 21 (12 million hectares per year by year 2000).
105. Id. para. 25; see also McKinsey & Co., Protecting the Global Environment: Funding
Mechanisms 24 (Nov. 1989) (report prepared for Noordwijk Conference, on file with author)
(envisioning central role for World Bank).
106. Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 71, para. 16.
107. Rudy Abramson, U.S. and Japan Block Firm Stand on Global Pollutants, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1989, at Al.
108. "Many" was a compromise between "most" (supported by the European Community) and
"some" (supported by the United States).
109. Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 71, paras. 15, 16.
110. See Steinar Andresen, US Greenhouse Policy: Reactionary or Realistic?, 11 INT'L
CHALLENGES 17, 18-19, 22 (1991); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GLOBAL WARMING:
ADMINISTRATION APPROACH CAUTIOUS PENDING VALIDATION OF THREAT 3-4 (1990).
111. See IEA, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY INITIATIVES: UPDATE at 5 (Nov. 20, 1991); IEA,
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY INITIATIVES: UPDATE at 2-3 (Mar. 9, 1992) [hereinafter lEA, MARCH
UPDATE] (describing climate change policies of OECD countries).
112. See Bergen: Weak Declaration Adopted, 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 84, 84 (1990).
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it did not require or even recommend that states establish targets and
timetables; it merely mentioned targets as one of two possibilities, along with
the U.S. approach of national strategies. 3
In May and June 1990, the IPCC working groups finalized their First
Assessment Reports, and, in August, the IPCC plenary met in Sundsvall,
Sweden to approve the reports and adopt an overview statement." 4 The
scientific report, the work of more than four hundred scientists," 5 quickly
gained acceptance as the authoritative scientific statement on the climate
change problem." 6 Written in clear, bold language intended for policy-
makers, the report predicted that if states continue "business as usual," the
global mean temperature will rise during the next century by an average of
0.30 C per decade - a rate of change unprecedented in human history." 7
Moreover, because of the complexity of the climate system, the report did not
rule out surprises, including the possibility of much more rapid warming."'
The IPCC meeting in Sundsvall was followed in November 1990 by the
Second World Climate Conference (SWCC) in Geneva," 9 perhaps the
biggest governmental meeting focusing on environmental issues prior to
UNCED. Unlike its 1979 forerunner, 20 the Second World Climate Confer-
ence included a ministerial as well as a scientific component, reflecting the
heightened political interest in climate issues.' By this time, momentum
was building towards the climate change negotiations, which were expected
to begin early the following year. As a result, the negotiations at the SWCC
became in essence a dress rehearsal for the INC, as countries jockeyed for
position.
Like the Noordwijk and Bergen Declarations, the SWCC Ministerial
Declaration stressed the need to stabilize emissions of greenhouse gases, but
failed to establish when or at what level stabilization should be achieved.
Shortly before the SWCC began, the European Community had agreed on an
EC-wide goal of stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels, in
general by. the year 2000. '1 The Ministerial Declaration welcomed this
113. See Bergen Declaration, supra note 71, para. 14(d).
114. IPCC First Assessment, supra note 76; see also 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1.
115. See John Houghton, World Climate Needs Concerted Action, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1990, at
5 (citing extensive participation by scientists in IPCC).
116. See SWCC Conference Statement, para. A(1) [hereinafter SWCC Conference Statement] in
CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENCE, IMPACTS AND POLICY - PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND WORLD CLIMATE
CONFERENCE 497 (Jill Jbger & Howard L. Ferguson eds. 1991) [hereinafter SWCC PROCEEDINGS]
(endorsing IPCC's conclusions as "reflect[ing] the international consensus of scientific understanding
of climate change").
117. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at xi. The estimate has an uncertainty range of
0.2 to 0.5* C per decade. Id.
118. Id. at xii (citing possibility of changes in ocean circulation patterns or stronger than expected
positive feedback effects).
119. See generally SWCC PROCEEDINGS, supra note 116.
120. See generally Proceedings of the World Climate Conference, Geneva, Feb. 12-23, 1979,
WMO Doc. No. 537 (1980).
121. The organizers of the First World Climate Conference had tried to attract participation by
policymakers, but had been unsuccessful in arousing their interest. See Kenneth Hare, The Global
Greenhouse Effect, in Toronto Conference Proceedings, supra note 64, at 59, 60.
122. EC Council Conclusions on Climate Change Policy, Council of the European Communities
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decision, as well as decisions and commitments by other states "to take
actions aimed at stabilizing their emissions of carbon dioxide, or carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,
by the year 2000 in general at 1990 levels."" However, the SWCC did not
recommend that states adopt this target. Instead, it merely urged developed
states "to establish targets and/or feasible national programmes or strate-
gies. "124
While the SWCC produced little movement on the targets and timetables
issue, it was marked by one important development: for the first time,
developing states participated as equal partners in the discussions and made
clear that North-South issues would play a prominent role in the Convention
negotiations." This development had two effects. First, it became obvious
Press Release 9482/90 (Oct. 29, 1990) [hereinafter EC Council Conclusions]. The phrase "in general",
was included for the benefit of the United Kingdom, whose stabilization timetable at the time was 2005.
THIS COMMON INHERITANCE: BRITAIN'S ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 19 (1990) (white paper on the
environment) [hereinafter THis COMMON INHERITANCE].
123. SWCC Ministerial Declaration, para. 12, in SWCC PROCEEDINGS, supra note 116, at 535
[hereinafter SWCC Ministerial Declaration]. The Declaration recognized "the differences in approach
and in starting point in the formulation of [these] targets." In addition, at the insistence of the United
States, a phrase was added "acknowledgiing] the initiatives of some other developed countries which
will have positive effects on limiting emissions of greenhouse gases." Id.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. This development was part of a larger transformation of international environmental politics
in the late 1980s, in which North-South issues began to move to center stage. In the ozone negotiations,
for example, developing countries began to assert themselves following the adoption of the Montreal
Protocol in 1987, demanding financial and technological resources as the price of obtaining their
participation. See RICHARD BENEDICK, OzONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET 148-62 (1991). At the London Conference in June 1990, they successfully pressed to establish
a special fund to provide assistance in implementing the Montreal Protocol. See id. at 183-88; Armin
Rosencranz & Antony Scott, Montreal Protocol: Bringing the Developing World on Board, 20 ENVTL.
POL'Y & L. 201, 201 (1990). Similarly, in the U.N. General Assembly debate in December 1989 over
the authorizing resolution for UNCED, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
G.A. Res. 44/228, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 151, U.N. Doc. A/44/49/Add.7 (1989),
developing countries insisted that the proposed conference give equal billing to environment and
development.
Developing countries took somewhat longer to become fully engaged on the climate change issue,
Thus, the IPCC was at first dominated by developed countries, which held most of the leadership
positions. However, the introduction of the climate change issue in the U.N. General Assembly in 1988,
and its'consideration again the following year, helped developing countries familiarize themselves with
the climate change issue. In 1989, some of the bigger developing countries, in particular Brazil and
Mexico, expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of developing country representation in the IPCC. Their
criticism led to the creation of the Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries,
chaired by Jean Ripert of France oater the INC Chair). At the August 1990 IPCC meeting in Sundsvall,
Sweden, in a preview of the later North-South debates in the SWCC and the INC, Brazil was very vocal
and almost prevented the adoption of the First Assessment Report. At its insistence, the preface to the
overview of the IPCC First Assessment Report contains the significant qualification: "It should be noted
that the Report reflects the technical assessment of experts rather than government positions, particularly
those governments that could not participate in all working Groups of IPCC." IPCC FIRST ASSESSMENT
REPORT, supra note 76, at iii.
By October 1990, when the SWCC convened, many developing countries had become fully aware
of the significance of the climate change issue. Preparations for the UNCED were by then in full swing,
and the UNCED Preparatory Committee had just held its first meeting in Nairobi. See generally Report
of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/46 (1991). The large developing
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that the climate change negotiation would not be simply about the environ-
ment, but about development as well. Second, the policy differences among
developing countries began to show. On the one hand, the oil-producing states
questioned the science of climate change and argued for a "go slow"
approach. On the other hand, small island and low-lying coastal states, fearing
the adverse effects of sea level rise, argued for strong response measures. At
the SWCC, they organized themselves into the Association of Small Island
States (AOSIS), Which eventually included thirty-seven countries from the
Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans and the Caribbean, Mediterranean, and
South China Seas. 26
C. Prologue to the Climate Convention
In the later half of the 1980's, as more and more scientists and policy-
makers began to see climate change as an imminent threat rather than a distant
possibility, a consensus gradually developed that states should negotiate a
legally-binding convention to address the problem.127 Initially, two legal
models were suggested. One approach, advocated by Canada, was to develop
a general framework agreement on the "law of the atmosphere,"' 28 and then
address specific atmospheric issues such as global warming, acid rain, and
ozone depletion in subsidiary protocols.' 29 The rationale for this approach
was that it recognized the interdependence of various global atmospheric
countries, in particular, knew that negotiations on a climate change convention were just around the
corner and were expected to feed into the UNCED process.
126. Sands, supra note 6, at 271; Earth Summit: Small Islands Say They Have Been Given Low
Priority, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRNT File.
127. See, e.g., Ninth Conference of Heads of State, supra note 96, at 108 (calling for "preparation
and adoption of an international convention on protection and conservation of the global climate on an
urgent basis"); Council Resolution of 21 July 1989 on the Greenhouse Effect and the Community, 1989
O.J. (C 183) 4 ("the conclusion of an international agreement on climate change is necessary"); G.A.
Res. 43/53, supra note 81, at 134 (directing IPCC "to initiate action leading, as soon as possible, to
a comprehensive review and recommendations with respect to ... [t]he identification and possible
strengthening of relevant existing international legal instruments having a bearing on climate; [and]
[ellements for inclusion in a possible future international convention on climate"); Villach Report, supra
note 35, para. 5(v). Global warming is the type of collective action problem that is often thought to
require an international agreement for a solution. Given the global nature of the problem, unilateral
action will not provide significant benefits if others continue to pollute. Thus, states are likely to take
potentially costly action to curb greenhouse gas emissions only if they have some assurance that other
states will take similar actions. An international agreement helps to provide that assurance, particularly
if it has strong mechanisms to encourage compliance. See WILLIAM A. NITZE, THE GREENHOUSE
EFFECT: FORMULATING A CONVENTION 9-10 (1990); Cf. Scott Barrett, Economic Analysis of
International Environmental Agreements: Lessonsfor a Global Warming Treaty, in OECD, RESPONDING
TO CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED ECONOMIC ISSUES 109, 113-16 (1991). But cf Peter Thatcher,
Alternative Legal and Institutional Approaches to Global Change, 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
101 (1990) (suggesting as a first step the development of climate action plan rather than legally binding
treaty).
128. Such an agreement was intended to parallel the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.
10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
129. For a discussion of the "law of the atmosphere" model, see Durwood Zaelke & James
Cameron, Global Warming and Climate Change: An Overview of the International Legal Process, 5
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249, 276-78 (1990).
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problems. The Toronto Conference Statement supported this approach, calling
for the development of "a comprehensive global convention as a framework
for protocols on the protection of the atmosphere."130 In February 1989,
Canada sponsored a meeting in Ottawa of legal and policy experts on the law
of the atmosphere, with the hope of beginning discussions on a framework
convention. 131
The second approach called for a convention specifically on climate
change. At the opening of the Ottawa meeting, Mostafa Tolba, the Executive
Director of UNEP, strongly criticized the "law of the atmosphere" model as
politically unrealistic, arguing instead for a more narrowly focused convention
on global warming.132 Although the elements of a framework convention on
the law of the atmosphere were discussed at the Ottawa meeting, 33 attention
turned to this alternative approach. The Ottawa meeting discussed the possible
elements of a climate change convention, recommended the use of the Vienna
Ozone Convention format for guidance, and suggested consideration of
protocols on the various greenhouse gases, deforestation/reforestation, and a
world climate trust fund.134
However, neither the Toronto nor Ottawa meetings were governmental in
nature, and as of early 1989, a governmental decision had not yet been made
to negotiate a climate change convention. The 1988 U.N. General Assembly
resolution on climate change had spoken merely of "a possible future
international convention on climate," but it had not actually authorized
negotiation of a convention. 35 In the IPCC, the United States forestalled the
creation of a separate legal group, questioning the need for negotiations and
arguing for more scientific study instead.'36
In the spring of 1989, pressure intensified on the United States to negotiate
a climate convention.' 37 After a White House attempt to dilute the Congressio-
nal testimony of a NASA scientist resulted in public embarrassment,138 the
130. Toronto Conference Statement, supra note 64, at 297 (emphasis omitted).
131. See generally Protection of the Atmosphere: Statement of the Meeting of Legal and Policy
Experts on the Protection ofthe Atmosphere, Ottawa, Feb. 20-22, 1989, reprinted in 5 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 529 (1990) [hereinafter Ottawa Statement].
132. See Mostafa Tolba, A Step-by-Step Approach to Protection of the Atmosphere, 1 INT'L ENvrL.
AFr. 304, 304 (1989). Tolba's stature was then at its height because of his recent success in the
Montreal Protocol negotiations, so his criticism had considerable influence. The law of the atmosphere
model was also questioned by Sir Crispin Tickell, the British Ambassador to the United Nations.
Ambassador Crispin Tickell, Address to the Second North American Conference on Preparing for
Climate Change: A Cooperative Approach (Dec. 6-8, 1988) (transcript on file with author).
133. Ottawa Statement, supra note 131, at 530.
134. Id. at 537-38.
135. G.A. Res. 43/53, supra note 81, at 134 (emphasis added).
136. Michael Weisskopf, Sununu Blocked Plan to Seek Convention on Global Warming, WASH.
POST, May 6, 1989, at A2.
137. In March, twenty-two countries called for negotiations, including five of the Group of Seven.
Cass Peterson, Experts, OMB Spar on Global Warming, WASH. POST, May 9, 1989, at Al.
138. See Climate Surprises: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 143-47 (1989) (discussing changes in testimony
of James Hansen of NASA made by the Office of Management and Budget); OMB vs. Science, L.A.
TIMas, May 9, 1989, at 6; Philip Shabecoff, Scientist Says Budget Office Altered His Testimony, N.Y.
TWO, May 8, 1989, at 1.
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United States finally reversed its position and announced on May 12 that it
would support negotiation of a framework convention on climate change.139
Several weeks later, the UNEP Governing Council adopted a resolution
requesting UNEP to begin preparations for the negotiations and recommending
that the negotiations begin as quickly as possible after the adoption of the
IPCC's First Assessment Report.140
In October 1989, the United States, in its capacity as chair of IPCC's
Response Strategies Working Group, organized a multi-disciplinary workshop
on implementation measures attended by representatives from forty-three
governments. 14 1 Participants recognized the inadequacy of existing legal
instruments and the need for a framework convention on climate change,
modelled on the Vienna Ozone Convention and framed so as to gain the
adherence of the largest number of states. They also agreed that the
convention should include, at a minimum, general principles of cooperation
and a legal and institutional framework for "monitoring and assessing climate
change and for developing and implementing responses.1 42 Some delega-
tions suggested that the convention should include binding commitments and
control measures, as well as a clear mechanism for providing financial
assistance, but they could not obtain a consensus on these points. Without
deciding which particular elements should be included in the convention, the
workshop elaborated a list of possible elements, which were refined and
ultimately included in the Response Strategies Working Group report the
following year. 43
In December 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution
supporting the UNEP decision to begin preparations for the negotiations."
The following September, UNEP and WMO convened an open-ended ad hoc
working group of government representatives to consider the ways, means,
and modalities for the negotiations. 45 The group recommended, inter alia,
139. U.S. Relents on "Greenhouse" Treaty, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., May 26, 1989,
at 376 D2. To begin work on the elements of a climate change convention, the IPCC Response
Strategies Working Group at its May 1989 meeting appointed the United Kingdom, Malta, and Canada
to coordinate work on legal measures and scheduled a workshop for October 1989. See WMO &
UNEP, Report of the Second Session of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
16, Nairobi, June 38-30, 1989, IPCC Doe. 3 (1989).
140. UNEP: Report of the Governing Council on the Work of Its 15th Session, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 25, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989).
141. See generally Report of the 2nd Session of 1PCC Working Group Ill/Response Strategies
Working Group, Geneva, Oct. 2-6, 1989, WMO & UNEP [hereinafter IPCC Legal Measures Report].
142. Id. at 1.
143. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES 263-68 (1990) [hereinafter IPCC
RESPONSE STRATEGIES].
144. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, G.A. Res.
44/207, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 262, U.N. Doc. A/44/862 (1989) [hereinafter G.A.
Res. 44/207] (calling on states "to prepare as a matter of urgency a framework convention on climate,
and associated protocols containing concrete commitments in the light of priorities that may be
authoritatively identified on the basis of sound scientific knowledge, and taking into account the specific
development needs of developing countries").
145. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Government Representatives to Prepare
for Negotiations on a Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva, Sept. 24-26, 1990,
UNEP/WMO Doc. Prep./FCCC/L. /REPORT [hereinafter INC Preparatory Meeting Report]. These
473
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that a single negotiating process be established to discuss both policy issues
and legal instruments. However, participants could not agree on whether
protocols should be negotiated simultaneously with the Convention,' 46 or on
who should organize and conduct the negotiations: a negotiating committee
under the auspices of WMO and UNEP, in essence carrying forward the
IPCC process, or a special conference under the authority of the U.N.
General Assembly. 47 Western countries tended to support the former
option, while many developing countries, who felt excluded from the IPCC,
preferred the second option. 4 ' Developing countries tended to see climate
change in developmental as well as environmental terms, given its implica-
tions for industry, transportation, and agriculture. Moreover, they argued that
climate change is a political and not merely a technical issue. For both
reasons, they felt that it should be addressed under the auspices of a political
body - namely the U.N. General Assembly - rather than by more technical
agencies like UNEP and WMO. At its forty-fourth session, the General
Assembly implicitly accepted this position by stating in a resolution that the
General Assembly was "the appropriate forum for concerted political action
on global environmental problems."'49 On December 21, 1990, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/212, establishing the INC as "a
single intergovernmental negotiating process under the auspices of the General
Assembly.""'5 While the General Assembly directed the INC to "take into
account" the work of the IPCC, and invited UNEP and WMO to make
"appropriate contributions" to the negotiation process, it nevertheless called
for the establishment of an ad hoc secretariat.'5 '
m. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATING
COMMITTEE FOR A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Between February 1991 and May 1992, the INC held five sessions. Under
the terms of the U.N. General Assembly resolution establishing the INC, each
negotiating session could last only two weeks,' 52 and the INC was to
complete its work in time for the Convention to be signed at UNCED.'51
included the structure of working groups, the venue for the negotiating sessions, the duration of the
sessions, rules of procedure, the structure of the bureau, the Secretariat, and whether protocols should
be negotiated simultaneously with the Convention. Id.
146. Id. at 6.
147. Id. at 13.
148. The question of who should conduct the negotiations had been looming in the background for
some time. In 1989 and early 1990, most observers assumed that the negotiations, like the IPCC, would
be conducted under the joint auspices of UNEP and WMO. Accordingly, these two organizations took
the lead in the initial preparations for the negotiations. As developing countries became more actively
involved in the climate change issue, however, the equation changed.
149. G.A. Res. 44/207, supra note 144, at 261.
150. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 5, at 148.
151. Id. at 148-49.
152. Id. at 148.




The discussions in the INC followed a pattern common to international
negotiations. At first, little progress was apparent. During most of 1991,
states debated procedural issues and enunciated and reiterated their positions
instead of bridging their differences by finding compromise formulations or
engaging in tradeoffs or deals. Where they disagreed about a provision,
participants simply bracketed the language in question (to indicate the
disagreement) or added alternative formulations. At the end of the year, much
if not most of the text remained bracketed - sometimes in brackets within
brackets within brackets. 154
This sparring process, although frustrating to those seeking rapid progress,
played a necessary role by giving states an opportunity to voice their views
and concerns. They learned about and gauged the strength of other states'
views. They sent up trial balloons and explored possible areas of compromise.
Indeed, without this mutual learning process, it is hard to imagine that
agreement would have been possible.
Real negotiations, however, began only in the final months before
UNCED. Given the public visibility of the UNCED process, most delegations
wished to have a convention to sign in Rio. 55 As one critic quipped, "The
INC was doomed to success." Thus, when it became clear in the spring of
1992 that the United States would not accept definitive targets and timetables,
that Western states would insist on some role for the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF), and that developing countries would not accept strong
commitments or implementation machinery, delegations finally got down to
the hard work of crafting compromise language and produced a text that the
INC adopted on the final night of the negotiations.
A. Obstacles to Agreement
Several factors complicated the INC's task.156 First, the stakes in the
negotiations were very high, since the world economy depends heavily on
fossil fuels. As one observer notes, "[t]he causes of the greenhouse problem
are deeply embedded in the central aspects of the world's economic and social
activity: across transportation, industrial, agricultural, and forestry practices;
from the developed to the developing world; and in the very growth of
154. See Delegates! Shake Off Your Brackets, Eco, Dec. 18, 1991, at 2; Death by 1,000 Brackets,
Eco, Dec. 10, 1991, at 2.
155. Even those states that might have preferred total failure were unwilling to accept responsibility
for that failure by blocking consensus.
156. See Michael Grubb, The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, 66 INT'L AFF. 67, 71-72
1990) [hereinafter Grubb, Targets] (predicting climate negotiations would be more difficult than ozone
or acid rain negotiations); Sebenius, supra note 74, at 118-22 (comparing difficulties of negotiating
climate treaty with ozone and law of sea negotiations). But cf. Jessica T. Mathews, Introduction and
Overview, in GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME 3-5 (Jessica T. Mathews ed.,
1990) (arguing that climate change issue would be easier to address than CFC control). The
controversies in the INC regarding such preliminary matters as establishing working groups and
compiling proposed elements for the Convention illustrated the extraordinary sensitivity of the
negotiations. See infra notes 191-201, 210 and accompanying text.
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populations and economies."' 57 A convention on climate change has the
potential to affect economic and social activities profoundly,' much more
so than other international environmental agreements dealing with problems
such as depletion of the ozone layer or acid rain, which have more limited and
easily addressed causes.
Second, the greenhouse problem still has a distant and somewhat
speculative quality. Major uncertainties exist about virtually every aspect of
the problem.'59 Little is known about many of the sources and sinks of
greenhouse gases 6' or the timing, magnitude, and regional distribution of
climate change resulting from increased greenhouse gas concentrations. 6
Moreover, the impacts of climate change on forests and other natural
ecosystems, agriculture, coastal areas, and human health are difficult to
predict, 62 as are the relative costs and benefits of adaptation and abatement
measures.163 Although the resulting "veil of ignorance"' could potentially
facilitate agreement, 6 5 in practice it has tended to make governments more
reluctant to act. 66
157. Sebenius, supra note 74, at 121.
158. See Sands, supra note 6, at 271 (finding it "difficult to identify any type of human activity
which falls beyond [the Convention's] scope").
159. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at xxvii, xxxi-xxxii.
160. Very little is known about either the sources or sinks of methane and nitrous oxide. Even with
respect to carbon dioxide, about which more is known, carbon emissions from land-use changes are
uncertain by a factor of more than two, and the calculated removal of carbon from the atmosphere
cannot be accounted for by known sinks. Watson et al., supra note 19, at 17. These gaps in scientific
knowledge make estimates of future atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases uncertain. See
generally 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 7, 19-30 (recognizing increased uncertainty in
calculation of global warming potentials); see also STONE & RISBEY, supra note 46, at 5; M.J. Grubb
et al., Pragmatics in the Greenhouse, 354 NATURE 348, 348 (1991) [hereinafter Grubb, Pragmatics].
161. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
162. Irving M. Mintzer, Living in a Warming World, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS,
IMPLICATIONS AND RESPONSES 1, 3 (Irving M. Mintzer ed., 1992) [hereinafter CONFRONTING CLIMATE
CHANGE] (arguing severity of regional impacts cannot be predicted with confidence).
163. See POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 17, at 29-35; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE
ECONOMICS OF LONG-TERM GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT at x (DOE/PE-
0096P) (1990) ("[E]conomic analysis of global change is in its infancy; few assertions about costs or
benefits can be made with confidence."); Joel Darmstadter, Estimating the Cost of Carbon Dioxide
Abatement, RESOURCES, Spring 1991, at 6-7. For differing assessments of the costs and benefits of
response measures, compare WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992)
(estimating substantial benefits from emissions abatement) and William K. Stevens, New Studies Predict
Profits in Heading OffWarming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at Cl with ALAN S. MANNE & RICHARD
G. RicHELS, BUYING GREENHOUSE INSURANCE: THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION
LIMITS 45-66 (1992) (estimating high costs of emissions abatement) and Sebenius, supra note 74, at 132
(citing report that 20% carbon dioxide cut would cost $800 billion to $3.6 trillion) and Peter Passell,
Economic Watch: Curing the Greenhouse Effect Could Run Into the Trillions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1989, at 1.
164. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (discussing term and its significance).
165. Cf. ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 225, 232-33 (1989) (contrasting Rawlsian veil of ignorance with
real world negotiations).
166. See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Policy Gridlock on Global Warming, 79 FOR. POL'Y 77, 78
(1990) ("[N]o major action is likely to be taken until [the] uncertainties are substantially reduced."); see
also E. William Colglazier, Scientific Uncertainties, Public Policy, and Global Warming: How Sure Is
Sure Enough?, 19 POL'Y STUD. J. 61 (1991).
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Third, states have widely divergent interests that must be reconciled. They
contribute to the climate change problem to varying degrees, have unequal
costs of abating greenhouse gas emissions, and face different risks from global
warming. 67 Consider, for example, the differences between major fossil-
fuel producers, who fear that limitations on carbon dioxide emissions will
depress oil prices, and small island states in the Pacific and Caribbean, who
fear being inundated by rising sea levels. Although it is often stated that there
would be no winners from global warming,' 68 some states in fact fear that
the cure for climate change will be worse than the disease and are skeptical
or even opposed to strong response measures.
Fourth, the climate change negotiations involved virtually every nation in
the world. 69 This was generally regarded as desirable, given the global
nature of the problem. Indeed, developing country participation was actively
promoted through the establishment of a trust fund to subsidize atten-
dance. 170 However, this inclusiveness had its drawbacks, because, as a
general rule, the more countries involved in a negotiation, the more difficult
agreement becomes. 171
Fifth, the climate change negotiators had less than eighteen months to
conclude an agreement. 72 Given the time needed for participants to formu-
late national positions and consult with other governments and for the INC
Secretariat to translate documents into the six official U.N. languages, little
time was left for the negotiations themselves. Most international environmen-
tal agreements have taken much longer to negotiate, even though they address
less sensitive issues. 73
Finally, the factor that may have introduced the most complications was
that the INC involved not merely a negotiation within the North, between the
167. Matthew Patterson & Michael Grubb, The International Politics of Climate Change, 68 INT'L
AFF. 293, 295-96 (1992).
168. See, e.g., Jesse H. Ausubel, A Second Look at the Impacts of Climate Change, 79 AM.
SciENTIST 210, 213-215 (1991). See generally Environmental and Societal Impacts Group of the
National Center for Atmospheric Research, On Assessing Winners and Losers in the Context of Global
Warming (June 18-21, 1990) (report of workshop, on file with author) (stressing uncertainties and need
for more research on winners and losers).
169. Between 102 and 151 states participated in the various sessions of the INC. In contrast, 43
states participated in the negotiations for the Vienna Ozone Convention, and about 60 in the negotiations
for the Montreal Protocol. BENEDICK, supra note 125, at 44, 74. Dozens of NGOs also participated in
the INC.
170. When the General Assembly established the INC it also established a special voluntary fund
to ensure that developing countries are able "to participate fully and effectively in the negotiating
process." G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 5, at 148.
171. See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental
Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421, 437 (1989).
172. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 5, at 148.
173. For example, the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention took more than two
years to negotiate, Gregory Wetstone & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search
for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 101-03 (1984), and the Vienna Ozone
Convention took almost four years, BENEDICK, supra note 125, at 41-44. Similarly, the European
Community's large-combustion plant directive took five years of intensive negotiations, even though it
involved only 12 relatively homogenous countries and had considerably smaller economic implications
than the climate change issue. Grubb, Targets, supra note 156, at 72.
Bodansky
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
North and the South, or within the South, but all three simultaneously.1 74 In
effect, the INC compressed into a single negotiation what had been a two-step
process in the ozone negotiations. The Vienna Ozone Convention and
Montreal Protocol had essentially been negotiations among developed
countries; developing countries did not become heavily involved until the
London Amendments were under consideration, after the initial agreements
had already been adopted. 75 In contrast, developing countries such as India,
China, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the small island states participated actively
in the INC from the start, 76 disagreeing both with countries in the North
and among themselves.
B. State Interests and General Positions
1. OECD Countries
Because Western developed countries - which make up the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) - account for a
disproportionate share of greenhouse gas emissions, both the North and South
assumed that developed countries would take the lead in addressing the
climate change problem. OECD countries generally agreed that the Conven-
tion -should institutionalize a strong .process to address climate change,
including regular meetings of the parties, scientific and implementation
committees, detailed reporting requirements, and procedures to resolve
questions about a country's compliance with the Convention. The most
pronounced split within the OECD concerned targets and timetables to limit
greenhouse gas emissions, which were favored by the European Community
and vigorously opposed by the United States."
To some degree, disagreements within the OECD resulted from perceived
disparities in the cost of abatement measures. For example, the United States
and Australia have large reserves of cheap coal (a relatively high source of
carbon dioxide per unit energy), while Germany currently subsidizes coal
production and could save money by switching to natural gas (a relatively low
emitter of carbon dioxide per unit energy). Thus, it would be more costly for
the United States and Australia to forgo the use of coal than it would be for
Germany to do so. On a broader level, discord within the OECD can be
174. See Sands, supra note 6, at 271. In this respect, the climate negotiations resembled the Third
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, where numerous issues cut across traditional North-South lines
and a wide variety of coalitions formed. The only major axis not involved in the climate change
negotiations was East-West. The former Eastern Bloc countries were preoccupied by other concerns and
stayed in the background of the INC. Their main objective was to obtain flexibility in implementing the
Convention's obligations to limit greenhouse gas emissions. See infra note 395 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 125.
176. See, e.g., Christopher Anderson & Peter Aldhous, Third World Muscles in on Climate Treaty,
349 NATURE 727 (1991); Marlise Simons, North-South Divide Is Marring Environmental Talks, N.Y.
TImEs, Mar. 17, 1992, at A8.




attributed, in part, to the differing public perceptions of the climate change
problem and differing attitudes towards regulation and taxation of the energy
and transport sectors. Differences in OECD positions narrowed over time as
economics and energy ministries in countries other than the United States
began to recognize the potential implications of the climate change issue, and
as industry began to mobilize against strong response measures.
2. Developing Countries
Although neither the North nor the South were monolithic, developed and
developing countries tended to maintain quite different perspectives during the
negotiations. Paralleling the split within the UNCED Preparatory Committee,
the North tended to see climate change as an environmental issue, whereas the
South saw it as a developmental issue.178 Despite widely divergent interests,
the South, speaking through its political grouping - the so-called Group of
77 (G-77) 17 9 - was united in arguing that the Convention must not hinder
its ability to develop.' Since increased greenhouse gas emissions, particu-
larly of carbon dioxide, have traditionally been a by-product of industrializa-
tion and improved living standards, developing countries insisted that their
emissions of greenhouse gases must be allowed to grow, eventually reaching
the same per capita level as the emissions of developed countries.' Instead,
industrialized countries should bear the main responsibility for addressing the
climate change problem, since their excess emissions caused the problem in
the first place. 1
2
The differences between the North and South were manifested most
consistently in the discussions of financial resources. In the South's view, if
178. See Marguerite Holloway, Still Negotiating, ScI. AM., June 1992, at 17, 18 ("We from the
South do not view this as an environment conference; we view this as an economic conference."
(quoting developing country representative)). For general discussions of the South's position, see
International Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change: Perspectives from Developing
Countries, New Delhi, Feb. 21-23, 1989 (conference statement, on file with author); Tariq Osman
Herder, Climate Negotiations: The North-South Perspective, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 162, at 323; Kilaparti Ramakrishna, Interest Articulation and Lawmaking in Global Warming
Negotiations: Perspectives from Developing Countries, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153
(1992); Sebenius, supra note 74, at 140-44; Anne Kristin Sydnes, Global Climate Negotiations: Another
Twenty Years of Fruitless North-South Bargaining?, 11 INT'L CHALLENGES 58 (1991); Peter Usher,
Climate Change and the Developing World, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 257 (1990); Cheng Zheng-Kang, Equity,
Special Considerations and the Third World, 1 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 57 (1990).
179. The G-77 is a U.N. intergovernmental caucus that was formed in the early 1960s in
preparation for the 1964 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. See BuRNs H. WESTON ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 264 n.26 (1990). It derives its name from an original
membership of 77 states, but the group now includes 138 states. China is not officially a member, but
G-77 texts are typically introduced jointly on behalf of the G-77 and China.
180. See Kuala LumpurDeclaration on Environment and Development, INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., 2d
Part, at 10, U.N. Doc. INC/FCCC/None No. 40 (1992).
181. Sylvia Nasar, Cooling the Globe Would Be Nice, But Saving Lives Now May Cost Less, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 31, 1992, § 4, at 6.
182. This has come to be known as the "main responsibility principle." See Government of the
People's Republic of China, Beijing Symposium on Developing Countries and International
Environmental Law 4, Aug. 12-14, 1991 (symposium report, on file with author).
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the North wanted developing countries to take abatement measures, the North
should pay for the costs, since it was responsible for causing the climate
change problem. OECD countries, while conceding that they should provide
financial resources to the developing countries, preferred to characterize these
transfers in forward- rather than backward-looking terms. Developed countries
would undertake commitments to provide financial resources because of their
greater capacity to pay, not because of their historical responsibility.
Moreover, they insisted that their obligation to provide financial resources
must be matched by corresponding undertakings by the South to develop and
report on national policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions and
enhance sinks. Finally, the North believed that the GEF should serve as the
financial mechanism for the Convention, while the South argued that a new
institution should be established to administer the funds, under the collective
authority of the parties to the Convention.
In essence, this North-South debate echoed the controversy in the 1970s
over the New International Economic Order (NIEO), in which the South
demanded a more equitable distribution of wealth and a greater say in global
economic institutions."8 3 Despite the South's lack of success then, many in
the South felt that they now had some leverage because of the North's concern
about global environmental issues."84 This feeling of comparative strength
led the South to maintain tough bargaining positions in both the INC and the
UNCED Preparatory Committee."8 5
Apart from the financial issues, however, developing countries had
difficulty acting as a bloc. Three groups emerged as particularly important:
semi-industrialized developing countries, oil-producing states, and AOSIS.
The big semi-industrialized developing countries - India, China, and
Brazil - emphasized the development and equity issues. In their view, if
anyone should limit greenhouse gas emissions, it should be the North, creating
the "environmental space" necessary for the South to grow.'86 These
countries also tended to prefer a minimal institutional structure consisting of
a conference of parties and secretariat, because they feared that developing
countries as a group lacked the resources and personnel necessary for
183. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI),
U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Program of Action on
the Establishment of a New Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 5, U.N. Doec. A/9559 (1974). See generally THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1977); JYoTI SHANKAR SINGH, A NEw
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: TOWARD A FAIR REDISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S RESOURCES (1977).
Although the Ghanaian delegate to INC 3, who at the time was serving as the G-77 coordinator, stated
that the INC was not the correct forum for addressing the NIEO agenda, G-77 Rejects 'Pledge and
Review' in Present Form, Eco, Sept. 17, 1991, at 2, many of the G-77 proposals in the INC and the
UNCED Preparatory Committee were reminiscent of the NIEO, prompting one Western delegate to
remark ironically that UNCED was the "last great U.N. conference of the 1970s."
184. SOUTH CENTRE, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A COMMON STRATEGY FOR
THE SOUTH IN THE UNCED NEGOTIATIONS AND BEYOND 1-2 (1991).
185. See Patterson & Grubb, supra note 167, at 299 (equating tactics of some developing countries
with "blackmail").
186. SOUTH CENTRE, supra note 184, at 3.
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adequate representation in other institutions. Finally, they regarded with
suspicion proposals to establish strong monitoring, review, and enforcement
mechanisms, since these would, in their view, be controlled by the North,
which could use the mechanisms to criticize developing countries and interfere
with their sovereign right to develop.
To one extreme of this widely shared "Southern" position stood the oil-
producing states, who questioned the need for strong commitments by either
developing or developed countries. They challenged, in particular, proposals
for a stabilization or reduction target for carbon dioxide emissions. On the
other extreme stood the small island states, who were more closely aligned
with the North." 7 Most immediately at risk from climate change, AOSIS
supported the EC stabilization target as a first step towards eventual
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and pressed for the creation of strong
institutional and implementation mechanisms. Although the island states
ultimately had less influence on the negotiations than their numbers might
have suggested they would, they nevertheless emerged as a potent political
force and achieved many of their original goals.
In addition to these main groups, a number of developing country groups
actively pursued particular issues. For example, African states sought to
include references to the risks of desertification and drought, while large
forest countries such as Malaysia and Brazil argued against singling out
forests from among other greenhouse gas sinks. Finally, for many of the least
developed countries, climate change remained a distant, hypothetical threat.
Although most attended the negotiations, their actual participation in the
discussions was nominal.
C. The INC Sessions
1. INC 1: Chantilly, Virginia, February 4-14, 1991
At the invitation of the United States, the INC held its first meeting in
February 1991 at the Westfields Conference Center in Chantilly, Virginia."'8
The INC elected Jean Ripert of France as Chair and representatives from
Algeria, Romania, Argentina, and India as Vice-Chairs; established two
working groups; adopted rules of procedure; and heard general statements by
delegations. Because only a short time had elapsed between the adoption of
the U.N. resolution establishing the INC and the Chantilly session, a
secretariat still had not been formed when the session began. During the
session, the Secretary-General of the U.N. appointed Michael Zammit
Cutajar, a U.N. staff member previously with the U.N. Conference on Trade
187. AOSIS countries generally caucused together and often made joint statements in the INC.
188. See generally Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of Its First Session, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 1st Sess.,
U.N. Doc. AIAC.237/6 (1991) [hereinafter Report of 1st Session]; Anderson & Aldhous, supra note
176; Dan Charles, 'Petty' Politics Mars Global Warming Conference, NEW SCIENTIsT, Feb. 23, 1991,
at 16; Richard A. Kerr, U.S. Bites Greenhouse Bullet and Gags, 251 SCIENCE 868 (1991).
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and Development (UNCTAD), to serve as Executive Secretary of the
Committee; additional staff were assigned to the INC Secretariat by
UNCTAD, WMO, and UNEP. Insufficient time also made it difficult to
provide financial assistance for attendance by developing countries; as a result
fewer developing countries participated at Chantilly than at later sessions,
despite the close proximity of Chantilly to New York and Washington, where
most developing countries have -missions.
Initially, many observers expected the INC to develop a negotiating text
at the Chantilly session, since government- and NGO-prepared draft texts for
a climate change convention had been in circulation for more than a year.1 89
Because of the extreme sensitivity of many delegations on such basic issues
as the INC's organization, however, these expectations proved overly-
optimistic and the INC was not able to produce a negotiating text until
December 1991 - ten months and three sessions later. 19
The question of working groups occupied most of the Chantilly session.
Ultimately, the INC decided to create two groups, one on commitments and
another on mechanisms. As set forth in Decision 1/1, the mandate of Working
Group I extended to all types of commitments, including appropriate
commitments to limit and reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases; to protect, enhance, and increase sinks and reservoirs; to
provide "adequate and additional" financial resources to enable developing
countries to meet incremental costs required to fulfil their commitments under
the Convention; to facilitate the transfer of technology on a "fair and most
favorable" basis; and to address the special situation of developing countries,
in particular, those specially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change.191 Working Group H had the mandate to develop legal and
institutional mechanisms to implement the Convention, including mechanisms
related to scientific cooperation, monitoring, and information; compliance;
assessment and review; transfer of financial resources and technology; and
entry into force of, accession to, and withdrawal from the Convention. t92
The division of issues into commitments and mechanisms was not a clean
one. Many implementation mechanisms are not purely procedural: they
involve commitments by states. For example, scientific cooperation and
189. See, e.g., Climate Inst., Report of the International Workshop on a Framework Convention
and Associated Protocols: A Non-Governmental Perspective, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2-4, 1990 (on
file with author) (containing NGO draft convention). Both the United Kingdom and the United States
had prepared drafts of a climate convention in 1989, based on the Vienna Ozone Convention. See World
"Greenhouse Effect" Treaty Already Drafted, THE TIMES (LONDON), May 12, 1989, at 2. At the
beginning of the Chantilly session, the United Kingdom, as co-coordinator of the IPCC legal measures
group, circulated a draft based on the consensus elements of the group's report. Set of Informal Papers
Provided by Delegations, INC/FCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 53, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.237/Misc.l/Add.1 (1991) [hereinafter Informal Papers 1]. Ordinarily a secretariat would have
prepared an initial discussion text. However, because Resolution 45/212, supra note 5, mandated the
creation of an ad hoc secretariat, which had not yet been created as of February 1992, the United
Kingdom stepped into the void by circulating its draft.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 229-235.




promotion of education and training are mechanisms to facilitate the
development and implementation of the Convention, but they also embody
substantive elements. Moreover, commitments and mechanisms may be linked
politically, even when they are conceptually distinct. For example, many
delegations viewed the commitment to transfer financial resources and the
mechanism for these transfers as one package. Accordingly, Decision 1/1
emphasized that the INC should deal with all items in an integrated manner
despite the formation of two working groups. Nevertheless, until the INC
discarded the working group structure at the very end of the negotiations, the
groups did not coordinate their efforts on any of the areas of substantive
overlap.
Many delegations and non-governmental observers expressed frustration
with what seemed to be the purely procedural nature of the Chantilly
session. 93 However, the discussions on the working groups' structure and
mandates represented the initial skirmishes on the main substantive issues
before the INC and served as a proxy for negotiations on a convention
text.'94 For example, differences between the European Community, and the
United States regarding targets and timetables were reflected in the dispute
over whether to establish different working groups to address the sources and
the sinks of greenhouse gases. The European Community wanted to establish
different working groups, because it favored concrete commitments on carbon
dioxide emissions and forests.' 9s In contrast, the United States pressed for
a single working group, because it favored more generic commitments that
addressed sources and sinks comprehensively.' 96 Ultimately, they reached
a compromise: one working group would address both sources and sinks but
its mandate would include commitments aimed at "limiting and reducing
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases," a formulation
reportedly resisted by the United States.197
The question of which working group should address financial and
technology transfer issues spurred a similarly complex debate relating to the
nature of the quid pro quo between developing and developed country
commitments. Developing countries generally wanted financial and technology
193. See, e.g., INC Climate Change Convention: First Discussions, 21 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 50,
52 (1991) (describing "feeling of frustration among many delegates that the Conference had made no
progress in its task of drawing up a draft text"); Charles, supra note 188, at 23 (quoting Dan Becker
of Sierra Club, "We've just wasted two weeks arguing over the shape of the table."); Global Warming
'Overtakes Talks,' Eco, Feb. 14, 1991, at I [hereinafter Overtakes Talks] (quoting David Doniger of
NRDC, "Global warming is now moving faster than these negotiations.").
194. Cf. William A. Nitze, International Negotiations Towards a Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Status Report, 9 OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N REv. 66, 66 (1991) (noting that decisions
of Working Group I at INC represented "hard-fought compromises").
195. At first, the European Community proposed establishing two groups, one on greenhouse gas
emissions, focusing initially on the energy, industrial, and transportation sectors, and another on sinks
and reservoirs, focusing initially on forests. The EC proposal paralleled the sectoral divisions in the
IPCC's Response Strategies Working Group. See IPCC RESPONSE STRATEmES, supra note 143, at 7-8.
196. The United States also proposed establishing working groups on scientific and economic
research and monitoring, implementation, and legal issues. Forest countries like Malaysia joined the
United States in opposing the establishment of a separate working group on greenhouse gas sinks.
197. See Overtakes Talks, supra note 193, at 16.
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issues assigned to the same working group as sources and sinks, in order to
keep all of these issues tightly linked.198 In contrast, the United States
proposed dealing with financial issues in the other working group, possibly to
allow financial commitments and mechanisms to be addressed as a package.
Here, the developing country position ultimately prevailed.
More obviously substantive in nature was India's proposal that Decision
1/1 refer to the need for "new and additional funding" to help developing
countries implement measures against global warming.199 In effect, the
Indian proposal sought to secure a pre-negotiation commitment from
developed nations to provide financial resources to developing nations. 200
Following intense negotiations with the United States, India ultimately
dropped its proposal. Instead, Decision 1/1 directed Working Group I to
prepare a text "related to ... [a]ppropriate commitments on adequate and
additional financial resources. '201 This language fell short of India's
proposal but, significantly, indicated that the Framework Convention, in
contrast to its predecessors on acid rain and ozone, 202 would probably
contain substantive financial commitments.
Finally, the INC adopted two procedural rules that greatly affected the
negotiations: a prohibition on holding more than two meetings at any one time
during a session, and a prohibition on meetings between official sessions.2°3
These rules were intended to promote transparency and full participation by
developing countries, particularly those with small delegations. However, by
restricting the opportunities to negotiate, these rules made reaching an
agreement more difficult; thus, toward the end of the negotiations, the INC
informally abandoned both rules.
2. INC 2: Geneva, June 19-28, 19912"4
Both during and after the Chantilly meeting, many states submitted papers
presenting their views on the Convention. These papers included general
198. For the same reason, developing countries wanted commitments on sources and sinks and
commitments on financial resources and technology transfer in a single article on commitments, rather
than in separate articles as is typical in other conventions. Thus, when the Secretariat introduced a paper
at INC 2 containing a possible structure for the Convention which separated commitments into several
articles, Compilation of Possible Elements for a Framework Convention on Climate Change,
INC/FCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/Misc.2 (1991) [hereinafter
First Compilation of Possible Elements], some developing country delegations raised objections. See
infra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
199. Overtakes Talks, supra note 193, at 16.
200. See Delegates Adopt Negotiating Guidelines in First Effort Toward Climate Convention, 4 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 97, 98 (Feb. 27, 1991).
201. Report of1st Session, supra note 188, at 24.
202. LRTAP, supra note 12; Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 13.
203. Report of1st Session, supra note 188, at 24.
204. See generally Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of Its Second Session, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 2d Sess.,
U.N. Doec. AIAC.23719 (1991) [hereinafter Report of 2d Session]; see also Peter Aldhous, Slow
Progress in Geneva on Warming Treaty, 352 NATURE 3 (1991); Debora Mackenzie, America Creates
Cold Climate for Greenhouse Talks, NEw SCtENTiST, June 22, 1991, at 16.
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position statements, 25 specific elements for inclusion in the Convention,2 6
and, in some cases, entire draft texts. 27 The Secretariat compiled these
papers into an ongoing documents series, which became known as the
"Misc. 1" papers. 2 8 These documents helped to clarify national positions and
identify options.
Despite this preparatory work, disputes among the various regional groups
over who should chair the two working groups delayed substantive discussions
at the beginning of INC 2. This question had not been resolved at INC 1, and
inter-sessional consultations by the INC Chair also proved inconclusive. In
order to allow more regions to be represented and to avoid a divisive vote, the
INC finally agreed to appoint two co-chairs and one vice-chair for each
working group. The INC elected E. de Alba of Mexico and Ambassador
Nobutoshi Akao of Japan as co-chairs of Working Group I, and Elizabeth
Dowdeswell of Canada and Ambassador Robert Van Lierop of Vanuatu as co-
chairs of Working Group II. The election of Van Lierop, reportedly the first
time that island states as a group had received a leadership position in a U.N.
forum, reflected their increasingly prominent role in the negotiations.
Substantive discussions finally began during the second week of INC 2.
The extreme wariness of some delegations was displayed again when they
raised objections regarding a compilation document prepared by the INC
Secretariat.20 9 The document collated the proposals in the Misc. 1 papers,
materials from relevant General Assembly resolutions, various ministerial
declarations, the IPCC First Assessment Report, and existing international
environmental agreements. To organize the material, the Secretariat had used
the elements listed in the IPCC legal mechanisms report as topic headings.
Some developing countries felt that this gave too much weight to the IPCC's
work and prejudged the structure of the Convention. As a result, the INC
Secretariat withdrew the document, reorganized it according to the categories
set forth in Decision 1/1, and reissued it.210
In both working groups, the discussions proceeded in a general manner.
Working Group I extensively discussed a proposed article on general
principles, which had not been mentioned in Decision I/1 but was introduced
205. E.g., Informal Papers 1, supra note 189, at 3, 89 (submissions of Australia and United
States); Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations, Addendum 2, INC/FCCC, 2d Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/Misc. l/Add.2 (1991) [hereinafter Informal
Papers 11] (submission of Norway).
206. E.g., Informal Papers I, supra note 189, at 6, 15, 24, 83 (submissions of Austria/Switzerland,
Germany, Malaysia/Malta, and United Kingdom).
207. E.g., Informal Papers I, supra note 189, at 53 (submission of United Kingdom); Set of
informal Papers Provided by Delegations, Addendum 3, INC/FCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item
2, at 3, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/Misc.l/Add.3 (1991) [hereinafter Informal Papers 111] (submission of
India).
208. Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations, INC/FCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 2, U.N. Does. A/AC.237/Misc.1/Adds.1-15 (1991).
209. First Compilation of Possible Elements, supra note 198.
210. Compare id. with Compilation of Possible Elements for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change, INCIFCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/Misc.2/Rev.1 (1991)
[hereinafter Revised Compilation of Possible Elements].
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by China shortly after INC 1 and supported by other developing countries at
INC 2. The group made no progress on the issue of specific limitations on
greenhouse gas emissions. Just prior to the session, the United Kingdom had
informally consulted the United States on a compromise formulation (later
coined "the phased comprehensive approach"), under which countries would
receive credit for cuts in greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide as well
as enhancements of sinks in calculations of their emissions levels. 2n The
United States, however, maintained its opposition to any targets and
timetables. In Working Group II, discussions began on legal and institutional
mechanisms, and the group unanimously agreed that the Convention should
rest on a sound scientific basis. In contrast to Working Group I, Working
Group II gave its co-chairs the mandate to prepare a single text for the third
session.2 3
The main source of controversy at INC 2 concerned "pledge and
review," a concept introduced by Japan as a potential compromise on the
targets and timetables issue.214 Under the Japanese proposal, states would
be required to make unilateral pledges consisting of national strategies and
response measures to limit their greenhouse gas emissions. An international
team of experts would periodically review and evaluate the pledges and make
recommendations. According to proponents, pledge and review would serve
two purposes: the unilateral pledges would be a one-way ratchet toward
stricter commitments by parties, 2 1- and the international review process
would promote transparency and accountability. Although the United Kingdom
and France made similar proposals,21 6 most EC members expressed reserva-
tions about substituting "pledge and review" for internationally-defined
commitments. Environmental NGO's also sharply criticized pledge and
review, dubbing it "hedge and retreat. "217
211. See Paul Brown, Britain Juggles Green Controls, GUARDIAN, May 28, 1991, at 3.
212. Report of 2nd Session, supra note 204, at 16.
213. Id. at 17.
214. Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations, Addendum 7, INC/FCCC, 2d Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 3, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/Misc.l/Add.7 (1991) (submission of Japan);
see generally MICHAEL GRUBB & NICOLA STEEN, ENERGY AND ENVTL. PROGRAMME OF THE ROYAL
INST. OF INT'L. AFFAIRS, PLEDGE AND REVIEW PROCESSES: POSSIBLE COMPONENTS OF A CLIMATE
CONVENTION (1991) (report of workshop held August 2, 1991).
215. However, the extent to which the pledges would have been binding under the Japanese
proposal was never clear.
216. Informal Papers I, supra note 189, at 54; Informal Papers 11, supra note 205, at 3.
217. Climate Action Network, Pledge and Review or "Hedge and Retreat"?, June 15, 1991 (on
file with author); Aldhous, supra note 204, at 3.
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3. INC 3: Nairobi, September 9-20, 1991218
Progress continued to be slow at the third session,219 with the United
States maintaining its opposition to targets and timetables for greenhouse gas
emissions.22 Near the. beginning of the session, the plenary held an
extensive informal discussion of "pledge and review." Proponents of
internationally-defined targets and timetables insisted that such an approach
should be adopted only as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for,
international commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. The European
Community in particular criticized pledge and review, characterizing it as "the
twin ghosts [that] have been haunting" the session. 1 But although the term
"pledge and review" was abandoned following INC 3, the substantive concept
continued to be discussed and is reflected in the final compromise pack-
age.2n
The working groups held discussions on virtually every other aspect of the
proposed convention, based primarily on consolidated texts prepared during
the inter-sessional period by the working group co-chairs. At the beginning
of the session, Working Group I had three documents: two compilations of
proposals submitted by states, one on general principles and the other on
commitments;' 2 and a consolidated text prepared by the co-chairs on both
principles and commitments.'2 Some delegations questioned the mandate of
the co-chairs to prepare the consolidated text, and most refused to use it as a
negotiating document. Instead, they made general comments and proposals,
which the Secretariat compiled into revised documents on each agenda
item.'- Delegations then made further comments on' these new compila-
tions, so that still lengthier documents were issued at the close of the session
and attached to the Working Group's report. 226 Thus, rather than narrowing
alternatives in order to move towards consensus, the negotiating process
218. See generally Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of Its Third Session, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/12 (1991) [hereinafter Report of3d Session]; see also Robert Pool, Stalemate in
Nairobi, 353 NATuRE 291 (1991).
219. See Pool, supra note 218, at 291.
220. See U.S. Statement on Commitments on Sources and Sinks, Sept. 12, 1991 (on file with
author); U.S. Continues to Resist Mandatory Emissions Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1991, at A19.
221. Intervention by The Netherlands on Behalf of the European Community and Its Member
States: The Structure and Implementation of the Convention, Sept. 19, 1991 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Netherlands Intervention].
222. See infra text accompanying note 344.
223. Compilation of Texts Related to Principles, INC/FCCC, 3d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item
2(a), U.N. Doc. AIAC.2371Misc.6 (1991); Compilation of Proposals Related to Commitments,
INC/FCCC, 3d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.7 (1991) [hereinafter
Compilation of Proposals], revised by U.N. Doc. A/AC.2371Misc.7/Corr. 1 (1991).
224. Consolidated Text Based on Proposals Regarding Principles and Commitments, INC/FCCC,
3d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2(a), U.N. Doc. AIAC.237IMisc.9 (1991) [hereinafter Consolidated
Text].
225. INC/FCCC, 3d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2(a), U.N. Docs. A/AC.2371WG.IICRP.1-4
(1991).
226. INC/FCCC, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 2(a), U.N. Does. A/AC.237/WG.I/CRP.1-4/Rev.1
(1991).
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produced ever longer compilations of alternative proposals. Some parties
appeared satisfied with this approach, arguing that a full airing of views was
useful at this stage; others expressed frustration with the lack of progress
toward consensus. At the end of the session, Working Group I finally gave
its co-chairs the mandate to prepare a consolidated text for the next negotiat-
ing session.
Discussions in Working Group Il were more productive. The Working
Group began a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the articles drafted by the
co-chairs,2 7 in effect initiating the negotiating process. In addition, the
delegations expressed their general views on issues not addressed by the draft
language in order to allow the co-chairs to prepare a draft text on these issues
for INC 4.2
4. INC 4: Geneva, December 9-20, 1991229
The fourth session continued the pattern established at INC 3. Rather than
negotiate, states tended to reiterate their previously enunciated positions,
reintroducing proposals and language that had been omitted from the co-
chairs' drafts." 0 Perhaps the most notable aspect of INC 4 was the break-
down of the G-77."2 1 At INC 3, the G-77 had played a relatively low-key
role, but early in the December session it had begun meeting on a regular
basis in an attempt to draft proposals on the core provisions of the Conven-
tion. Initially, the G-77 initiative had some success when it agreed on a
general principles text?2 which other countries accepted in large part as a
basis for discussion. During the second week of INC 4, however, the G-77
foundered on the question of what commitments to support. Unable to
overcome this stumbling block, the G-77 chair announced in plenary that the
G-77 would no longer meet at the session as a group. The breakdown of the
G-77 allowed member states to submit their own proposals. The G-77 draft,
as it stood when discussions collapsed, was immediately introduced by a G-77
rump led by China and India.23 AOSIS submitted an alternative proposal
containing more far-reaching commitments, including a carbon dioxide
227. See generally Single Text on Elements Relating to Mechanisms, INC/FCCC, 3d Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 2(b), U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.8 (1991) [hereinafter Single Text].
228. See generally Anderson & Aldhous, supra note 176; Charles, supra note 188, at 16; Richard
A. Kerr, U.S. Bites Greenhouse Bullet and Gags, 251 SCIENCE 868 (1991).
229. See generally Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on the Work of Its Fourth Session, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/AC.237/15 (1992) [hereinafter Report of 4th Session]; Bodansky, supra note t.
230. The NGO newsletter dryly observed that the negotiations were proceeding at "less than a
snail's pace." Negotiations Grind, Eco, Dec. 11, 1991, at 1.
231. See Saudis, Kuwait, Mauritania Isolated; Group of 77Breaks Up at Climate Talks, Eco, Dec.
19, 1991, at 1.
232. See Joint Statement of the Group of 77, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 4th Sess., Working Group
I, Agenda Item 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/WG.I/L.8 (1992) [hereinafter G-77 Statement].
233. Proposal on the Entire Section on Commitments, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 4th Sess.,
Working Group I, Agenda Item 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/WG.IIL.7 (1991). The rump group was
initially dubbed the G-24 but ultimately included 43 states.
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stabilization target at 1990 levels by the year 1995 for developed countries and
reductions thereafter on a timetable to be agreed by the parties."4
Despite these problems, the INC made some progress, at least from a
cosmetic standpoint. At the end of the session, the INC combined the various
texts from the two working groups into a "Consolidated Working Docu-
ment," allowing participants to claim that they had finally succeeded in
preparing a negotiating text. In fact, this document was no different
stylistically than the texts prepared for the session by the working group co-
chairs, which the groups had agreed at the outset of the session to use as
negotiating texts. However, by assembling the texts from the two working
groups into a single document, the result looked more like a complete
convention.
5. INC 5: New York, February and May 1992
Originally, the INC planned to hold only a single session in 1992.
However, towards the end of 1991, the INC was still so far from completing
its work that some delegations suggested the need for two sessions in 1992,
one in February and another in April. Still, no final decision was made, for
fear that, if delegations knew that there would be an additional session, they
would merely continue to postpone making compromises. 6 Ultimately, a
resumed fifth session did prove necessary.
a. Part I: February 18-28, 1992237
At the February session, intensive negotiations finally began. To expedite
the discussions, the working group co-chairs encouraged contact groups to
form on various issues such as financial resources, technology transfer, and
implementation. While the more focused work style represented a substantial
change from previous sessions, the INC succeeded in bridging few gaps in the
text that emerged at the end of the meeting, the Revised Text Under
Negotiation.3 Instead, with the Rio Summit fast approaching, states
engaged in a game of chicken, hoping that the other side would blink first.
Following its disarray at the December session, the G-77 resumed meeting
in New York, primarily to press its views on financial resources and
234. Statement on Commitments Submitted by the Delegation of Vanuatu, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC,
4th Sess., Working Group I, Agenda Item 2(a), U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/WG.I/L.9 (1991).
235. Consolidated Working Document in Report of 4th Session, supra note 229, Annex II
[hereinafter Consolidated Working Document].
236. See Report of 4th Session, supra note 229, at 4 (raising possibility of holding "resumed" fifth
session in April 1992 if February session did not finalize Convention); Report of3d Session, supra note
218, at 10 (same).
237. See generally Report. of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of Its First Part of the Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR
INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., 1st Part, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part I) (1992) [hereinafter Report of 5th
Session].
238. Revised Text Under Negotiation, in id., Annex II [hereinafter Revised Text].
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technology transfer. Early in the session, OECD countries also began to
caucus almost continuously to try to narrow their differences on specific
commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Despite hopes by some
observers that the removal of John Sununu as White House Chief of Staff
would lead to a softening of the U.S. position,"9 the United States remained
firm in its opposition to targets and timetables. Moreover, other OECD
countries continued to disagree among themselves about the exact terms of the
proposed target and timetable. As a result, the final OECD text still contained
numerous brackets and alternatives. When it was finally introduced in
Working Group I toward the end of the session, developing countries
expressed dismay and proposed alternative formulations of their own, creating
further complications in the negotiating text.240 Even an announcement by
the United States toward the end of the session that it would provide $25
million in assistance to developing states for country studies, as well as $50
million to the core fund of the "revised" GEF, failed to assuage the frustration
of many NGOs and developing country delegations.24
b. Extended Bureau Meeting: Paris, April 1992
At the end of the February meeting, the wide differences among
delegations on the core issues of targets and timetables and financial
commitments and mechanisms, as well as the sheer volume of work remaining
on the rest of the Convention, made many participants doubt that the INC
would be able to finish the Convention at the resumed Fifth Session in April.
The INC Chair therefore scheduled a meeting in mid-April of the so-called
"Extended Bureau," a group consisting of the bureaus of the INC and of its
two working groups and selected key delegations.242 While this quietly-
organized gathering technically violated the "no inter-sessional meeting" rule,
no delegation objected.243
The Extended Bureau met from April 15 to 172' and discussed most
aspects of the Convention, making progress on several issues.245 More
importantly, however, the Bureau unanimously urged the Chair to develop his
239. See, e.g., David Doniger, US Wall About to Crumble?, Eco, Feb. 19, 1991, at 4.
240. See generally Revised Text, supra note 238, art. 4(2)(1).
241. U.S. Statement on Commitments, Feb. 27, 1992 (on file with author); US Breaks Silence on
Climate: NGOs React to US Statement, Eco, Feb. 28, 1992, at 1.
242. The "bureau" of a negotiating committee or of a working group consists of the officers of the
committee or group, generally including the chair(s), vice-chair(s), and rapporteur. Various delegations
participated in the Extended Bureau at different times during the INC, but it generally included Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, the
United States, and Vanuatu.
243. Even those delegations, such as Saudi Arabia, who generally sought to slow down and even
obstruct the negotiations, failed to protest.
244. Immediately before the extended Bureau meeting, the OECD countries met in a final effort
to resolve the target and timetable issue. Despite substantial pressure, however, the United States
maintained its position and no compromise was reached.
245. For example, the Extended Bureau decided to add a chapeau to the principles article to
narrow its implications. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
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own compromise text for the final meeting, so that the INC would not have
to work its way through the many brackets and alternatives remaining in the
negotiating text.2' Somewhat reluctantly, the Chair agreed. 47 Many
participants believed that this move was critical to the ultimate success of the
negotiations. Significantly, however, the Chair declined to introduce a text on
specific commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions because of its political
sensitivity. This issue was still being discussed at a high political level in late
April.248 The deadlock was finally broken at the very end of the month, just
as the Fifth Session resumed, when the United States and United Kingdom
worked out the compromise language that now appears more or less
unchanged in Article 4(2).249
c. Part II: April 30-May 9, 1992?°
At the beginning of the resumed Fifth Session, the INC decided to
abandon its working group structure and to divide instead into three groups
to consider various clusters of articles. A group led by the INC Chair
considered the core articles on commitments, financial 'mechanism, and
reporting (restyled as "communication of information" to make it more
politically palatable). A group chaired by the Algerian Vice-Chair examined
the preamble and the objective and principles articles. Finally, a group led by
the Argentine Vice-Chair considered the articles on institutions, dispute
settlement, and final clauses. Toward the end of the session, this last group
also served as a legal drafting group and considered articles from the other
clusters.
The core group met initially in an open-ended meeting, at which the U.S.-
U.K. compromise text on specific commitments was heavily criticized,
particularly by India and other developing countries." After giving all
delegations the opportunity to express their views, the INC Chair reconstituted
the extended Bureau, which met almost around the clock during the final days
of the session to hammer out compromises on the outstanding issues. The
provision on specific commitments, as drafted by the United States and the
246. Revised Text, supra note 238.
247. The Chairman's text was issued as Working Papers by the Chairman, INC/FCCC, 5th Sess.,
2d Part, Agenda Item 3, U.N. Docs. AIAC.237/CRP. 1 and Adds. 1-8 (1992).
248. For example, EC President Jacques Delors and President Bush reportedly discussed
greenhouse gas limits at their Washington, D.C. meeting.
249. Rose Gutfeld, How Bush Achieved Global Warming Pact with No Timetables, WALL ST. J.,
May 27, 1992, at Al; John Vidal, Britain "Weakens' Climate Treaty, GUARDIAN, May 11, 1992, at
3.
250. See generally Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of the Second Part of Its Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR,
INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., 2d Part, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/18 (Part I)/Add. 1 (1992).
251. The Indian delegate characterized the compromise text as "legal striptease," and the G-77
outlined a long series of questions regarding the provision. Initially, the EC Environment Commission-
er, Carlo Ripa de Meana, characterized the compromise text as "completely unacceptable," Grim Ripa
Blasts "Sell-Out," Eco, May 6, 1992, at 1, but ultimately the EC member states acquiesced in its
adoption with only minor changes.
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United Kingdom, was amended only slightly after limited discussion. In the
end, the major sticking point was the financial mechanism, with OECD
countries seeking to designate the GEF as the mechanism and developing
countries pressing either to create a separate fund or to leave the issue to the
Conference of the Parties (COP). Ultimately, a compromise entrusted the
operation of the financial mechanism to the GEF on an interim basis and left
the final decision to the COP.252
Even after this deal was concluded, it was still unclear on the final day of
the session whether some states would object to the compromise text in
plenary on the ground that they had been excluded from the extended Bureau
meetings. Iran, in particular, reportedly threatened to open up the package by
reintroducing a previously-rejected principle on the right to development.
Although the INC's rules of procedure permitted votes, 3 the INC had been
able to operate on the basis of consensus until this point, and few delegations,
if any, wanted a vote at the eleventh hour. Following a general discussion and
some minor amendments, the Convention was finally adopted by acclamation
on the evening of May 9, 1992.
IV. COMMENTARY
Broadly speaking, the Convention can be separated into four parts: (1) the
introductory provisions, setting forth the basic definitions, principles, and
objectives of the Convention; (2) the commitments relating to the sources and
sinks of greenhouse gases; scientific cooperation, public information, and
education; and financial resources and technology transfer; (3) institutional
and procedural mechanisms to implement the Convention; and (4) final clauses
dealing witi such matters as protocols and annexes, amendment, ratification,
and entry into force.
The following sections do not attempt to provide a definitive interpretation
of the Convention. 4 Rather, they provide a reader's guide, explaining the
background and rationale of the Convention's provisions, and highlighting the
alternative formulations proposed and the compromises reached. For the
Climate Change Convention, like other international agreements, two factors
complicate the interpretive task. First, words were debated and selected as
much for their political as for their legal significance. Indeed, proposed
formulations often took on a talismanic quality, only distantly connected to the
actual meaning of the words. Linguistic debates became a proxy for political
confrontation, with success or failure measured not just by the substantive
outcomes, but also by the inclusion or exclusion of particular terms. For
252. See infra notes 520-522 and accompanying text.
253. Rules of Procedure, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, Rule 27, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/5 (1991).
254. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, international agreements are to
be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of their terms, in their context, and in light of
their object and purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92. The negotiating history of an agreement is a "supplementa-




example, developing and developed countries argued for hours over whether
economic development should be characterized as "essential" or a "prerequi-
site" for developing countries' response measures. Delegations often sought
to introduce identical language in different parts of the Convention or to move
language from one part of the Convention to another, not to effect particular
legal consequences, but to highlight certain provisions for political reasons.
Second, the Convention represents a carefully balanced compromise. Many
of the Convention's provisions do not attempt to resolve differences so much
as paper them over, either through formulations that preserved the positions
of all sides,"s that were deliberately ambiguous, 6 or that deferred issues
until the first meeting of the COP. 7 Although such devices may make it
impossible to determine what a provision "means," the ambiguities are
constructive: by making agreement possible, they allow further discussions to
be carried out by other means, particularly in the process of interpreting and
implementing the Convention. From this perspective, the Convention
represents not an end point, but rather a punctuation mark in an ongoing
process of negotiation."5
A. Framework vs. Substantive Approach
In establishing the INC, the U.N. General Assembly charged it with
drafting "an effective framework convention on climate change, containing
appropriate commitments." 9 This mandate left open a fundamental question
that ran throughout the negotiations: was the INC's task to draft a framework
convention - that is, a largely procedural convention, establishing a basis for
future action - or a substantive convention committing states to specific
measures and policies?26
Early proposals for the climate change negotiations focused on the
framework convention/protocol approach, 26' which had been used with
considerable success to deal with the problems of acid rain and depletion of
255. See, e.g., Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 11 (financial mechanism); see infra
notes 520-534 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2); see infra notes 392-393 and
accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 13 (directing COP to consider
establishing multilateral non-compliance procedure).
258. Indeed, this process has already begun, in meetings of the INC in December 1992 and March
1993 (INC 6 and 7). Additional sessions are scheduled for August 1993 and February and August 1994.
259. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 5, at 148.
260. A third option, namely to develop a General Agreement on Climate Change modelled on the
GAT', involving a semi-contihuous process of negotiation "rounds," see David G. Victor, How to Slow
Global Warming, 349 NATURE 451 (1991), was never seriously considered in the INC.
261. See Richard Elliot Benedick, Lessons from "the Ozone Hole," in GREENHOUSE WARMING,
supra note 156, at 9, 11-12; see also Winfried Lang, Is the Ozone Depletion Regime a Modelfor an
Emerging Regime on Global Warming?, 9 U.C.L.A. I. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 161 (1991); Peter M.
Morrisette, The Montreal Protocol: Lessons for Formulating Policies for Global Warming, 19 POL'Y
STUD. J. 152 (1991). For critical evaluations of the framework convention/protocol approach to climate
change, see Sebenius, supra note 74, at 114-18; Victor, supra note 260, at 454 (questioning whether
framework convention/protocol model allows sufficient issue linkages to gain widespread acceptance).
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the ozone layer.262 Under this model, states first negotiate a framework
convention, establishing general obligations concerning such matters as
scientific research and exchange of information, as well as a skeletal legal and
institutional framework for future action. States later develop specific pollution
control measures (including emissions limitations targets) and more detailed
implementation mechanisms in protocols.
The framework convention/protocol model serves two basic functions.
First, it allows work to proceed in an incremental manner.263 States can
begin to address a problem without waiting for a consensus to emerge on
appropriate response measures, or even before there is agreement that a
problem exists. Lawmaking can thus proceed "amidst great uncertainty. " 264
For example, when both the ECE Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Convention (LRTAP) and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer (Vienna Ozone Convention) were adopted, some states remained
unconvinced of the need for action.265 Nevertheless, even skeptical states
acquiesced in the adoption of these conventions, since the conventions did not
commit them to any specific measures. Later, when the scientific evidence
became stronger, protocols could be adopted more quickly, since the
framework conventions had cleared away many of the preliminary procedural
and institutional issues.
262. The framework convention for the acid rain problem established an executive body and
secretariat and set general obligations to reduce and prevent air pollution, develop policies and
strategies, exchange information, hold consultations, and initiate and cooperate in research and
development. LRTAP, supra note 12. Three protocols to LRTAP have been adopted to deal with
particular air pollution problems: (1) the Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or
Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent, July 8, 1985, 27 I.L.M. 707 [hereinafter Sulfur
Dioxide Protocol], (2) the Sofia Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or
Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 214 [hereinafter Nitrogen Oxide Protocol], and
(3) the Volatile Organic Compounds Protocol, Nov. 18, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 568 [hereinafter VOC
Protocol].
The Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 13, established a conference of the parties, secretariat,
and general obligations relating to research and systematic observations; cooperation in the legal,
scientific, and technical fields; and transmission and exchange of information. Adopted less than three
years later, the Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, required 50% cuts in specified ozone-depleting
substances from 1986 levels by 1993-94. Subsequent amendments mandate a total phaseout of most
ozone-depleting substances by the year 1996 and establish an Interim Multilateral Fund to help finance
compliance by developing countries. Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537
[hereinafter London Amendments]; Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol, UNEP Doc. OzL.Pro.4/15 (Nov. 25, 1992); 32 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Copenhagen
Amendments]. See also BENEDICK, supra note 125; David D. Caron, Protection of the Stratospheric
Ozone Layer and the Structure of International Environmental Lawmaking, 14 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 755 (1991); Morrisette, supra note 261, at 155-59 (noting that, despite differences
between ozone depletion and climate change issues, ozone negotiations provide insight on negotiation
process and means for resolving uncertainties).
263. See Tolba, supra note 132, at 305 ("By aiming in 1987 for what we could get the nations to
sign ... we acquired a flexible instrument for action.... If we had reached too far at Montreal, we
would almost certainly have come away empty-handed.").
264. Caron, supra note 262, at 773.
265. See Marc A. Levy, Acid Rain in Europe, ENVIRONMENT, May 1992, at 16, 16 (stating that
only two out of 30 countries thought acid rain was a problem when LRTAP was negotiated).
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Second, the framework convention approach can produce positive feedback
loops, making the adoption of specific substantive commitments more likely.
Scientific research and assessments carried out under the convention help
reduce uncertainties and lay a basis for action. The institutions established by
the framework convention play a catalytic role by collecting data, providing
technical assistance, and issuing reports.266 The meetings held under the
convention provide a forum for discussions among the technical elites in
different countries, and serve to focus international public scrutiny on
countries that lag behind an emerging international consensus. In effect, once
a framework convention is adopted, the international lawmaking process takes
on a momentum of its own. States that were initially reluctant to undertake
substantive commitments, but that acquiesce in the seemingly innocuous
process set in motion by the framework convention, feel increasing pressure
not to fall out of step as that process gains momentum.
Despite the advantages and historical successes of the framework
convention/protocol model, many countries wanted the INC to produce more
than a framework convention.267 Given the perceived urgency of the
problem as well as the extensive preparatory work of the IPCC, they viewed
the two-step, framework convention/protocol process as unnecessarily slow.
This desire for a more elaborate convention manifested itself in both working
groups. In Working Group I, some states argued that the INC should not only
adopt general commitments to promote scientific research, exchange
information, and so forth, but also set specific targets and timetables to limit
greenhouse gas emissions, possibly in protocols developed concurrently with
the framework convention.268 In Working Group II, states disagreed about
whether the Convention should establish only a skeletal structure (for
example, a conference of the parties and secretariat), leaving the elaboration
of this structure to the COP as the need arose, or set forth more developed
implementation mechanisms at the outset.
States did not necessarily fall on the same side of the frame-
work/substantive convention split for commitments and for mechanisms. At
one extreme, some oil-exporting states favored at most a barebones convention
that set general principles rather than specific commitments and that did not
establish subsidiary bodies to the COP or binding dispute settlement
procedures.269 In contrast, the United States supported what it characterized
266. See generally Marc Levy et al., Institutions for the Earth: Promoting International
Environmental Protection, ENVIRONMENT, May 1992, at 12 (arguing that international environmental
institutions serve functions of raising governmental concern, providing bargaining fora, improving
monitoring and verification of parties' compliance, and offering technical assistance).
267. See INC Preparatory Meeting Report, supra note 145, at 6; David A. Wirth & Daniel A.
Lashof, Beyond Vienna and Montreal - Multilateral Agreements on Greenhouse Gases, in
GREENHOUSE WARMING, supra note 156, at 13, 18-19.
268. For example, Germany initially proposed the negotiation of protocols on the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions, the conservation and creation of carbon dioxide reservoirs and sinks, and
adaptation to climate change. Informal Papers 1, supra note 189, at 21. However, support for
concurrent negotiation of protocols quickly waned, as the negotiations lagged and the difficulty of
reaching agreement on even a convention became apparent. Instead, supporters of specific commitments
on sources and sinks focused on trying to include such commitments in the Convention itself.
269. Initially, China objected even to including the heading "commitments" in the outline of the
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as a "process-oriented convention," which, although limited on the commit-
ments side, established quite ambitious implementation mechanisms, including
advisory committees on science and implementation; detailed provisions on
scientific research, information exchange, and education; and flexible non-
compliance procedures. Many developing countries expressed support for
specific commitments, as long as those commitments were differentiated so
as to apply primarily to developed countries. However, they questioned many
of the more detailed procedural proposals, including those for the creation of
subsidiary institutions to the COP. 7 Finally, the European Community,
generally joined by Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, AOSIS, and the CANZ
group (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), supported detailed provisions
on both substantive commitments and procedural mechanisms, including a
specific commitment by developed countries to stabilize emissions of carbon
dioxide at 1990 levels by the year 2000, a scientific advisory committee, an
implementation and/or executive committee, and binding dispute-settlement
procedures.
The debate between the framework and substantive approaches persisted
right up to the end of the INC, when the INC considered whether the title of
the Convention should be, the "U.N. Convention on Climate Change," or, as
was ultimately agreed, the "U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change." In the end, the Convention lies somewhere between a framework
and a substantive convention. It establishes more extensive commitments than
those contained in LRTAP or the Vienna Ozone Convention, but falls short
of the type of specific emissions control measures contained in the Sulfur
Dioxide or Montreal Protocols. While there are few procedural or institutional
innovations in the Convention, it does establish scientific and implementation
committees and provides for scientific assessment, reporting and review of
greenhouse gas levels, financial and technical support to aid implementation,
and a financial mechanism.
B. Definitions (Article 1)
Article 1 contains a brief list of terms and their definitions. 271 The terms
defined represent only a fraction of the terms proposed for definition during
the negotiations.272 The phrase "adverse effects of climate change" is
Convention, so adamant was it that the Convention should be a framework only.
270. See infra text accompanying notes 484-485 and 501-510.
271. The definitions, initially drafted during informal discussions among scientists at INC 4, see
Set of Infornal Papers Provided by Delegations, Addendum 16, INC/FCCC, 5th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 3, at 3, U.N. Doc. AIAC.237/Misc.l/Add.16 (1992), were finalized at INC 5 by an
informal group chaired by Poland.
272. Some definitions were not included because, as the substantive articles of the Convention
evolved, the terms were no longer used (e.g., "reforestation," "afforestation," "renewable energy,"
"greenhouse warming potential index," "clearinghouse") or were used in such a general manner as not
to require definition (e.g., "forests"). In other cases, terms were defined operationally elsewhere in the
Convention. For example, "developed countries" and "economies in transition" were defined by means
of annexes listing the countries falling into these categories. In still other cases, definitions proved too
controversial. For example, the term "net emissions" raised the question of how to allocate sinks in the
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defined so as to exclude the direct or indirect costs of measures to mitigate
climate change, which could potentially be viewed as an indirect result of
climate change. Instead, it is limited to "changes in the physical environment
or biota" that have "significant deleterious effects."273 Notably, the Conven-
tion defines "climate change" quite stringently, limiting it to changes that are
"attributed directly or indirectly to human activity" and are "in addition to
natural climate variability."'274 "Emissions," in contrast, is defined broadly
to include releases of both greenhouse gases and precursors of greenhouse
gases.275 The definition of "greenhouse gases," by not excluding gases
controlled under other agreements like the Montreal Protocol, implicitly
includes them.276
C. Preamble, Objective, and Principles
The Convention includes not only a Preamble but also articles setting forth
the "ultimate objective" of the Convention and outlining general principles to
guide the parties in implementing its provisions. Ordinarily, the material
included in these articles, which states the intent of the parties and the context
of the Convention, would be contained in the Preamble. By instead placing
these provisions in the operative part of the Convention, some states sought
both to highlight these provisions and to elevate their legal status. Whether
this strategy proves effective is a question for the future.
1. Preamble
Preambles to international agreements generally state the background,
purposes, and context of the agreement. 2' The Preamble to the Climate
Change Convention refers to several existing or emerging concepts of
international environmental law, including the characterization of climate as
the "common concern of mankind, "278 Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration (in the slightly modified form of the Rio Declaration on
global commons (e.g., ocean and atmospheric sinks) among different countries.
273. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(1); cf IPCC Legal Measures Report, supra
note 141 (defining effects of climate change more broadly to include economic and social effects).
274. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(2).
275. Id. art. 1(4).
276. Id. art. 1(5).
277. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 254, art. 31(2); see also GYORGY
HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 106-07 (1973).
278. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 1; see also supra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text.
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Environment and Development),279 and the principle of inter-generational
equity. 280
Several paragraphs address particular concerns of developing countries.
Perhaps the most significant of these is paragraph 3, which notes
[tihat the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has
originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still
relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will
grow to meet their social and development needs.
While this paragraph contains much that is of interest to developing countries,
it represents a substantial compromise on their part. Developing countries had
sought inclusion of the "main responsibility" principle, which posits that since
the climate change problem results primarily from the overconsumptive and
profligate lifestyles of developed countries, developed countries bear the main
responsibility for combating it.281 The first clause of paragraph 3, reflecting
only the first half of this principle, appears as a neutral factual statement,
severed from the corollary that "developed country parties should take the
lead in combating climate change," which appears only later in the Conven-
tion.282 Similarly, the reference in the second clause to "per capita emis-
sions" is all that remains of an Indian proposal that the Convention should
promote the convergence of greenhouse gas emissions at a common per capita
level.283 Finally, the concluding clause, referring to the growth in emissions
of developing countries, was originally proposed as a principle and phrased
in mandatory rather than descriptive terms.28 a
279. Compare Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 21, in
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A. 14 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 ("States have,
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.") with Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration], reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 ("States have. . . the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies") (emphasis added) and
Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 8 (same).
280. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 23. For a discussion of the principle
of inter-generational equity, see generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERA-
TIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989).
281. AGARWAL & NARAIN, supra note 32; see also supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text;
infra note 315 and accompanying text. Developing countries also characterized this point in terms of
the "polluter pays" principle. Cf. Rio Declaration, supra note 279, princ. 16 ("the polluter should, in
principle, bear the cost of pollution"). This characterization of the "polluter pays" principle is quite
different from the polluter pays principle used in OECD states, where it is a principle of domestic law
that requires companies (not states) to internalize the environmental externalities of their activities. See
generally Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental
Ethos, 26 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 463 (1991).
282. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(l); see infra text accompanying notes 314-
315.
283. See Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. 111(2).




The Preamble also addresses developing country concerns by tying the
level of response measures to the "differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities" of the parties;285 reaffirming the principle of sovereignty; 26
recognizing that "standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate
and of unwarranted economic and social costs to other countries, in particular
developing countries" ;27 taking into "full account the legitimate priority
needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic
growth and the eradication of poverty" ;288 and recognizing that developing
countries in particular need access to resources required to achieve sustainable
development and that, in order to progress towards that goal, "their energy
consumption will need to grow. "29
However, the Preamble does not include several provisions supported by
developing countries, such as references to the need for "adequate, new and
additional financial resources" and transfer of technology on "preferential,
concessional and non-commercial terms" ;29' a paragraph recognizing that
improvement in the international economic environment is a "prerequisite" for
enabling developing countries to address climate change;29' and language
opposing any new "conditionality" in aid or development financing. 22
Other noteworthy provisions of the Preamble stress the importance of
basing response measures on "scientific, technical and economic consider-
ations";293 recognize the "no regrets" principle (i.e., that some actions to
address climate change can be justified in their own right independent of the
climate issue);... and contain the only surviving reference in the Convention
to energy efficiency.295
2. Objective (Article 2)
Article 2 establishes the "ultimate" objective of the Convention as
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.2 196 This level
285. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 6. This differentiation of response
measures is operationalized in Article 4, which distinguishes between the commitments of developed
and developing country parties.
286. Id. pmbl. para. 9. This paragraph was initially proposed for the principles article.
Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. II(10).
287. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 10. The last clause of paragraph 10
is identical to Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 279.
288. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 21.
289. Id. pmbl. para. 22.
290. Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, pmbl. para. 10.
291. Id. pmbl. para. 16.
292. id. pmbl. para. 20.
293. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 16.
294. Id. pmbl. para. 17; see C. Boyden Gray & David B. Rivkin Jr., A "No Regrets"
Environmental Policy, 83 FoR. POL'Y 47, 52 (1991).
295. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 22. All references to "energy
efficiency" in other parts of the Convention were ultimately deleted at the insistence of oil-producing
states.
296. Cf. SWCC Ministerial Declaration, supra note 123, para. 10. An objectives article, not
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is to be achieved "within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change.., and to enable economic development to
proceed in a sustainable manner. 297
By recognizing the need eventually to stabilize atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases, the objective acknowledges climate change as a problem
and helps legitimize it as a matter of international concern. Some commenta-
tors have interpreted Article 2 as favoring prevention of, over adaptation to,
climate change.29 The text, however, appears to be neutral on this question,
since it condemns only those interferences with the climate system that are
"dangerous." To the extent that adaptation to climate change is possible, such
change could be viewed as benign.
The exact legal status of the Convention's stabilization objective may be
the subject of future discussion. Some early proposals relating to the objective
phrased it as a collective commitment, binding on all the parties.2 9
Although the Secretariat categorized the proposals on objectives as "general
obligations" in a compilation document,3" as ultimately adopted Article 2
uses declarative language and does not characterize the objective as a
commitment. Also unclear is whether Article 2 falls under the category of
"object and purpose" contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties." 1 If so, signatories to the Climate Change Convention would have
a duty not to defeat the stabilization objective. 0 2 In what may have been an
attempt to prevent "objective" from being equated with "object and purpose,"
the Convention adds the qualification "ultimate."
included in the early proposals for a climate change convention, made its first appearance as a separate
article at INC 3, apparently as a proposal of the European Community. Compare Compilation of
Possible Elements, supra note 210 (no section on objectives) with Consolidated Text, supra note 224,
at 8 (containing section on "general objective"); see also EC Raises Climate Stakes, Eco, Sept. 12,
1991, at 1. Articles on "objectives" have been included in other recent international environmental
agreements. See, e.g., Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, U.S.-Can., arts. II (purpose), Ill
(general air quality objective), 30 I.L.M. 676, 679.
An Indian proposal to include an objective that anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide should
converge at a common per capita level received little support from other delegations and ultimately was
not included. Early in the INC, France had proposed a similar objective. See Informal Papers 1, supra
note 189, at 10, 13 (proposing objective of two tons of carbon emissions per capita by 2000).
297. Cf. Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 71, para. 8. This part of the objective reflects the
concept of "ecological limits." See STOCKHOLM ENv'T INST., TARGETS AND INDICATORS OF CLIMATIC
CHANGE at viii (F.R. Rijsberman & R.J. Swart eds., 1990) (on file with'author) (concluding that, to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, the rate of global warming must not exceed 0.1" C per decade).
But see Kelly & Granich, supra note 6, at I (contending that defining ecological limit is nearly
impossible).
298. See Sands, supra note 6, at 272. Some support for this proposition is found in the provision
that measures should be taken within a time frame that allows ecosystems to adapt naturally.
299. See, e.g., Informal Papers 11, supra note 207, at 4 (submission of India) ("the parties agree
to work towards a common long-term objective"); cf. Informal Papers 1, supra note 189, at 12
(submission of France) (suggesting that while setting "objectives cannot of itself produce all the actions
necessary for the campaign against the greenhouse effect, it will signify the political will of States to
take appropriate measures and will define the ultimate aim which we must pursue").
300. Revised Compilation of Possible Elements, supra note 210, at 25-32.
301. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 254, arts. 18, 3 1(1).




3. Principles (Article 3)
Most developing countries supported the inclusion of an article on general
principles, arguing that such an article would serve as the lodestar or compass
to guide the parties in implementing and developing the Convention. 3
Some even argued that the Convention should include only principles and
leave commitments to future protocols.3t 4 In contrast, developed countries
generally questioned the inclusion of a principles article. 5 The United
States in particular insistently opposed its inclusion, arguing that its legal
status was unclear. The United States maintained that if the principles merely
stated the intentions of the parties or provided a context for interpreting the
Convention's commitments, they served the traditional functions of the
preamble,3" and placing them in the operative part of the Convention would
be unnecessary and even misleading. On the other hand, the United States
argued, if the principles were themselves commitments, they should be
designated in the Convention as such.
The U.S. reasoning, however, fails to take into account that principles
may serve a third function, different from those of either preambles or
commitments: unlike preambular paragraphs, principles embody legal
standards, but the standards they contain are more general than commitments
and do not specify particular actions. As Ronald Dworkin explains, both legal
principles and legal rules
point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular circumstances, but they differ
in the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing
fashion. . . . [A principle] states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate
a particular decision. . . . All that is meant, when we say that a particular principle is a
principle of our law, is that the principle is one which officials must take into account, if it
is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one way or another."07
Because of the open-ended character of principles, a government cannot be
certain of where they will eventually lead. This may explain why the United
States, which is deeply skeptical of the international lawmaking process,
303. An article on general principles was first proposed by China. See Set of Informal Papers
Provided by Delegations, Revision I to Addendum 4, INC/FCCC, 3d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item
2, at 2, U.N. Doe. AIAC.2371Misc.IAdd.41Rev.1 (1991). Argentina was one of the few developing
countries to question including an article on principles, arguing that principles are appropriate for
political declarations, not legally-binding agreements. Articles on "principles" are relatively rare in
international treaty law. E.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2; LRTAP, supra note 12, arts. 2-5; Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, art. II, 27 U.S.T.
1087, 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; Bonn Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, art. II, 19 I.L.M. 15, 18; Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, art. 3, 30 I.L.M. 1460 [hereinafter
Antarctic Environment Protocol]. Even among this list, some of the putative principles use mandatory
language and are best understood as commitments. E.g., LRTAP, supra note 12, arts. 3-5; CITES,
supra.
304. For example, the Republic of Korea made this point at INC 3.
305. Nevertheless, most developed countries accepted its inevitability and stressed that, if it were
included, it should be short, concise, and focused specifically on climate change.
306. See supra text accompanying note 277.
307. RONALD DWORKn, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 24, 26 (1977).
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opposed a principles article and preferred more clearly enunciated commit-
ments.
Although developing countries ultimately prevailed in obtaining the
inclusion of a principles article, the United States successfully pressed for
several changes to Article 3 to reduce its potential legal implications. First,
a chapeau was added, specifying that the principles are to "guide" the parties
in their actions to achieve the objectives of the Convention and to implement
its provisions. Second, the term "states" was replaced by "Parties." Finally,
the term "inter alia" was added to the chapeau to indicate that the parties may
take into account principles other than those listed in Article 3 in implement-
ing the Convention. These three modifications were intended to forestall
arguments that the principles in Article 3 are part of customary international
law and bind states generally. Instead, the principles clearly apply only to the
parties and only in relation to the Convention, not as general law.3"8
Developing countries also had to compromise on the substance of the
principles. In some cases, Western opposition led to the transfer of proposed
principles to the preamble; 3 9 in other cases, principles proposed by develop-
ing countries were not included in the final text at all. 10 In general,
Western countries were able to define the principles more narrowly than in the
parallel negotiations on the Rio Declaration, possibly because the INC was a
less politicized, less public forum than the UNCED Preparatory
Committee.3 '
As adopted, the first principle reiterates several concepts contained in the
preamble: the principle that the climate should be protected for the benefit of
present and future generations, the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, 312 and the related principle of
equity.' 3 The final sentence, which states that "developed country Parties
308. The United States also tried to remove any reference to the term "principles" in the
Convention. As a result, it appears only in the title of Article 3, which the United States unsuccessfully
sought to delete. Still, at the United States' suggestion, a footnote was added stating that "[t]itles of
articles are included solely to assist the reader." Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. The
United States apparently intended this to mean that the titles are without legal significance. However,
the footnote does not actually say this and whether it would be interpreted in this manner is unclear.
The United States also sought to make clear that a party could not be found in violation of Article 3 in
a dispute settlement proceeding under Article 14. The final version of Article 14, however, does not
contain an express limitation of this nature. C. Antarctic Environment Protocol, supra note 303, art.
20(2) (expressly excluding matters relating to Article IV of Antarctic Treaty from competence of
Protocol's arbitral tribunal).
309. Compare Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. paras. 3 (growth of developing
country emissions), 9 (sovereignty) with Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. II(1),
(10).
310. These included principles on the right to development, the principle that states have an equal
right to ocean sinks, the principle that the greenhouse gas emissions of developing countries must grow,
the principle that no environmental conditions should be imposed on aid, and the "main responsibility"
principle and related principles on liability and compensation.
311. Compare Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 3 with Rio Declaration, supra note
279, princs. 3 (right to development), 7 (responsibility of developed states), 13 (liability and
compensation).
312. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. paras. 6, 23.
313. For discussions of the implications of the principle of equity for the global warming issue,
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should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects
thereof,"3" 4 was supported by both developing and developed countries,
although they disagreed on why developed countries should take the lead.
Developing countries argued that developed countries should so do because
they bear the "main responsibility" for the climate change problem." 5
Developed countries (in particular, the United States) opposed this reasoning,
but agreed to take the lead because of their greater financial and technical
capabilities. Article 4, which defines the respective commitments of
developing and developed countries, fleshes out this principle in further detail.
The second principle gives "full consideration" to the specific needs and
special circumstances of developing country parties, especially those that are
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and parties that would
have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention.316
The latter category singles out, but is not limited to, developing countries.
The third principle, the precautionary principle, states that where there is
a threat of serious environmental harm, scientific uncertainty should not be
used as a reason to postpone precautionary measures to prevent the harm.317
Various formulations of the precautionary principle now appear regularly in
international environmental agreements and declarations. 318 In the INC, the
main issue was whether to include a reference to "cost-effectiveness" and
thereby introduce economic considerations into what otherwise is a purely
environmental standard. The SWCC Ministerial Declaration had spoken of
"cost-effective" precautionary measures, 39  and the G-77 proposal on
see Dallas Burtraw & Michael Toman, Equity and International Agreements for CO, Containment, J.
ENERGY ENGINEERING (forthcoming); Prodipto Ghosh, Structuring the Equity Issue in Climate Change
(Dec. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Michael A. Toman & Dallas Burtraw,
Resolving Equity Issues in Greenhouse Gas Negotiations, REsouRcEs, Spring 1991, at 10.
314. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
315. See supra text accompanying note 281.
316. Article 4 elaborates on this principle. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(4)-
(10).
317. The precautionary principle was supported most vigorously by AOSIS. At INC 1, AOSIS
explained its support for the principle in eloquent terms: "For us the precautionary principle is much
more than a semantic or theoretical exercise. It is an ecological and moral imperative. We trust the
world understands our concerns by now. We do not have the luxury of waiting for conclusive proof,
as some have suggested in the past. The proof, we fear, will kill us." Robert F. Van Lierop, Permanent
Representative to the United Nations and Chairman of the Delegation of Vanuatu, Statement to the
Plenary Session of the INC/FCCC, at 3, Feb. 5, 1991 (on file with author) [hereinafter Statement of
Vanuatu).
318. See generally Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle,
ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1991, at 4; James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 1 (1991); Lothar Giindling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of
Precautionary Action, in THE NORTH SEA: PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CO-
OPERATION 23 (David Freestone & Ton Ijlstra eds., 1990); Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in
Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303 (1992).
319. The SWCC Ministerial Declaration and the Rio Declaration include virtually identical versions
of the precautionary principle: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent such
environmental degradation." SWCC Ministerial Declaration, supra note 123, para. 7; Rio Declaration,
supra note 279, princ. 15.
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principles used a similar formulation.32 At the final session, the INC Chair
dropped any reference to cost-effectiveness from the precautionary principle
in his compromise draft, both because of opposition by some European states
and because his draft included a separate principle on cost-effectiveness.*2t
After attempts by the United States and Saudi Arabia to reintroduce the
concept were met with opposition, the United States proposed combining the
precautionary principle paragraph with the separate paragraph in the Chair's
text on cost-effectiveness, and the INC accepted this compromise. The
principle, as adopted, also endorses the comprehensive approach and joint
implementation.322
The fourth principle is that of sustainable development. Initially,
developing countries pressed for inclusion of a principle recognizing that "the
right to development is an inalienable human right" and that "[a]ll peoples
have an equal right in matters relating to reasonable living standards.""
Meanwhile, some developed countries wished to include a principle that states
have a duty to aim at sustainable development. Both proposals raised serious
problems for some delegations. On the one hand, the United States has long
refused to accept the "right to development" as advanced in the human rights
field, on the grounds that it is vague and could be used by developing
countries to demand financial assistance from developed countries. 24 In
contrast, developing countries, fearing that "sustainability" might become a
new conditionality on financial assistance and ultimately inhibit their
development plans, have traditionally expressed doubts about the concept of
"sustainable development."
The Convention finesses both issues by stating that "the Parties have a
right to, and should, promote sustainable development," thereby addressing
the concerns of both developing and developed countries. The Convention
speaks of a "right," thereby satisfying developing countries, but the right
relates to the "promotion of sustainable development," which is arguably
different from the traditional "right to development" of the 1986 U.N.
Declaration.3" With respect to sustainable development, paragraph 4 states
that parties "should promote sustainable development," an important
recognition by developing states but less than the "duty" sought by developed
countries. This paragraph also contains a number of caveats that address
developing country concerns, including the recognition that environmental
320. The G-77 text was a compromise between AOSIS, which had strongly supported the
precautionary principle in its purely environmental form, and Saudi Arabia, which did not want to
include the principle in the Convention at all.
321. Working Papers by the Chairman, supra note 247, art. 2(3) (precautionary principle), art. 2(4)
(cost-effectiveness).
322. Id. art. 2. See generally infra notes 403-435 and accompanying text.
323. Consolidated working Document, supra note 235, art. Il.1; G-77 Statement, supra note 232,
at 2 (proposing principle on right to development).
324. In 1986, the United States voted against the U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development,
G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986).
325. Id.; cf. Rio Declaration, supra note 279, princ. 3 ("The right to development must be fulfilled
so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.").
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policies and measures should be "appropriate for the specific conditions of
each party" and should be integrated with national development plans, and that
"economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate
change. 326
The final principle concerns the need for a supportive and open interna-
tional economic system, and addresses in particular the relationship between
environmental measures and trade, an increasingly contentious issue. 27 The
principle reiterates the rule contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) prohibiting measures that "constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries . . . or a disguised restriction
on international trade. "32 It is neutral in effect, since it does not define what
types of trade measures constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable" discrimination
or are a disguised restriction on trade. Thus, it neither condones nor forbids
using trade measures 'of the sort contained in the Montreal Protocol to enforce
the Convention.
D. Commitments
Like other international environmental agreements, 329 the Convention
creates differentiated obligations for developing and developed states. The
commitments are organized in a complicated structure, consisting of (1)
general commitments, which apply to all parties, both developed and
developing; (2) specific commitments on sources and sinks, which apply to the
parties listed in Annex I (OECD member states and the former Eastern bloc);
and (3) specific commitments on financial resources and technology transfer,
which apply to the parties listed in Annex II (OECD countries). This structure
reflects the INC's initial premise that developing countries would not assume
the same commitments as developed countries. The general commitments are
qualitative not quantitative in nature and relate to such matters as greenhouse
gas inventories, national strategies, reporting, cooperation in scientific
research, and information exchange. The specific commitments, on the other
hand, include the obligations of OECD countries to provide financial
resources and technology to developing countries. Although a weak set of
specific commitments for developing countries were also suggested original-
326. Developing countries had initially sought an even stronger formulation, characterizing
economic development as a "prerequisite" for adopting climate change measures. G-77Statement, supra
note 232, at 2; Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. 11(1).
327. This principle is analogous to Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration.
328. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, 262.
329. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 5 (granting developing countries 10-year grace
period to comply with control measures and allowing them to meet future targets "with due regard to
their development requirements and within the limits of their financial and technical capabilities");
Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 13, art. 2 (providing that parties undertake measures "in
accordance with the means at their disposal and their capabilities"). For an excellent discussion of the
use of differential norms in international environmental agreements, see Daniel B. Magraw, Legal
Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual, and Absolute Norms, 1 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 69, 89-98 (1990).
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ly,330 they were eventually abandoned. Thus, the Convention includes
specific commitments only for developed countries.
The linkages between the general and specific commitments proved
troublesome during the negotiations. Virtually all delegations agreed that the
ability of developing countries to undertake general commitments would
depend upon the specific commitments of developed countries to provide
financial resources and technology. 31 Almost perversely, however, some
developing countries also insisted on linking their general commitments with
the specific commitments of developed countries to limit greenhouse gas
emissions. As a result, when the compromise on targets and timetables
reached by developed countries in the final round of the negotiations proved
quite weak, a domino effect ensued. Developing countries, led by India,
argued that the general commitments had to be correspondingly circumscribed,
to preserve what they regarded as the proper balance and differentiation
between the commitments of developed countries and those of developing
countries.
1. Classes of Parties
Developing countries account for an increasing share of greenhouse gas
emissions and are expected eventually to exceed the emissions of OECD
countries.332 Nevertheless, it became clear at the outset of the negotiations
that developing countries would not accept any quantitative limits on their
greenhouse gas emissions for fear that such limitations would impede their
economic progress.333 The negotiators therefore recognized a need to exempt
developing countries from any quantitative limits. Until the final negotiating
session, however, delegations still had not decided how to determine the
classes of parties and the obligations of each. Most developing states argued
that the Convention should recognize only two economic categories,
"developed" and "developing." Other developing states, including AOSIS,
supported a more complex and multivariate differentiation, focusing on special
vulnerability to climate change. Several developed states proposed the
additional categories of "newly industrialized states" and "countries with
economies in transition" (i.e., the states of eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union).334 In the end, although the Convention uses "developed" and
330. Consolidated Text, supra note 224, at 5 (proposing that developing countries commit to keep
future net growth of greenhouse gas emissions to lowest level possible).
331. See Daniel A. Reifsnyder, Remarks at the 1992 Seoul Symposium on UNCED and Prospects
for the Environmental Regime in the 21st Century (Sept. 2, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
332. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Statement of India, Feb. 6, 1991, at 4 (on file with author) (maintaining that "there
can be no legal obligation for developing countries"); see also Toronto Conference Statement, supra
note 64, at 519 (stating industrialized nations have responsibility to lead way in reducing carbon dioxide
emissions); Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 71, at 596-97 (declaring industrialized nations should
achieve carbon dioxide stabilization as soon as possible).
334. Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations, Addendum 6, INC/FCCC, 2d Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 3, U.N. Doe. AIAC.237lMisc.lIAdd.6 (1991) (submission of Sweden).
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"developing" countries as the primary categories, it also recognizes two
additional categories: "countries with economies in transition" and "least
developed states."
Proposals on how to define these categories broke down into three types:
defining "developed" and "developing" countries by objective criteria, such
as per capita income; listing particular states to which specific commitments
would apply; or using a combination of the first two methods. The definition
method has the benefit of flexibility, since, as countries meet the definition of
"developed country," they would automatically become subject to the specific
commitments. On the other hand, the list method avoids ambiguities about
whether a state meets the definition of "developed.1
335
The INC ultimately decided to use lists rather than definitions to fix the
scope of application of the Convention's specific commitments. The specific
commitments on sources and sinks of greenhouse gases apply only to states
listed in Annex I, which includes two general categories of states: members
of the OECD and countries with "economies in transition." The specific
commitments on financial resources and technology transfer, in contrast, apply
to parties listed in Annex II, which includes OECD members but not
economies in transition. Although the lists have several anomalies, 336 the
simplicity of the list method promises to minimize conflicts. 337 Both annexes
will be reexamined by the end of 1998 with a view to amendments, but a
party may be added to an annex only with its approval.
338
Countries with economies in transition are indicated by an asterisk in
Annex I. Although there was no question about which states qualify as
economies in transition, their legal status posed a problem. Several eastern
European states (Romania and Poland in particular) objected to being
characterized as "developed," fearing that such a label might subject them to
financial or other additional obligations in the future. By referring to "the
335. The Montreal Protocol combined the two approaches. Pursuant to a provision that sets the
criterion for differential timetables (annual consumption of controlled substances of less than 0.3
kilograms per capita), Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 5, the parties to the Montreal Protocol
adopted a list of countries at their first meeting, Report of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on the
Work of Their First Meeting 18, UNEP Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.I/5 (May 6, 1989).
336. For example, Israel and South Africa, nations that some consider industrially and
economically "developed," are not included in Annex I. On the other hand, Turkey, by virtue of its
membership in the OECD, is subject to the specific commitments although it is in many ways a
"developing" state. At INC 5, Turkey unsuccessfully proposed using economic criteria, rather than
membership in the OECD, to differentiate between developed and developing countries. Under the
Convention, Turkey, as a "developed" country, would have an obligation to provide financial resources
to Saudi Arabia, a "developing" country. In protest against its inclusion in Annexes I and II, Turkey
was one of the very few countries that did not sign the Convention at UNCED.
337. Cf. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 111-13 (1960) (discussing role of
"focal points" in minimizing conflict).
338. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(f).
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developed country Parties and other Parties included in annex I,"" Article
4(2) allows these states to argue that they are not developed 40
"Least developed states" is not defined in the Convention, nor are states
falling into this category listed. The term is likely to be interpreted by
reference to the U.N. General Assembly's list of "least developed coun-
tries. "34' Least developed states are to receive special consideration for
funding and technology transfer,342 and are allowed to file their initial report
under Article 12 "at their discretion" rather than within a specified time
frame. 43
2. General Commitments (Articles 4(1), 5, 6, and 12(1))
From the beginning, the negotiators viewed general commitments as
qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. An extensive list of general
commitments was proposed, including use of best available technology to limit
greenhouse gas emissions; promotion of energy efficiency and conservation;
development of renewable energy sources; promotion of sustainable forest
management; removal of subsidies that contribute to global warming;
harmonization of national policies, taxes, and efficiency standards; internaliza-
tion of costs; and development and coordination of market instruments.
During the negotiations, these proposals were slowly pared away (in some
cases, becoming specific commitments) or watered down, and the general
commitments became general not only in their application to all parties, but
also in their content.
Perhaps the most important general commitments to survive the negotiating
process are those designed to promote long-term national planning and
international review of national actions - in essence, those embodying the
concept of "pledge and review. "s" Article 4(1) requires each party to
develop, periodically update, and publish national inventories of greenhouse
339. Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added); cf. id. art. 4(3) (describing entities comprising Annex II,
which do not include economies in transition, as "developed country Parties and other developed
Parties") (emphasis added). In Article 4(2), the phrase "other Parties" is used rather than "other country
Parties," since the European Community is included in Annex I.
340. The alternative - namely, to refer to "the Parties listed in Annex I" without characterizing
them as "developed" - was not used, because some developing countries, for political reasons, wished
the Convention to state explicitly that the countries bound by the specific commitments are "developed,"
thereby maintaining the developing-developed dichotomy which was central to the NIEO.
341. As of July 1, 1992, this list included forty-seven states. Until this year, applications for "least
developed country" status were considered by the Committee for Development Planning, an expert body
established by the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1965. The Committee evaluated
applications on the basis of criteria such as per capita gross national income, literacy standards, and
manufacturing capabilities. The ECOSOC forwarded the Committee's endorsements to the General
Assembly for final designation. NEw ZEALAND MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND TRADE,
UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK 123-24 (1992). The Committee disbanded at the end of 1992. Its functions
are expected to be taken over by the high-level advisory board being established by the U.N. Secretary
General as a result of UNCED.
342. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(9).
343. Id. art. 12(5).
344. See supra notes 214-217, 221-222 and accompanying text.
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gas emissions and removals by sinks, using "comparable methodologies" to
be agreed on by the COP. 4 These inventories are to lay the basis for
national planning and to provide more accurate information for use in future
scientific a~sessments of the greenhouse problem. Each party must also
formulate, implement, and regularly update programs to mitigate and adapt
to climate change,3" and communicate information to the COP on its
national inventories and the steps it has taken to implement the Conven-
tion.347 The COP is then to review the national reports and assess the
parties' implementation, the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to
the Convention, and the progress towards meeting the Convention's
objective.34
The negotiators heavily debated each of these general commitments. Some
developed states argued that parties should be required to use the same
methodology to prepare greenhouse gas inventories, so that the inventories
would be fully comparable; in contrast, developing countries felt that the same
methodologies might not be appropriate for all countries. Similarly, some
developing countries argued that national planning requirements should include
the formulation and implementation only of programs, not of "strategies, '
and that provisions to communicate information should be voluntary rather
than mandatory. In the end, developing countries agreed to a limited reporting
requirement in return for a commitment by developed countries to pay the full
costs of the reports. 5 °
In contrast to these provisions, which survived the negotiations relatively
intact, the general commitments relating to sources and sinks were progres-
sively weakened. Oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
objected to the regulation of sources, while countries with large forests such
as Malaysia and Brazil fought substantial commitments on enhancing sinks.
As a result, Article 4(l)(c) (dealing with greenhouse gas emissions) makes no
mention of energy efficiency measures351 or renewable energy sources, and
seems to place all relevant economic sectors (energy, transport, industry,
agriculture, forestry, and waste management) on an equal footing. Similarly,
Article 4(l)(d) fails to single out forests for special consideration in requiring
states to promote the sustainable management and enhancement of sinks and
352reservoirs.
The commitments relating to research and systematic observation 353 were
345. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 7(2)(d) (directing COP to promote and
guide development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies for preparing greenhouse gas
inventories).
346. At INC 7, the INC Secretariat, together with UNEP, announced plans to establish a
clearinghouse mechanism to coordinate information on national climate change country studies.
347. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 12(1).
348. Id. art. 7(2)(e).
349. Developing countries felt that the formulation of strategies is a sovereign function that should
not be required by the Convention. They viewed the term "programs" to be more limited in scope.
350. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, arts. 4(3), 12(5).
351. Energy efficiency is now mentioned only in the Preamble. Id. pmbl. para. 22.
352. See id. art. 4(1)(d).
353. Id. arts. 4(1)(g), 5. Article 5(b) includes an implicit reference to remote sensing, requiring
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modeled on similar provisions of earlier framework conventions.354 These
provisions, as well as those on education, training, and public awareness 55
were comparatively non-controversial. At the final session, an annex setting
forth detailed priorities for research and systematic observation was
dropped.356 Although the proposed annex was not particularly controversial
and may be revived by the COP once the Convention enters into force, some
delegations felt that they did not have sufficient time to consider it adequately
in the INC.3"7
Other general commitments relate to adaptation and to integration of
climate change considerations into each party's social, economic, and
environmental policies and actions. 58 Earlier drafts had contained a require-
ment for environmental impact assessments (EIA), but the negotiators
accommodated U.S. objections by referring to EIA only as one possible
method to integrate climate considerations into policymaking. 59 Some
developing countries objected to a proposed general commitment to "coordi-
nate" or "harmonize" economic and administrative instruments, such as taxes,
subsidies, and charges. 60 As a result, it was ultimately modified and made
a specific commitment. 61
The general commitments are qualified in several ways so as to make them
acceptable to parties with different circumstances. In carrying out their
commitments, parties may "tak[e] into account their common but differentiat-
ed responsibilities and their specific national and regional development
states to promote access to, and the exchange of, data and analyses obtained from "areas beyond
national jurisdiction." Existing scientific research programs include the World Climate Research
Programme (a joint undertaking of WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)),
which focuses on the dynamic and physical aspects of climate, and the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme (a complementary undertaking of ICSU), which focuses on the chemical,
biological, and ecological aspects of climate. The commitment relating to systematic observation could
be affected by the Global Climate Observing System, which was approved by the Eleventh WMO
Congress in May 1991.
354. See, e.g., LRTAP, supra note 12, art. 7; Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
355. Id. arts. 4(1)(i), 6. Earlier framework conventions do not contain articles on education,
training, and public awareness, and the co-chairs of Working Group II did not include such an article
in the consolidated document they prepared for INC 3. Single Text, supra note 227. At INC 3, a
number of delegations suggested inclusion of a separate article on this subject, and a small group met
in Nairobi to draft what is now Article 6.
356. Compare Revised Text, supra note 238, annex I with Climate Change Convention, supra note
6, art. 5.
357. Negotiators at the final session also deleted a separate article and annex on exchange of
information. See Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. V(3), annex II. Consequently,
this subject is now dealt with exclusively in Article 4(1)(h). The INC deleted the proposed annex at the
first part of its final session, while the proposed article on exchange of information was deleted at the
resumed fifth session in May 1992.
358. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(1)(e)-(f).
359. An EIA requirement applicable to private conduct would go beyond existing U.S. domestic
law, see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988), which applies only to
federal actions, and would be difficult to implement.
360. See Elements Related to the Preamble, Principles and Commitments, INC/FCCC, 4th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 2(a), at 13, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.12 (1991); Consolidated Working
Document, INC/FCCC, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 2(c), at 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237Misc.17/Add.1 (1991).
361. See infra note 371 and accompanying text.
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priorities, objectives and circumstances. '36 2 Moreover, the Convention
specifically recognizes the financial and technical limitations of developing
countries and their priorities of "economic and social development and poverty
eradication."363 Nevertheless, although developing countries had sought to
make their commitments legally contingent on the provision of adequate
financial resources and technology, 3" the Convention adopts a more neutral
formulation, which makes the factual observation that developing country
performance "will depend" on the fulfillment of developed country commit-
ments.365 Similarly, developing countries had sought language suggesting
that they would implement climate change measures only to the extent that the
measures were "without detriment" to their national development goals and
policies. As adopted, the Convention provides simply that developing country
implementation "will take fully into account" their socio-economic priori-
ties. 366
3. Specific Commitments on Sources and Sinks (Articles 4(2) and 12(2))
The Convention's provisions on specific commitments set forth three basic
requirements relating to sources and sinks. First, each party listed in Annex
I must adopt national policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions
and to protect and enhance its sinks and reservoirs. 367 This requirement is
similar to the general commitments discussed above (which are applicable to
all parties). Second, Annex I parties are subject to more stringent reporting
requirements, both in terms of timing and content. They must communicate
initial reports within six months of the Convention's entry into force, whereas
other parties have three years to complete their reports.368 Moreover, Annex
I parties' reports must contain detailed information on policies and measures,
as well as on the projected effects on emissions by sources and on removals
by sinks, and should take into account the "best available scientific knowl-
edge. "369 To this end, the COP is to adopt and periodically review methodolo-
gies for these calculations.37° Finally, Annex I parties must coordinate
relevant economic and administrative instruments and identify and periodically
review their policies and practices that contribute to increased greenhouse gas
362. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(1); see also id. art. 4(l)(f) ("to the extent
feasible").
363. Id. art. 4(7).
364. Under one suggested formulation, the extent of developing countries' commitment would have
depended on (or corresponded to) the extent to which developed countries implemented the Convention's
provisions on financial resources and technology transfer.
365. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(7). A similar formulation is used in the
London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, supra note 262, art. 1(T) (capacity of developing
countries to comply with control measures "will depend upon the effective implementation of the
financial co-operation... and transfer of technology" provisions of the Protocol).
366. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(7).
367. Id. art. 4(2)(a).
368. Id. arts. 4(2)(b), 12(5).
369. Id. art. 4(2)(b)-(c).
370. Id. art. 4(2)(d).
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emissions (e.g., subsidies and energy pricing policies).37' These last
commitments were originally proposed as general commitments, but were
changed to specific commitments because of objections by several developing
countries.
a. Targets and Timetables
In connection with the specific commitments to adopt and report on
national policies and measures, the Convention establishes a quasi-target and
quasi-timetable for greenhouse gas emissions. The targets and timetables issue
was perhaps the most controversial in the entire negotiation. Although, in
common parlance, the term "target" means an object or goal,372 in the
context of international environmental negotiations the phrase "targets and
timetables" means quantitative limitations, including those that are legally-
binding commitments. In recent years, targets and timetables have become the
preferred form of international regulation of atmospheric pollution. They tend
to be easier to negotiate than uniform international regulatory rules, because
they allow countries to choose how to meet overall national emissions levels,
for example, by direct regulation, market mechanisms, or taxes.373 Several
key precedents for the Convention used a targets and timetables approach,
notably the Montreal Protocol and the Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxide
Protocols to the LRTAP 74 Significantly, both direct international regulation
and taxation were discussed only marginally in the INC.375
International targets and timetables for limiting greenhouse gas emissions
could be set on a variety of bases. A per capita target would favor countries
with populations that are large relative to their overall emissions, including
most developing states and countries that rely on non-fossil fuels such as
hydroelectricity or nuclear power.376 Alternatively, setting targets on the
basis of gross domestic product (GDP) would favor countries that use energy
371. Id. art. 4(2)(d). The term "coordinate" was a compromise between the stronger term,
"harmonize" (suggested by France) and the weaker phrase, "exchange information" (proposed by
developing countries before this provision was moved from the general to the specific commitments
paragraph).
372. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1244 (2nd College ed. 1982) (defining "target" as
"[a]nything aimed or fired at; ... a desired goal").
373. But cf Grubb, Targets, supra note 156, at 67 (discussing political difficulties of negotiating
national targets).
374. Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, arts. 8, 9; Sulfur Dioxide Protocol, supra note 262, arts.
2, 6; Nitrogen Oxide Protocol, supra note 262, arts. 2, 6.
375. Very early in the negotiations, Sweden proposed that the Convention establish energy
efficiency standards and fiscal instruments (i.e., taxes). Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations,
Addendum 6, INC/FCCC, 2nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 4, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.2371Misc.llAdd.6 (1991). However, these proposals were not pursued. The difficulties
experienced by the European Community in adopting a carbon tax, see infra note 383, illustrated the
political and practical difficulties of requiring specific measures, rather than a general target that states
can meet by whatever means they choose.
376. For this reason, several large developing countries, led by India, as well as the major nuclear
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efficiently (i.e., that use relatively little energy per unit output). Both the per
capita and GDP approaches have strong policy justifications. Proponents of
the per capita approach justify it on the equitable principle that "every human
has an equal right to use the atmospheric resource." 3" A GDP-based target,
in contrast, would promote the objective of economic efficiency. Both
approaches, however, raise the same dilemma. On the one hand, if the per
capita or per unit GDP target were set at a level that would stabilize global
emissions, countries that have higher than average emissions rates, like the
United States would have to reduce their emissions very substantially; such
a target would therefore be politically infeasible. On the other hand, if the
target were set high enough to make it acceptable to the United States, then
global emissions could increase substantially, as states with low emissions
rates increase theirs to U.S. levels. Because of such difficulties in obtaining
agreement on a per capita or per unit GDP formula, states have tended to
negotiate either country-by-country targets3 71 or uniform targets based on
historical or current emissions levels (sometimes referred to as the "grand-
fathered emissions" approach). The INC took the latter course, following the
precedents of the Sulfur Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxide, and Montreal Protocols,
all of which established targets keyed to a base-year emissions level.
Both before and during the negotiations, most Western states pressed
vigorously for the adoption of an internationally-defined stabilization target
and timetable to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions,379 particularly carbon
377. Grubb, Targets, supra note 156, at 83.
378. E.g., Council Directive 88/609 of 24 November 1988 on the Limitation of Emissions of
Certain Pollutants into the Air from large Combustion Plants, 1988 O.J. (L 336) 1 (using approach
which allows maximum flexibility but also has high transaction costs); see Grubb, Targets, supra note
156, at 72.
379. . EC Council Conclusions, supra note 122. Before the INC, it was widely believed that
developed countries would eventually have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in order to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations at a safe level while giving developing countries "environmental space" to
grow. See, e.g., Toronto Conference Statement, supra note 64, at 521 (recommending 20% reduction
in global carbon dioxide emissions); IPCC SciENTiFIC ASsESSMENT, supra note 3, at xi (concluding that
reductions of 60-80% in carbon dioxide and 15-20% in methane emissions would be necessary to
stabilize atmospheric concentrations at present levels). Thus, early in the negotiations, delegations
submitted proposals to establish reduction targets. At INC 1, Vanuatu proposed immediate and
significant cuts in carbon dioxide emissions. Statement of Vanuatu, supra note 317, at 3. Similarly,
Denmark proposed a 20% reduction from 1990 levels by 2005. Compilation of Proposals, supra note
223, at 30. At INC 3, the Netherlands proposed on behalf of the European Community that developed
countries should commit to "analyz[ing] the feasibility of and options for strategies and/or targets for
a staged approach for achieving reductions of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol." Intervention Made by The Netherlands Delegation on Behalf of the European Community
and Its Member States: Commitments, Sept. 11, 1991 (on file with author). Even as late as the
December 1991 session in Geneva, the draft negotiating text included alternative proposals requiring
developed countries to reduce emissions, as a first step, by 25% by the year 2010 from 1990 levels,
Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. IV(2)(C), alternative B, or requiring developed
countries to commit themselves to negotiations to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, id. However,
these proposals were abandoned after it became apparent that a consensus even on a stabilization target
would be difficult to achieve. States committed to reducing carbon dioxide emissions accepted the
political reality that reduction targets must await a protocol to the Convention. AOSIS briefly revived
the reduction proposals at the end of the first part of INC 5 in February 1992 in retaliation for the
failure of OECD countries to agree on a stabilization target, Revised Text, supra note 238, art.
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dioxide emissions."' For example, the European Community supported an
immediate commitment by developed countries to stabilize carbon dioxide
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.1 l In fact, many OECD countries
unilaterally adopted national targets and timetables." 2 The main holdout
against the adoption of targets and timetables was the United States, which
derided the targets and timetables adopted by most other countries as political
in nature, not backed by concrete measures designed to achieve them."3 The
United States opposed targets and timetables for greenhouse gas emissions as
premature. It criticized the EC proposal as a rigid and inequitable "top-down"
approach, given the differences between countries in national circumstances
and implementation costs.38 4 The United States argued that the Convention
should instead adopt a "bottom-up" approach that encourages the development
of better information, national strategies, and action plans. 315
IV(2)(a), but the proposals were not actively pursued when INC 5 resumed in April.
380. Establishing targets and timetables for specific greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide
or for sinks was never seriously considered in the INC. Given the substantial uncertainties regarding
the sources of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide, quantitative targets for them would not have
been very meaningful. Methane emissions in the energy and waste sectors are among the few such
sources that are relatively well understood, and the draft text included a proposed provision that an
agreement to limit or reduce these emissions "should be considered as a priority," Consolidated
Working Document, supra note 235, art. IV(2)(1)(c). This proposal was ultimately deleted. On sinks,
the Noordwijk Declaration had contained a global target for forest growth of 12 million hectares per
year by the beginning of the next century. See supra note 104. However, the parties to the climate
change negotiations did not believe targets or timetables for the enhancement of sinks to be politically
viable, since such commitments would have the greatest impact on developing countries, which possess
most of the world's forests.
381. See Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. IV(2)(1)(b), alternative A("developed countryParties... shall ... commit themselves to stabilization"). This proposal surpassed
the European Community's own unilateral policy adopted in Luxembourg in October 1990 to take
actions "aiming at reaching stabilization." EC Council Conclusions, supra note 122, at 267 (emphasis
added).
382. Australia, for example, established an interim planning target to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases by 20% by the year 2005. Denmark published an action plan with an agreed overall
target for the energy sector of 20% reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005 compared with 1988
levels. Germany also set a target to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 25% or more by 2005 from
1987 levels. By the end of the INC, the so-called "carbon club" - that is, states that had accepted
targets and timetables - included all of the OECD countries except for the United States and Turkey.
383. See Europe 'Only Political' - US, Eco, Dec. 12, 1991, at 4 (quoting U.S. negotiator Robert
Reinstein characterizing European targets as "political commitments"). According to an OECD report,
the targets and timetables adopted by countries unilaterally have varying status: some are conditioned
on what others do, some are political rather than legal in nature, and some limit greenhouse gases
generally, not carbon dioxide in particular. IEA, MARCH UPDATE, supra note 11, at 17-18.
Throughout 1991 and early 1992, the European Community experienced difficulties in adopting policy
measures, such as a carbon and energy tax, to implement its targets and timetable, thus diminishing the
European Community's political credibility on the issue. On EC problems, see, e.g., EC Waffles on
Energy Tax, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1992, at A8; David Gardner, EC Plans over CO2 Emissions at Risk,
FiN. T MES, Apr. 16, 1992, at 1.
384. See Patterson & Grubb, supra note 167, at 295 (finding that ease of limiting emissions varies
among states); Sebenius, supra note 74, at 122 ("seeking absolute or percentage reductions....
efficiency targets or similar benchmarks will entail inequities and frustrations"). Japan also maintained
that the Convention should "aim at establishing an appropriate framework that will encompass all
countries by taking into account their individual situations instead of a mechanical and uniform target."
Statement by Ambassador Nobutoshi Akao, Head of Delegation of Japan, Feb. 1991, at 3 (on file with
author).
385. At the first session of the INC, the United States submitted its own national plan, which it
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Although the target and timetable issue is often portrayed as a battle
between the United States and the rest of the world, the situation was in fact
more complicated. Other industrialized countries did agree with the United
States about the need for a long-term planning process. Moreover, while the
United States was one of the few industrialized countries to flatly oppose
targets and timetables, other OECD states proposed varying formulations of
the target and timetable. These differences concerned the strictness of the
legal obligations, the types of gases covered, a focus on net or gross
emissions, and joint implementation.386 For example, the CANZ group and
Finland favored establishing a stabilization target for all greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol rather than for just carbon dioxide, while
Japan supported a "best efforts" approach rather than a firm commitment to
limit greenhouse gas emissions. 7 The United Kingdom and, to some
extent, Japan attempted to mediate between the European Community and the
United States - Japan by proposing the "pledge and review" formula at the
June 1991 session," 8 and the United Kingdom by proposing the "phased,
comprehensive approach" in the spring of 1991,39 by supporting "pledge
and review, "390 and finally by brokering the ultimate deal of a "quasi-target"
and "quasi-timetable" in May 1992."9'
A compromise was finally reached in two highly ambiguous subparagraphs
of Article 4(2). By way of setting a quasi-target, Article 4(2) states that
developed countries are to adopt and report on national policies to limit
emissions and enhance sinks with the "aim of returning to" 1990 emissions
levels.392 Although this phrase has been equated with stabilization, the term
"return" unlike "stabilize" does not necessarily have an ongoing temporal
dimension. Thus, a state could potentially argue that, once it had achieved a
"return" to 1990 levels, emissions increases would be allowed. The "time-
table" is even more ambiguous: the Convention simply states that developed
characterized as an "action agenda," OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AMERICA'S CLIMATE CHANGE
STRATEGY: AN ACTION AGENDA (1991) [hereinafter U.S. ACTION AGENDA], in an effort to distinguish
its approach from that of countries that had adopted political targets and timetables. For an exposition
of the U.S. position, see Reifsnyder, supra note 331.
386. Even after extensive discussions at INC 5, OECD countries other than the United States could
not bridge their differences on targets and timetables and the proposed OECD text contained numerous
brackets and alternatives. See supra text accompanying note 240.
387. Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. IV(2)(1)(b), alternative A ("developed
country Parties ... shall ... make best efforts to stabilize"); Japanese Statement on "Commitment,"
Sept. 12, 1991 (on file with author). In addition to the flat commitment and best efforts commitment
approaches, the parties considered a commitment to adopt policies and measures that will have the effect
of stabilizing emissions, Revised Text, supra note 238, art. 4(2)(1)(a), and a commitment to aim at
stabilization, id. Due to U.S. opposition, however, the final wording is weaker than any of these
proposals.
388. See supra notes 214-217, 221-222 and accompanying text.
389. See John Hunt, UK to Offer Deal over Greenhouse Gases to US, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991,
at 18; see also infra note 413 and-accompanying text.
390. See supra text accompanying note 216.
391. See supra text accompanying note 249.
392. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(b) (emphasis added). The language is
similar to that used in the United Kingdom's global warming policy, which requires a "return to" 1990
emissions levels. See THIS COMMON INHERITANCE, supra note 122, at 68.
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countries recognize that a return by the year 2000 to earlier (unspecified)
emissions levels would contribute to a modification of longer-term emissions
trends.393
Article 4(2)'s quasi-target and quasi-timetable are not only highly
ambiguous, but also heavily qualified. Because some eastern European
countries were concerned about meeting the quasi-target (although most use
energy inefficiently and have ample room for improvement), the COP is to
allow countries with economies in transition "a certain degree of flexibili-
ty." 394 The Convention does not limit the type of "flexibility" that may be
accorded, but identifies the baseline emissions level as a potential subject of
flexibility. 395 Additionally, the quasi-timetable is to take into account
differences in the parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures,
and resource bases; the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic
growth; available technologies and other individual circumstances; and the
need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each party to the global
effort.396
Indeed, it is questionable whether the Convention creates a legally binding
target and timetable at all.3 97 Article 4(2) states that parties "shall" adopt
national policies and take corresponding measures to mitigate climate change,
and "shall" communicate information on these policies and measures and on
the resulting projected emissions. For the quasi-target and quasi-timetable,
however, the Convention uses less obligatory language. The target is phrased
as an "aim, "398 and the verbs used to characterize the timetable are all
descriptive rather than imperative.399 These ambiguous formulations allow
states to put their own spin on the requirements imposed by Article 4(2).
Indeed, within days after the Convention was adopted, various countries
advanced divergent interpretations. For example, President Bush's domestic
policy advisor stated, "there is nothing in any of the language which
constitutes a commitment to any specific level of emissions at any time.""
393. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(a). Whether the Convention even sets
the same baseline level for the target ("1990 levels") and for the timetable ("earlier levels') remains
unclear.
394. Id. art. 4(6).
395. Id. Energy use in eastern Europe declined from 1987 to 1990 as a result of the general
economic downturn, so a 1987 baseline would give these countries room to expand as their economies
revive and grow. Cf. Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 2(6) (allowing Soviet Union to include in
its baseline production facilities under construction or contracted for prior to September 16, 1987).
396. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(a).
397. See Sands, supra note 6, at 274 ("The most that can reasonably be said of these provisions
is that they establish soft targets and timetables with a large number of loopholes.").
398. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(b) (parties shall communicate information
on their "projected anthropogenic emissions of sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases . . . with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels") (emphasis added).
399. Id. art. 4(2)(a) (required policies and measures "will demonstrate that developed countries are
taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective
of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases would contribute to such
modification") (emphasis added).
400. Letter from Mr. Clayton Yeutter to Representative John Dingell, Chair of the House Energy
Vol. 18:451, 1993
Climate Change Convention
In contrast, the chief British negotiator characterized the provisions as
"indistinguishable" from an absolute guarantee."h These widely divergent
interpretations illustrate the limitations of the quasi-target and quasi-timetable
contained in Article 4(2).
The Convention does provide for the periodic review of the adequacy of
the quasi-target and quasi-timetable. The first review is to take place at the
COP's inaugural session (which will take place one year after the Conven-
tion's entry into force); the second, not later than December 31, 1998; and
subsequent reviews, at regular intervals. 2 The reviews are to be based on
the best available scientific information, as well as relevant technical, social,
and economic information. The COP is to take "appropriate" action based on
the reviews, but the Convention does not stipulate whether such action is
likely to lead (through an amendment) to stricter or more lenient targets and
timetables, or whether protocols might be needed to supplement the parties'
obligations.
b. Comprehensive Approach To Emissions Limitation
Before the United States introduced the "comprehensive approach"'  in
a submission to the IPCC in December 1989, the tendency in climate change
discussions had been to consider each source and sink of greenhouse gases
individually, focusing primarily on reducing carbon dioxide emissions from
the energy and transportation sectors.' In contrast, the comprehensive
and Commerce Committee, quoted in Rose Gutfield, How Bush Achieved Global Warming Pact with
Modest Goals, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1992, at Al.
401. James Erlichman, Howard Defends Emissions Treaty, GUARDIAN, May 12, 1992 at2 (quoting
David Fisk). Portugal issued a statement on behalf of the European Community, offering still another
interpretation. It characterized the Convention as establishing a "commitment to introduce measures
aiming at the return of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol to their 1990 levels by the end of the present decade." Statement
by Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic on Behalf of the European
Community and Its Member States on the Occasion of the Signature by the Community of the
Convention (June 1992) (on file with author).
402. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(d). This review procedure is modelled
on that of the Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 6, which has been widely praised.
403. U.S. Concept Paper: Comprehensive Greenhouse Gas Approach to, Addressing Climate
Change, Dec. 29, 1989 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See generally Center for
International Climate and Energy Research-Oslo (CICERO), A Comprehensive Approach to Climate
Change, Oslo, Norway, July 1-3, 1991 (workshop proceedings, on file with author); Lakshman
Guruswamy, A True Comprehensive Approach, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 115 (1992); Richard B.
Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of
Design and Practicality, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83 (1992); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B.
Wiener, A Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change: Using the Market to Protect the Environment,
AM. ENTERPRISE, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 75; U.S. Dept. of Justice, A Comprehensive Approach to
Addressing Potential Climate Change (Feb. 1991).
404. At both the Toronto and Noordwijk Conferences, for example, discussions of targets and
timetables focused almost exclusively on carbon dioxide emissions. Similarly, the Ottawa Legal Experts
Meeting suggested negotiation of separate protocols on different greenhouse gases, although it did
recognize that "[tihe possibility of trade-offs between CO2 equivalents should also be considered ... in
order to allow flexibility while still achieving overall improvements. " Ottawa Statement, supra note 13 1,
at 538.
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approach considers collectively all sources and sinks of different greenhouse
gases in formulating policy. Under the comprehensive approach, global
warming potentials are calculated for each greenhouse gas to permit emissions
of different gases to be compared according to a single metric. 5 States may
then take measures to limit their net contribution to the greenhouse effect,
either by controlling their aggregate emissions or by enhancing their sinks.
Supporters of the comprehensive approach, which included CANZ and most
Nordic countries, justified the approach on both economic and environmental
grounds. Economically, the comprehensive approach allows states to choose
which gases and sinks to focus on, so that they may determine for themselves
which abatement measures are most cost-effective. Environmentally, it
eliminates incentives to switch from one type of polluting activity to another
by focusing on aggregate levels of greenhouse gas emissions rather than any
specific gases, sinks, or activities.
Initially, supporters of the comprehensive approach differed about whether
to include greenhouse gases controlled under other legal instruments. The
United States sought to include CFCs in the comprehensive calculations,
although they are already scheduled to be phased out under the Montreal
Protocol.' Others opposed the inclusion of these gases, arguing that
crediting states under the Convention for actions already required under the
Montreal Protocol would constitute "double counting" and would allow certain
states to increase substantially their emissions of carbon dioxide.40 7 The INC
seemed to favor the latter approach, 40 ' although by the end of the negotia-
tions, new scientific evidence made the controversy over CFCs moot.4 9
Delegations at the INC generally accepted the theoretical merits of the
comprehensive approach,410 and it is mentioned favorably in both the
preamble and the principles article.41" In the context of targets and timeta-
405. Global warming potentials are a function of the heat-trapping potential of a gas and its
atmospheric lifetime. See IPCC SciENTiFnc ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at xviii-xix. The Montreal
Protocol uses a comprehensive approach, requiring parties to reduce their aggregate production of a
basket of gases listed in an annex based on the gases' "ozone depleting potentials." See Montreal
Protocol, supra note 73, art. 3 (calculation of control levels), annex A (ozone-depleting potentials).
406. Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 262, art. 2A(4). The United States argued that, if CFCs
were included, its greenhouse gas emissions in the year 2000 would be at levels equal to or below 1987
levels. U.S. AcTION AGENDA, supra note 385, at 2 (based on estimates of the effects of existing and
planned U.S. policies on energy, transportation, etc.).
407. By some estimates, if CFCs were included, the United States could stabilize emissions of
greenhouse gases while still increasing emissions of carbon dioxide by 15%. See Richard N. Mott,
Looking Through "America's Climate Change Strategy," Eco, Feb. 5, 1991, at 8.
408. Decision 1/1 of the INC stated that the commitments to limit and reduce net emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases were to go "beyond those required by existing agreements."
Report of 1st Session, supra note 188, at 24.
409. 1992 IPCC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 20 (reporting that reduction in greenhouse warming
resulting from ozone depletion by CFCs could negate greenhouse effect of increased CFCs). It is now
unclear whether CFCs have a net positive or negative effect on global warming.
410. However, some developing states viewed the comprehensive approach as inequitable, arguing
that methane emissions from subsistence agriculture should not be compared with carbon dioxide
emissions, because the former are "survival emissions," which cannot be controlled without irreparable
societal and economic damage.
411. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 18 (recognizing need for developed
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bles, however, some delegations argued that the comprehensive approach,
however theoretically desirable, was infeasible because of insufficient
knowledge about the sources, sinks, and global warming potentials of
greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide.412 In response, some observers
suggested that the comprehensive approach could be phased in, beginning with
sources and sinks that are well understood and adding others as knowledge
about them improves.413 Ultimately, the INC adopted somewhat ambiguous
language in Article 4(2), which refers to "levels of anthropogenic emissions
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol'414 without specifying whether emissions levels of greenhouse
gases should be considered collectively (i.e., the comprehensive approach),
or whether each gas should be accounted for separately.415 In any event, the
formulation is notable for singling out carbon dioxide and for clearly
excluding greenhouse gases controlled by the Montreal Protocol.4 6
The comprehensive approach raised another issue: some states argued that
the Convention should focus on gross greenhouse gas emissions; others
advanced a standard of net emissions, derived by subtracting the removal of
greenhouse gases by sinks from total emissions by sources. The United States,
CANZ, Finland, and Brazil were among those nations that pushed for a net
emissions approach, and successfully achieved its inclusion in Decision 1/1
of the INC.4"7 Others such as Switzerland, Germany, and Austria argued
that a net emissions approach, like the comprehensive approach generally, is
theoretically sound but impractical at the present time because of uncertainties
about the amounts of greenhouse gases removed by sinks. 4 8 The net
countries to have "comprehensive response strategies .. . that take into account all greenhouse gases,
with due consideration of their relative contributions to the enhancement of the greenhouse effect"), art.
3(3) (stating that "policies and measures to deal with climate change should . .. be comprehensive,
[and] cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouses gases").
412. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainties of sources other than
carbon dioxide). France, for example, justified giving special attention to carbon dioxide in part because
carbon dioxide emissions are best known. Informal Papers 1, supra note 189, at 11.
413. See Grubb, Pragmatics, supra note 160, at 349 (suggesting establishment of two lists, one
for controlled substances and the other for transition substances).
414. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(a).
415. The United Kingdom has expressed support for the latter interpretation, pointing to the use
of the plural form, "levels." See Grubb, Assessment, supra note 6, at 541. In its view, if the Convention
had intended to allow states to aggregate emissions of different greenhouse gases in a single
comprehensive figure, then it should have used the singular, "level."
416. Here as elsewhere, when the Convention refers to "greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol," it was intended to exclude only those gases actually subject to "control measures"
under the Montreal Protocol, not transitional substances currently subject to a reporting requirement but
not to control measures. Moreover, the reference to the Montreal Protocol was intended to include
existing and future adjustments and amendments to the Protocol as well as the Protocol itself.
417. Report of 1st Session, supra note 188, at 24 (referring to "[a]ppropriate commitments.., for
limiting and reducing net emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases").
418. Some sinks raise the problem of quantification: the carbon cycle is relatively well understood
in qualitative terms, but "the current quantitative estimates of sources and of sinks and of CO do not
balance; the atmospheric increase is less rapid than expected from carbon cycle models." Watson et al.,
supra note 19, at 17. Other sinks raise theoretical questions. One way around these problems would be
to implement a net emissions approach in stages, beginning with those sinks that can be most easily
quantified.
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emissions approach also implicated highly contentious questions about whether
to include sinks located in the global commons (i.e., ocean and atmospheric
sinks), and, if so, how to allocate them. 4 9 The INC did not resolve these
questions and ultimately rejected the proposal to define "sinks."
As with so many other issues, the Convention reflects a compromise on
the net emissions issue. Without explicitly setting either a net or gross
standard, the Convention refers several times to "emissions by sources and
removals by sinks" as a package;420 nevertheless, Article 4(2)'s quasi-target
and quasi-timetable relate only to emissions.
c. Joint Implementation
Since greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for a long time and
migrate globally, where emissions are reduced makes little difference to the
greenhouse effect. This suggests a further extension of the comprehensive
approach: namely, focusing on greenhouse gas emissions on a regional or
group basis, rather than on a country-by-country basis, so that countries may
implement their emissions limitations jointly.42' Joint implementation can
take two forms: (1) setting umbrella or joint targets that apply to a group of
countries collectively (creating "bubbles"), or (2) granting credits to a party
in achieving its own emissions target for projects it undertakes in other
countries. 4' The main rationale for joint implementation is cost-effective-
ness. Because of differing national circumstances, the costs of abatement
measures can vary substantially by country. If greenhouse gas emissions can
be reduced more cheaply in country A than in country B, then allowing B to
take advantage of this cost differential by funding an emissions reduction in
A is more efficient than requiring B to achieve the same reduction at
home.4z Such a scheme would reduce the costs of implementing the
Convention while advancing its ultimate goals.
A primary issue in designing a system of joint implementation is
determining its scope of application. One approach would permit joint
implementation at the regional level. For example, the EC policy of stabilizing
419. India, for example, has suggested that global sinks should be allocated on a per capita basis.
Under this approach, India has negative net emissions of greenhouse gases because of its large
population and relatively low emissions. Pacific island states, in contrast, have argued that states should
be allocated the sinks found within their exclusive economic zones. The INC declined to accept a
proposed principle that states have an equal right to ocean sinks. See supra note 310.
420. See, e.g., Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(l)(a), (b).
421. See generally Gary E. Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for
Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623 (1992); CICERO et al., Criteria and Guidelines for Joint
Implementation of Commitments, Feb. 19, 1992 (paper submitted to INC 5, on file with author); Ted
Hanisch, CICERO, Joint Implementation of Commitments to Curb Climate Change (Nov. 27, 1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The Montreal Protocol allows joint implementation to
a limited degree, for the purpose of industrial rationalization. Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, arts.
1(8),2(5).
422. See Marchant, supra note 421, at 641.
423. On the other hand, joint implementation can readily be subject to abuse, if countries simply





carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 provides for joint
implementation within the European Community.424 Alternatively, joint
implementation could be permitted among all countries that are subject to
specific quantitative commitments to limit emissions and enhance sinks - that
is, among developed states.4'
A third option would permit joint implementation on a general basis,
among both developing and developed states.426 Proposed by Norway, this
last scheme would be most economically efficient, since developing countries
tend to use energy less efficiently than developed countries and can attain
emissions reductions more cheaply. It would also have the added benefit of
encouraging the transfer of substantial financial resources and technology from
developed to developing countries pursuant to joint projects undertaken in
developing countries. To protect against possible abuse, however, the scheme
would have to set clear baselines from which to measure the emissions
reductions in developing countries that a developed country could count
towards meeting its target. Otherwise, a developing country could simply say
that it planned to increase its emissions, and then agree not to do so as part
of a "joint" project with a developed country seeking to reduce its calculated
level of emissions. Besides raising the possibility of fraudulent collusive
agreements, critics objected that joint implementation between developing and
developed countries would be unethical, since it would allow a developed state
to make its reductions abroad instead of taking responsibility at home. As a
compromise, Germany suggested that the credits given for emissions
reductions in developing countries be discounted so as to encourage developed
countries to take domestic measures unless joint implementation is substantial-
ly cheaper.427 This would make joint implementation attractive only when
the cost differential in developing countries exceeds the discount rate.
Ultimately, the proponents of joint implementation prevailed in the INC.
The Convention endorses the general concept of joint implementation, by
stating that "[e]fforts to address climate change may be carried out coopera-
tively by interested Parties,"42' and by permitting states to "imple-
ment. . . policies and measures jointly with other Parties." '429 Since these
provisions do not restrict which states may participate in joint implementation
424. EC Council Conclusions, supra note 122. Creating a bubble for the European Community's
stabilization target was necessary in order to obtain the support of Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
These countries, like developing countries of the South, want room to grow and are unwilling to commit
individually to stabilizing their greenhouse gas emissions. The Montreal Protocol established a precedent
for an EC bubble, by allowing members of regional economic integration organizations to fulfill jointly
their obligations respecting consumption, provided that their combined calculated level of consumption
does not exceed the specified limits. Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 2(8)(a).
425. See Netherlands Intervention, supra note 221, at 2 (proposing commitment of stabilization
of carbon dioxide emissions by industrialized countries individually or jointly).
426. Informal Papers II, supra note 205, at 17-19 (submission of Norway).
427. Statement of Prof. Ansgar Vogel, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection
and Nuclear Safety of Germany, Dec. 12, 1991 (on file with author). Germany also proposed that
credits not be given for measures to enhance sinks.
428. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(3).
429. Id. art. 4(2)(a).
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schemes, the clear implication is that a developed country may implement its
commitments jointly with any other country. To safeguard against possible
abuse, the Convention provides that "the Conference of the Parties shall, at
its first session, . . . take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementa-
tion."43 These criteria could potentially include the German suggestion to
discount the credits given for emissions reductions achieved through joint
implementation.
Two complementary mechanisms to promote joint implementation were
discussed in the INC but were not adopted. First, Norway proposed
establishing a clearinghouse to match proposed projects in developing
countries with sponsors among developed countries, and to monitor and verify
emissions reductions.431 Although many delegations expressed support for
this proposal, it was not incorporated into the Convention because of both a
lack of adequate time for consideration and a feeling that a clearinghouse
mechanism was overly ambitious so early in the development of the
Convention. Second, several delegations discussed establishing a system of so-
called "tradeable emissions rights." '432 Under this scheme, states would
initially be given an allocation of greenhouse gas emissions based on some
agreed criteria.433 States would then have the right either to emit their
allotment of greenhouse gases or to trade or lease their emissions rights to
other states. Proponents argued that a tradeable emissions scheme could
promote both efficiency (by inducing emissions reductions in those states
where they can be made most cheaply) and equity (through the initial
allocation of emissions rights).434 Even more ambitious and complex than
a clearinghouse mechanism, a tradeable emissions scheme was not seriously
considered for inclusion in the Convention. The quasi-target and quasi-
timetable actually contained in the Convention proved far too ambiguous to
have been the basis for tradeable emissions rights. However, if protocols are
430. Id. art. 4(2)(d).
431. Informal Papers II, supra note 205, at 19.
432. Id. at 17-20. The United States initially suggested the idea of tradeable emissions rights, but
later turned neutral on the issue after realizing that a provision on tradeable emissions rights would
make sense only if the Convention established quantitative emissions limitations (i.e., targets and
timetables), which the United States opposed. Tradeable emissions rights have been used in some
domestic environmental actions, including the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§
7651, 7661 (Supp. 1 1992). For a general discussion of emissions trading, see T.H. TIErENBERa,
EMISSIONS TRADITION: AN EXERCISE IN REFORmING POLLUTION POLICY (1985).
The tradeable emissions scheme was also discussed in the IPCC. IPCC RESPONs E STRATEGIES,
supra note 143, at 240-41. An extensive literature has developed on the possible use of tradeable
pollution rights to mitigate global warming. See, e.g., Jonathan Green & Philippe Sands, Establishing
an International System for Trading Pollution Rights, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 80 (Feb. 12, 1992);
Grubb, Targets, supra note 156; UNCTAD, TRADEABLE ENTITLEMENTS FOR CO2 ABATEMENT
(forthcoming).
433. Examples of such criteria include population, historical emissions, and gross national product.
434. For example, if emissions rights were allocated on the basis of population, developing
countries would start with a huge surplus, since their per capita emissions of greenhouse gases are very
low compared to developed states. As developed states bought the surplus emissions rights of developing
states, substantial resource transfers would occur. Grubb, Targets, supra note 156, at 84. Agreement
on such an allocation formula would, of course, be extremely difficult politically.
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eventually negotiated establishing firm targets and timetables, the tradeable
emissions mechanism could well be revived.435
4. Specific Commitments on Financial Resources and Technology Transfer
Along with targets and timetables, financial resources and technology
transfer were among the most controversial issues in the negotiations.436
These North-South issues have become prominent in international environmen-
tal negotiations only fairly recently. The Vienna Ozone Convention, adopted
in 1985, did not provide for the transfer of financial resources. Even the 1987
Montreal Protocol, which established specific control measures for developing
countries, contained only a very weak commitment by developed countries to
"facilitate the provision of subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance
programs. 437 Following Montreal, however, developing countries began to
assert that they would accept obligations to limit their use of ozone-depleting
substances only if developed states agreed to provide them with additional
financial resources and technology.438 The 1990 London Amendments
responded by establishing a World Bank-administered fund to help developing
countries implement the Montreal Protocol.439 For the most part, INC
discussions on financial transfers picked up where the negotiations for the
London Amendments left off,"0 and, from the outset, Working Group I's
mandate included the development of a text on "appropriate commitments on
adequate and additional financial resources" for developing countries."
a. Financial Resources
Transfers of financial resources to developing countries were proposed for
two general purposes: (1) to offset the various costs of implementing the
Convention's general commitments, and (2) to aid developing countries in
adapting to the adverse effects of climate change if steps taken under the
Convention fail to abate global warming adequately.
435. As the Indian delegation observed at INC 4, joint implementation is a halfway house to
tradeable emissions rights.
436. For background on these issues, see LAURA BULATAO & PHILIPPE SANDS, FINANCIAL
RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL FUNDING MECHANISMS FOR THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION
(Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL)-AOSIS Background Paper No. 3, 1991).
437. Montreal Protocol, supra note73, art. 5(3) (emphasis added). This commitment was designed
to achieve only the limited purpose of helping developing countries use alternative technologies and
substitute products. Id.
438. See BENEDICK, supra note 125, at 150-57; Caron, supra note 262, at 761.
439. London Amendments, supra note 262, art. 1(1).
440. Note that, as a strictly legal matter, the financial mechanism established by the London
Amendments was intended to be "without prejudice" to other international environmental negotiations.
London Amendments, supra note 262, art. 1(T).
441. Report of 1st Session, supra note 188, at 24.
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(1) Implementation Costs (Articles 4(3) and 12(3))
Although many observers believe that developing countries can reduce
emissions and enhance sinks more cheaply than developed countries,
developing countries' implementation costs are nevertheless likely to be high
relative to their ability to pay." 2 For this reason, developing countries
argued that they would assume general commitments to combat climate change
only if they received financial resources from developed countries to cover
their increased (or "incremental") costs." 3 Developed countries generally
accepted this position, but insisted in return that the channeling of money
occur through an appropriate financial mechanism;" that developing
countries accept at least some binding commitments, in particular, commit-
ments to report on their greenhouse gas emissions and national programs; and
that developing countries agree to establish institutions with adequate authority
to implement the Convention effectively. Although this quid pro quo was
rarely stated explicitly, it shaped the package that ultimately emerged from the
negotiations.
A number of questions arose over the specific terms on which financial
transfers would take place. The first related to whether economies in transition
were to be donors or recipients of financial assistance. During the negotia-
tions, the United States suggested that economies in transition be eligible to
receive financial assistance, but this proposal received little support, even
from the potential beneficiaries. Instead, the eastern European states were
satisfied with an exemption from any obligation to provide financial
resources. 445
The second question was whether the Convention should establish a fiscal
instrument to generate resources. The Toronto Conference Statement had
proposed raising money for climate change measures by imposing a levy on
fossil fuel consumption."' In the INC, however, there was little discussion
of creating an automatic mechanism to generate financial resources, such as
a carbon tax, emissions fees, or fines. Instead, developed countries are to
442. See BULATAO & SANDS, supra note 436, at 2. Implementation costs could include the costs
of developing inventories of sinks and sources; designing and implementing national programs for
emission reduction; conservation and management of sinks; research, education, and training; building
new facilities and introducing new technologies; meeting reporting requirements; and participating in
future convention activities and planning sessions.
443. As the Executive Director of UNEP stated:
Developing countries cannot be expected to accept the discipline of legally-binding
[commitments to reduce economic activities implicated in emissions of] greenhouse
gases ... unless they have [a] clear indication that they will receive the necessary financial
support to finance the major up-front investments associated with any significant action.
Mostafa K. Tolba, Carrying the Stone of Hope, Statement to the Third Plenary Session of IPCC, at 5-6,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 5-7, 1990 (on file with author).
444. See infra note 518 and accompanying text.
445. This issue was revisited at INC 7 in March 1993, where several OECD countries (including
the United States, Italy, and Switzerland) argued that GEF funds for global warming activities should
be available for countries with economies in transition. Several eastern European states expressed
support for this view.
446. Toronto Conference Statement, supra note 64, at 516.
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provide periodic contributions "through bilateral, regional, or other multilater-
al channels," including the Convention's financial mechanism.'
Related questions were whether developed nations would provide financial
assistance on a mandatory basis, and if so, whether the Convention should set
a minimum or assessed amount. Both the Noordwijk Declaration and the
SWCC Ministerial Declaration stated that "additional resources" should be
"mobilized" to help developing countries take action to deal with climate
change." In the INC, developing countries sought a commitment requiring
developed countries to provide financial assistance, while the United States
sought to make the provision of financial resources strictly voluntary. 449
Here the developing countries prevailed.
Nevertheless, the Convention does not mandate a specific level of funding.
In the UNCED negotiations, developing countries had sought a commitment
by developed countries to transfer a certain percentage of their gross national
product.45° In the INC, however, specific figures for financial transfers were
never proposed. 45' As an alternative to minimum financial transfers, some
developing countries suggested that developed countries be required to make
"assessed" contributions - that is, to provide specified amounts, possibly
determined by the COP.452 This proposal was also unsuccessful. Instead,
Article 4(3) simply stresses the "need for adequacy and predictability in the
flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the
developed country Parties. 141 While this provision lays down important
guidelines, the Convention allows each developed country to determine for
itself the size of its financial contribution. These sums will probably not be
known for some time, until more country studies are completed and the costs
of implementing the Convention are better known.454
447. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 11(5).
448. Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 71, at 599; SWCC Ministerial Declaration, supra note
123, at 535.
449. See Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. IV(2)(2)(a) ("developed country
Parties ... [shall commit ... ]/[will][may] provide on a voluntary basis] financial resources")
(brackets in original text). A similar issue arose with respect to contributions to the Interim Multilateral
Fund, established under the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol. London Amendments, supra
note 262, art. I(T); see also Jason M. Patlis, Note, The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol:
A Prototype for Financial Mechanisms in Protecting the Global Environment, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
181, 209 & n.187 (1992) (describing conflicting interpretations of provision that Interim Multilateral
Fund "shall be financed by contributions on the basis of the United Nations scale of assessments").
450. THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) 452 (Stanley P. Johnson ed., 1993) [hereinafter EARTH SUMMIT] ("Developed
countries reaffirm their commitments to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of
GNP for [Overseas Development Assistance] .... Some countries agree or have agreed to reach the
target by the year 2000."). The term "reaffirm" was used to exclude the application of this provision
to the United States, which has never accepted the 0.7% target.
451. Norway did suggest at INC 4 that financial transfers by developed countries should amount
to 1.1% of their GNP. Statement of Norway, Commitments on Financial Resources, Transfer of and
Cooperation on Technology 3 (undated) (on file with author).
452. Cf. London Amendments, supra note 262, art. 1im (setting contribution levels "on the basis
of the United Nations scale of assessments").
453. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(3).
454. At least initially, funding amounts will be determined through ongoing discussions about the
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Instead of seeking specific minimum sums, some developing countries
sought a more general commitment by developed countries to provide
"adequate, new and additional" financial resources. Although the exact
meaning of this phrase was never fully explained, the general thrust of the
developing countries' demands was clear: money to implement the Convention
should not be diverted from existing development aid, but should consist of
"new and additional" resources.' 5 In the INC, most Western countries were
willing to accept language requiring the provision of "new and additional"
financial resources, although the United States opposed this formulation until
near the end of the negotiations.
Also problematic was the demand by developing countries that financial
transfers should cover their "full incremental costs" in implementing the
Convention.45 6 Although the general concept of "incremental costs" is clear,
identifying these costs can be very difficult, if not impossible, since for many
types of actions there is no baseline from which to measure a country's
incremental costs.457 For this reason, states in general can more easily agree
on specific categories of costs to be funded rather than on a general definition
of "incremental costs." This was the approach taken under the London
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, where a list of categories of incremen-
tal costs was adopted by a decision of the parties."'
Ultimately, the parties resolved the financial resources issue by distin-
guishing between two types of financial transfers: (1) transfers to help
developing countries comply with their reporting obligations under Article
12(1); and (2) transfers to help developing countries implement other aspects
of the Convention, such as mitigation measures, research, information
GEF replenishment for the three-year period beginning in 1994. See Implementation of Article 11
(Financial Mechanism), U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 7th Sess., Agenda Item 2(a), at 11, U.N. Doe.
AIAC.237/26 (1993) [hereinafter Implementation of Article 11]. At its March 1993 meeting, the INC
requested the Secretariat to prepare a preliminary list of elements relevant to the assessment of funding
needs for this period. Id.
455. Interpretations of Phrases "Adequate New and Additional, 'New and Additional" and
'Adequate and Additional" Financial Resources, at 24, UNEP Doc. UNEP/Bio.DivIINC.4/4 (Aug.
16, 1991). The concept of "additionality" in the provision of financial resources is relatively new in
international environmental law. Although the need for additional financial resources for environmental
purposes has long been recognized, see BULATAO & SANDS, supra note 436, at 22 (citing reference to
"additional assistance" in 1972 Stockholm Action Plan), demands by developing countries for such
assistance did not pick up momentum until the late 1980s. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/207, supra note 144,
at 262 (recognizing "need to provide new and additional resources to developing countries" to address
environmental problems); G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 125, at 304 (calling on UNCED "to provide
new and additional resources, particularly to developing countries, for environmentally sound programs
and projects"); London Amendments, supra note 262, art. I(') (stating that contributions to Interim
Multilateral Fund should be "additional to other financial transfers").
456. Developing countries tended to demand payment of their "full incremental costs," while
developed countries countered with language referring to "agreed incremental costs." Article 4(3)
incorporates both adjectives, referring to "agreed full incremental costs."
457. For example, if a state built a new, more efficient power plant, it would be very difficult to
discern which of the construction costs were incurred in implementing the Convention, and which costs
would have been incurred by the state anyway in filling its energy needs.
458. UNEP, OZONE SECRETARIAT, HANDBOOK FOR THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES
THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER 96 (1991) [hereinafter MONTREAL PROTOCOL HANDBOOK].
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exchange, education, training, and public awareness.459 Developing coun-
tries were most immediately concerned with the former category of costs,
because those costs were their only definite costs of joining the Convention.
Developed countries were amenable to underwriting these costs fully,"
both because they want developing countries to develop and publish invento-
ries and reports and because the costs of doing so will be limited. In contrast,
developed countries resisted underwriting the other costs that may be incurred
by developing countries in addressing climate change, because such costs are
open-ended and potentially great. They could include the costs of building
hydroelectric or nuclear facilities to replace coal-fired power plants, or the
opportunity costs of not clearing forests for timber sales. Developed countries,
particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, wanted to ensure that
in accepting the Convention they would not be writing a blank check.
The Convention attempts both to protect developed countries' treasuries
and to satisfy developing countries' concerns about bearing the costs of
implementing the Convention. Under Article 4(3), developed countries will
provide "new and additional financial resources to. meet the agreed full costs
incurred by developing countries" in fulfilling their reporting requirements.
For other implementation measures taken pursuant to Article 4(1), developing
countries may propose projects to the Convention's financial mechanism. If
the financial mechanism approves the project, developing countries will
receive the "agreed full incremental costs" of the project. If the financial
mechanism rejects it; developed countries need not provide any funding."
(2) Adaptation Costs (Articles 4(4) and 12(3))
The issue of implementation costs focuses on who should pay for measures
to abate climate change; it does not address the question of who should bear
the costs of climate change if it actually occurs. Many of the states that would
be most affected by climate change do not contribute substantially to the
problem, and hence do not need much money to implement abatement
measures. If global warming does occur, however, they would incur
substantial costs. These costs fall into two related categories: (1) the costs of
adaptation measures (e.g., building sea walls to combat sea-level rise and
developing heat- and drought-resistant crops); and (2) the costs of damages
459. This approach was foreshadowed by a U.S. suggestion at the October 1989 IPCC workshop
on implementation that funding be offered in two phases: first, developed countries would provide
assistance for country assessments; then, additional assistance would be provided for implementation
measures. IPCC, Legal Measures Report, supra note 141, at 21.
460. For example, in February 1992, at the first part of INC 5, the United States announced that
it was providing $25 million to developing countries for national inventories and plans. See supra text
accompanying note 241.
461. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(3) (emphasis added). The language of
Article 4(3) is purposefully vague on the question of whether these financial resources are to be new
and additional. The second sentence (on financial resources for the other implementation measures) does
not specifically state that the resources will be "new and additional," but it does use the phrase "such
financial assistance," which may be a reference to the "new and additional" used in the first sentence
(on financial resources for reporting).
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caused by global warming (e.g., decreased agricultural yield, increased
disease, and coastal flooding).
Many scientists believe that past emissions of greenhouse gases make some
global warming inevitable, and the Convention nominally addresses the special
needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change." 2 In the discussions of financial commitments,
however, the INC focused on funding abatement measures rather than
adaptation. This emphasis is not surprising, since potential victim states had
less to offer the developed world in exchange for financial transfers than did
large developing countries like China, India, and Brazil. Because these latter
countries have very high projected emissions and could therefore make a
substantial contribution to the prevention of climate change by, for example,
promoting energy efficiency and using environmentally-sound technologies,
their participation in the Convention was considered by developed countries
to be crucial to its success. Moreover, financing measures to mitigate global
warming serves the interests of developed countries, since such measures have
global effects. In contrast, adaptation measures generate primarily local
benefits, so that developed countries have little incentive to fund adaptation
measures in other countries.
In an effort to focus attention on the potential adaptation costs of its
members, AOSIS proposed that the Convention establish an insurance fund
that would provide compensation for damages suffered as a result of sea-level
rise. 3 As discussed below, this proposal was successively whittled down.
The only remaining trace is a reference in Article 4(8) to insurance as one of
the possible measures to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing
countries, particularly those that are specially vulnerable.
In the closing days of the negotiations, however, AOSIS did succeed in
adding Article 4(4) to the Convention. This paragraph states that developed
countries "shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of
adaptation to those adverse effects.""4 The significance of this provision is
as yet unclear. Although AOSIS representatives viewed its inclusion as a
major victory," 5 parties seeking aid for adaptation costs may have difficulty
proving causation. Especially if the amount of sea-level rise is relatively
small, it will be difficult to establish that any particular harm is due to climate
change rather than natural variability. Moreover, in contrast to Article 4(3),
which calls for funding of the "agreed full incremental costs," Article 4(4)
does not require any particular degree of funding.466
462. Id. pmbl. para. 20, arts. 3(2), 4(8).
463. Elements Related to Mechanisms, INC/FCCC, 4th Sess., Working Group 1I, Agenda Item
2(b), at 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/WG.II/CRP.8 (1991) (draft annex relating to insurance submitted by
Vanuatu) [hereinafter Insurance Proposal]. See generally infra notes 539-543 and accompanying text.
464. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(4).
465. Cf. Sands, supra note 6, at 275 (predicting that this provision is likely to emerge as one of
more costly commitments in Convention).






A final category of costs are the "direct and indirect social and economic
costs... that may result from the implementation of the Conven-
tion. "'7 Such costs could include the economic losses to fossil-fuel produc-
ing states that would result from reductions in fossil fuel consumption by other
states. A proposal to provide financial resources for these costs was rejected,
and these costs are not encompassed in Article 4(3) or 4(4): Article 4(3)
covers only the "costs of implementation measures," not the indirect costs
resulting from those measures; Article 4(4) covers the costs of adaptation to
the adverse effects only of climate change itself, not of climate change
response measures.
b. Technology Transfer (Articles 4(5) and 12(3))
Technology cooperation and transfer is closely related to the issue of
financial resources." s Delegations generally agreed on the importance of
technology transfer and on the need to view technology broadly (to include
"know how" as well as hardware).4"9 INC discussions on this issue centered
on the terms of technology transfer.47 Developing countries initially sought
Under the general law of state responsibility, states adversely affected by climate change may have
rights and remedies outside of Article 4(4). Stockholm Principle 21provides that states have a duty to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to other states. Cf Climate Change
Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. para. 8. If this is in fact a legal norm, it follows that states could be
held responsible for damage to other states for injuries caused by activities such as emissions of
greenhouse gases. The injured states could pursue general international law remedies, although they
would face formidable difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction and establishing causation. A number of
South Pacific island states issued formal interpretive declarations reaffirming that the Convention does
not prejudice existing rights under international law relating to state responsibility. See, e.g.,
Supplement to U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/10, at 9 (statement of Kiribati) (entering understanding "that
signature and/or ratification of the Convention shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights
under international law concerning state responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change, and that
no provisions in the Convention can be interpreted as derogating from the principles of general
international law").
467. Revised Text, supra note 238, art. 4(2)(2).
468. See generally M. BLAKENEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1989); Peter Lawrence, Technology Transfer Funds and the Law: Recent
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 4 J. ENVTL. L. 15
(1992); Gordon J. MacDonald, Technology Transfer: The Climate Change Challenge, 1 J. ENV'T &
DEV. 1 (1992).
469. Currently, developing countries face a number of barriers to obtaining and using technologies,
including lack of necessary institutions and trained personnel; social factors that inhibit innovation;
insufficient capital to purchase, operate, and maintain new technologies; and legal barriers and
restrictive trade practices. IPCC Legal Measures Report, supra note 141, at 5-6. Remedies include
providing greater financial resources; enhancing institutional and technical infrastructure; establishing
incentives for private sector transfers; resolving questions concerning intellectual property protection;
and improving the dissemination of information, possibly through the creation of an international
clearinghouse. Id. at 2.
470. One of the few questions on the content of technology transfer involved nuclear power.
Throughout the INC and the UNCED preparatory processes, Saudi Arabia sought to include the words
"safe and" before every reference to "environmentally sound technologies." This was generally regarded
as a barbed reference to nuclear power, which many states regard as unsafe. As the major producer of
529
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a commitment by developed countries to transfer technology on "concessional
and preferential terms." They argued that, to implement the Convention, they
needed access to environmentally sound technologies at an affordable
cost.47' Some even suggested that the Convention provide for "assured
access to technology" or "compulsory licensing." In contrast, developed
countries emphasized technology "cooperation" rather than "transfer" and the
need to protect intellectual property rights in order to preserve incentives for
innovation.472 Most were willing to agree to the transfer of technology only
on "fair and most favorable terms. "'4 Since the rights to most technologies
are privately held, developed countries argued that governments could not
commit to their transfer.
For reasons not fully apparent, developing countries decided to press the
technology transfer issue at UNCED rather than in the INC, and accepted a
quite moderate provision in the Convention which does not define the terms
on which transfers will occur.474 Instead, Article 4(5) requires developed
countries simply "to take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound
technologies and know-how to other Parties," and to support the "development
and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing
country Parties. "
5. Special Circumstances (Article 4(8)-(10))
The Convention gives special consideration to categories of countries that
may be particularly affected either by climate change itself or by the response
measures taken to mitigate climate change, or that require special help in
nuclear energy, France in particular objected to the Saudi proposal. In the INC, the Saudis ultimately
did not insist on including a reference to "safe" technologies, but at UNCED they were more
unrelenting, and this issue was resolved only on the final night of the conference, with the inclusion in
Agenda 21 of a general provision stating that references to "environmentally sound" technologies mean
"safe and environmentally sound." EARTH SuMMrr, supra note 450, at 130. In addition, India called
in the INC for the transfer of "state of the art" technology.
471. Set of Informal Papers Provided by Delegations, Addendum 15, INC/FCCC, 4th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 3, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/Misc. I/Add. 15 (1991) (statement of Ghana on
behalf of G-77). The G-77 suggested that international mechanisms be established to purchase patents
on privately-held technologies for transfer to developing countries on a non-commercial basis. The G-77
statement also emphasized the need to develop endogenous capacity, to develop long-term partnerships,
and to stimulate private sector transfers. Id. at 3-4.
472. The United States in particular argued that technology transfer would be useful only if it took
place within the broader context of technology cooperation, including assessment, training, and other
capacity-building programs.
473. This was the standard adopted during the ozone negotiations. See London Amendments, supra
note 262, art. 1(U).
474. A number of Western delegations proposed that the technology transfer provision be a general
commitment, applicable to all parties. If this proposal had been adopted, it would have allowed
developed countries to argue that developing countries have an obligation to promote technology transfer
by creating the proper climate for investment in innovation, i.e., by protecting intellectual property
rights. The limitation of the technology transfer commitment to developed countries was thus a victory
for developing countries, and may account in part for their moderation on the "terms of transfer" issue.
475. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(5).
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implementing the Convention. Article 4(8) requires the parties to give "full
consideration" to the specific needs of developing countries that are particular-
ly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change or the impact of
implementing response measures.476 The legal effect of this provision is
questionable, and it may well have been included for purely political purposes
so that particular categories of countries could receive explicit recognition in
the Convention. Although it does not limit the type of consideration that may
be given to vulnerable states, it specifically mentions actions relating to
funding, insurance, and the transfer of technology. The provision therefore
appears to be related to Article 4(4)-(5), which requires developed countries
to provide financial resources for adaptation costs and to facilitate the transfer
of technology. However, Article 4(8) establishes no meaningful priorities for
the provision of financial resources and technology, since most (if not all)
developing countries would appear to fall into one or more of the specified
categories. These categories include low-lying coastal, transit, and land-locked
countries; small island countries; fossil-fuel dependent countries;' and
countries with semi-arid areas, areas liable to drought and desertification,47
forested areas, areas prone to natural disaster, areas of high urban atmospher-
ic pollution, and areas with fragile ecosystems such as mountains.479
The last two paragraphs of Article 4 address the special needs and
concerns of two additional categories of states. Article 4(9) singles out least
developed countries for financial and technology transfers. It does not
differentiate between funding for implementation and adaptation costs, and
therefore seems to apply to both. Article 4(10), included at the insistence of
Australia, addresses the needs of countries that may be economically harmed
by climate change response measures, particularly countries with economies
that are highly dependent on the production, processing, export and/or
consumption of fossil fuels. The parties are to "take into consideration [the
situation of these states] in the implementation of the commitments of the
Convention." Since developing countries that are highly dependent on fossil
fuels are already entitled to special consideration under Article 4(8), the
distinctive feature of Article 4(10) is its applicability to developed countries
that produce fossil fuel (e.g., United States, Australia, and Russia). In this
regard, it could potentially be cited by developed states to qualify their
commitments under Article 4(2).
476. These provisions elaborate preamblular paragraphs 19 and 20. The final sentence of Article
4(8) authorizes the COP to "take actions, as appropriate, with respect to this paragraph."
477. Since the financial commitments set forth in Article 4(3)-(4) do not extend to economic harms
resulting from the implementation of response measures, it is unclear what type of consideration could
be given pursuant to this provision to fossil-fuel producing states.
478. At INC 4, African states introduced a provision calling for the development and adoption of
a "green plan" to protect and rehabilitate ard and semi-arid areas affected by drought and desertification
in Africa. Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. IV(3)(2). This provision was dropped
during the final session in New York. At UNCED, African states were more successful. At their
insistence, Agenda 21 includes a provision calling for the negotiation of a convention on desertification.
EARTH SuMirr, supra note 450, at 252.
479. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, at art. 4(8)(a)-(i).
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E. Institutions and Mechanisms for Implementation
At the third session in Nairobi, the co-chairs of Working Group II
identified seven basic implementation functions: (1) scientific assessment, (2)
national reporting on implementation, (3) implementation review, (4)
secretariat support, (5) dispute settlement, (6) financial transfer, and (7)
technology transfer. Notably missing from this list were liability, and
enforcement, a clear reflection of the prevalent view that the Convention
should play a facilitative and consultative role, not a punitive one.
Initially, negotiators discussed ambitious implementation mechanisms,
including establishment of a new green fund and/or a technology clearing-
house,480 designation of national assessment bodies,4"' monitoring and
verification by an international body,482 non-compliance procedures, 483 and
compulsory dispute settlement. 484 As the discussions in the INC wore on,
however, it became increasingly clear that many countries remained deeply
skeptical of strong international machinery. On the one hand, many develop-
ing countries feared that developed countries would dominate the Convention's
machinery and use it to intrude on their sovereignty, much as the IMF and the
World Bank have done in the past. For these countries, it was not enough that
the Convention created differential obligations; they did not want it to
establish institutions that could review their national policies and actions. On
the other hand, many developed countries did not wish to entrust their money
to a new and untested financial mechanism. Thus, innovative institutional and
procedural mechanisms tended to come under criticism from one or both
sides. As a result, the Convention breaks little new ground on implementation
matters.
1. Institutions485
The Convention establishes or defines five institutions: (a) a conference
of the parties, (b) a secretariat, (c) a subsidiary body for scientific and
technological advice, (d) a subsidiary body for implementation, and (e) a
financial mechanism. Delegations generally agreed on the need for both a
conference of the parties to provide general policy review and guidance, and
a secretariat to provide technical support. However, they differed about
whether to create additional bodies and, if so, which ones. Developed states,
which generally supported detailed implementation mechanisms, sought to
delegate technical functions relating to science and implementation to
subsidiary bodies, so that the COP would not be overburdened. European
480. See Single Text, supra note 227, at 60.
481. Id. at 8.
482. Id. at 23-24.
483. Id. at 24.
484. Id. at 36.
485. For an excellent discussion of institutional issues in international environmental agreements,
see LEE A. KIMBALL, WORLD REsoURcEs INST., FORGING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT: STRENGTH-
ENING INTER-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1992).
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states tended to prefer institutions composed of independent experts, while the
United States argued that technical bodies would be more politically
acceptable and effective if composed of government experts. In contrast,
developing states, led by India and China, tended to support less extensive
implementation mechanisms and questioned the need for additional bodies,
although they did agree with the United States that, if additional bodies were
established, such bodies should be composed of government representatives.
The only new institution supported by the developing states was a climate fund
to serve as the financial mechanism for the Convention. Ultimately, the INC
created two bodies subsidiary to the COP: one to provide scientific and
technological advice, the other to facilitate implementation. In addition, the
Convention defines a financial mechanism, whose operation will initially be
entrusted to the GEF. To preserve flexibility, the Convention gives the COP
authority to create additional subsidiary bodies as needed.
a. Conference of the Parties (Article 7)
The COP is the "supreme" decision-making body of the Convention.4" 6
The COP's primary functions are to make the decisions necessary to promote
the implementation of the Convention, and to review its effectiveness
regularly." 7 In carrying out these functions, the COP is specifically autho-
rized to examine the parties' obligations and the institutional arrangements
under the Convention; review the adequacy of the commitments in Article
4(2) of the Convention; facilitate, upon request, the coordination of national
measures; and make recommendations on any matters necessary to realize the
goals of the Convention. Meetings of the COP are to take place annually and
are likely to play a crucial role in determining the effectiveness and future
evolution of the Convention. These meetings will provide a forum for
discussions among states and between states and NGOs, focus public attention
on the problem of climate change, and bring peer and public pressure on
states to comply with and strengthen their commitments under the Conven-
tion. 48 8
In addition to these primary functions, the COP is responsible for a
number of specific tasks and routine functions. For instance, the COP is to
develop methodologies for calculating national inventories of greenhouse gases
486. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art 7(2).
487. Some developed countries sought a stronger formulation, giving the COP the mandate to
"ensure" (rather than "promote") the effective implementation of the Convention "and its further
development." But several countries (including the United States) questioned the latter phrase, arguing
that it prejudged whether the Convention would need further development.
488. William A. Nitze et al., Shaping Institutions to Build New Partnerships: Lessons from the Past
and a Vision for the Future, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 162, at 337, 346
(discussing core role of COP); cf. Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance
Regime under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 565 (1991) (noting that every meeting
of Montreal Protocol parties has been of "enormous importance, even if just to build a groundswell of
support for strengthening amendments").
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and the effectiveness of efforts to limit emissions and enhance sinks. 489 It
must also adopt criteria and guidelines for joint implementation and report-
ing, 490 and designate a permanent secretariat.49 1 The COP is to manage the
implementation of the Convention's financial provisions by negotiating with
the entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism,492 and by
deciding whether to maintain the interim financial arrangements. 493 The
COP's more routine functions include establishing and reviewing reports by
subsidiary bodies,494 and adopting rules of procedure and financial
rules. 495 A savings clause, allowing the COP to exercise such other func-
tions as are required to achieve the Convention's objective, ensures that the
COP will not be vulnerable to challenges to its legal authority. The Conven-
tion leaves open whether the COP will make decisions by consensus or use
some type of majority rule. At its first session, the COP will adopt rules of
procedure which "may include specified majorities for the adoption of
particular decisions. 496
In a departure from the standard clause on observers found in other
agreements, the Convention allows non-state observers to the United Nations
or its specialized agencies to attend the COP as observers.49 7 The United
States accepted this formulation to forestall questions that might otherwise
arise about the Palestinian Liberation Organization's competence to attend the
COP as a "state" member of U.N. specialized agencies. The Convention also
permits qualified NGOs to attend meetings as observers unless at least one-
third of the parties present object.495 Given the prominent role that NGOs
played in the INC's deliberations, many participants regarded this as an
important means of promoting transparency and focusing public attention on
the COP's work.
b. Secretariat (Articles 8 and 21(1))
Two general issues arose with respect to the Secretariat: first, the scope
of its authority; and second, whether to use an existing institution or to create
a new one. Some commentators and delegations suggested a broad role for the
Secretariat in monitoring compliance, modelled on the verification functions
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, most
delegations preferred to establish a secretariat with strictly administrative
functions. Some even raised questions about the scope of the Secretariat's
power to prepare reports, fearing that the Secretariat's reports might reflect
489. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, arts. 4(l)(a), 4(2)(c)-(d), 7(2)(d).
490. Id. art. 4(2)(d).
491. Id. art. 8(3).
492. Id. art. 11(3).
493. Id. art. 11(4).
494. Id. art. 7(2)G).
495. Id. art. 7(2)(k).
496. Id. art. 7(3).




adversely on particular parties. Thus, Article 8 authorizes the Secretariat to
arrange for sessions of the COP, to facilitate assistance to parties in preparing
their reports, to compile and transmit reports submitted to it by others, and
to coordinate with secretariats established under other international agree-
ments. However, Article 8 does not authorize the Secretariat to collect data
or review or report on the implementation of the Convention by the par-
ties. 4
99
Although many delegations expressed support for using the INC Secretar-
iat as the permanent secretariat for the Convention, the Convention maximizes
flexibility by leaving open which institution shall serve as the Secretariat.
After the Convention enters into force, the INC Secretariat will continue to
carry out secretariat functions on an interim basis and will prepare for the first
COP.5" The COP shall then decide whether to continue this arrangement,
designate another existing institution to serve as the secretariat, such as UNEP
or WMO, or create a new institution.
c. Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (Article 9)
Although decisions under the Convention are to be based on the best
available scientific information,5 ' not all states were convinced of the merits
of establishing a new science committee. Some developing countries argued
that the IPCC could adequately provide scientific assessments and advice to
the COP. In response, other states argued that a new committee would help
keep politics out of the IPCC, and would serve as a useful interface between
outside scientific groups and the Convention's institutions. At times during the
negotiations it appeared that, because of these differences, the Convention
would not establish a science committee or would let the COP determine its
composition, functions, and procedures. In the end, however, the Convention
not only establishes a science committee, but also specifies its composition
and functions. However, as a concession to developing countries, who were
particularly concerned about technology development and transfer, the
mandate of the body was expanded to include technological as well as
scientific matters.
Under Article 9, the Scientific and Technological Committee will assess
the state of scientific knowledge and the effects of measures taken to
implement the Convention, and provide information on innovative, efficient,
and state-of-the-art technologies. 02 Given the Committee's multi-disciplinary
499. Id. art. 8(2)(b). In this respect, the Convention's Secretariat will be similar to secretariats
established by other international environmental agrements, which typically have very limited authority.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
ARE NOT WELL MONITORED, GAO/RCED-92-43, at 29-30 (1992) (noting that secretariats typically do
not verify data or assess compliance).
500. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 21(1).
501. Id. pmbl. para. 16 ("steps required to understand and address climate change will be
environmentally, socially and economically most effective if they are based on relevant scientific,
technical and economic considerations").
502. Id. art. 9(2)(a)-(c).
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character, its mandate could potentially include economic and social issues.
The Committee is to provide information and advice only to the COP and its
subsidiary bodies."3 This limitation reflects the concern of some states that
providing advice directly to individual parties could be intrusive.
The Scientific and Technological Committee will be open to all parties and
will be composed of government representatives "competent in the relevant
field of expertise. 5I AOSIS and some European states had preferred a
more independent group of experts with limited membership. However, most
developing countries insisted on having government representatives on the
Committee, and the United States argued that an open-ended, governmental
group would best be able to serve as a liaison between primarily scientific
bodies (such as the IPCC) and the politically-oriented COP. Although Article
9 does not specifically address the relationship between the new committee
and the IPCC, it does stipulate that the Committee is to draw upon "existing
competent international bodies" in carrying out its functions. 5 Presumably
the IPCC will be among those consulted; 6 however, the Convention's only
specific reference to the IPCC appears in the provision for interim arrange-
ments. 507
d. Subsidiary Body for Implementation (Article 10)
For a time during the negotiations, it appeared possible that an implemen-
tation committee with strong technical review powers would be established.
Both the Consolidated Working Document and the Revised Text Under
Negotiation contained bracketed provisions establishing an implementation
committee with authority to receive information from international and non-
governmental organizations, and to review individual parties' reports.0 '
Developed countries initially proposed giving it two general functions: first,
providing technical assistance to the parties in developing inventories,
formulating national strategies, and meeting the Convention's reporting
requirements; and, second, reviewing and reporting on the implementation of
the Convention on a global and national basis. Austria suggested that this
latter function might include quasi-adjudicative authority to resolve questions
relating to a country's implementation of or compliance with the Convention.
503. Id. art. 9(2)(e).
504. Id. art. 9(1).
505. Id. art. 9(2).
506. In mid-March 1993, the new INC Chair, Raul Estrada of Argentina, wrote to the IPCC
requesting its input on, inter alia, the greenhouse warming potentials of different gases, the impacts of
climate change, and methodologies for assessing the global results of measures taken under the
Convention. Although the Chair did not have the INC's authorization to send the letter, most delegations
accepted his action. This marked the first time that the INC made a specific request to the IPCC for
information.
507. Id. art. 21(2) (providing for cooperation between the interim Secretariat and the IPCC "to
ensure that the [IPCC] can respond to the need for objective scientific and technical advice").




However, a number of developing countries, in particular India and China,
objected strongly to international review of their national energy, transporta-
tion, and industrial policies, and threatened to block the adoption of the
Convention if it provided for an implementation committee. An eleventh-hour
compromise to narrowly define the powers of the implementation body broke
the impasse. The Implementation Committee's function was reduced to
assessing "the overall aggregated effect of the steps taken by the Parties" and
considering the reports of developed countries in order to assist the COP in
reviewing whether to amend the Convention's specific commitments on
sources and sinks."c9 The Implementation Committee has no express
authority to assess the steps taken by individual developing states to implement
the Convention.51 Nevertheless, even these limited functions are more
extensive than those of the Secretariat or the Scientific and Technological
Committee, which do not have any monitoring or reviewing role under the
Convention.
The Implementation Committee's functions include assisting the COP in
preparing and implementing its decisions."' For reasons not altogether
clear, the Implementation Committee's technical assistance functions were
dropped from Article 10. The Convention instead divides these functions
between the COP, which is to arrange for the provision of technical and
financial support," 2 and the Secretariat, which is to facilitate assistance in
the compilation and communication of reports.513
Like the Science and Technological Committee, the Implementation
Committee will be open-ended and will consist of government representatives
who are expert on matters related to climate change." 4 The Convention
makes no special provision for participation by NGOs at the Implementation
Committee's meetings as it does for meetings of the COP.515
509. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 10(2).
510. Id. art. 10(1)(a). By comparison, the Implementation Committee established by the London
Amendments has authority to review data and consider questions regarding an individual state's
compliance with the Montreal Protocol, although it, too, lacks authority to undertake investigations or
to enforce its decisions. See Barratt-Brown, supra note 488, at 543.
511. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 10(1). These would have been among the main
functions of a proposed executive committee suggested by France and Norway at INC 3 and 4.
Explanatory Note on the Proposal for Establishing an Executive Committee, INC/FCCC, 4th Sess.,
Agenda Item 2(b), U.N. Doc. AIAC.237/WG.II/CRP.6/Add.1 (1991); Consolidated Working
Document, supra note 235, art. VI(2) (listing functions). As explained by these countries, the executive
committee would have played a more political, policy-oriented role than the Implementation Committee,
which was to be technical in nature. In addition, creating two institutions would have allowed for
different membership - an executive committee with governmental members and an implementation
committee with expert members. However, once it was decided that the Implementation Committee
would have government representatives, this latter rationale for creating a separate executive committee
diminished. In the end, most delegations instead preferred limiting the number of new institutions by
creating a single committee.
512. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 12(7).
513. Id. art. 8(2)(c).
514. C. Barratt-Brown, supra note 488, at 568 (criticizing composition of Montreal Protocol's
Implementation Committee, which consists of state representatives, who "pursue violations far less
aggressively and tend to politicize the committee's work," rather than independent experts).
515. At INC 7; the Secretariat introduced draft rules of procedure pursuant to which meetings of
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e. Financial Mechanism (Articles 11 and 21(3))
After the targets and timetables issue, perhaps the most controversial issue
in the entire negotiation was whether the Convention should establish a new
financial institution - a so-called "climate" or "green" fund - or channel
financial assistance through the existing GEF,1 6 a joint project of the World
Bank, UNEP, and UNDP. 17 Many developed countries did not wish to
entrust their money to a new and untested financial mechanism, potentially
under the sway of developing countries. Instead, they argued that the GEF
should serve as the financial mechanism for the Convention. 18
In contrast, the South argued that since providing financial assistance to
developing countries that participate in efforts to curb climate change is an
obligation, not charity, donor countries do not have a right to control the
subsidiary bodies would be held in "priyate," unless otherwise stipulated by the COP, Rules of
Procedure of the Conference of the Parties, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 7th Sess., Agenda Item 3(a),
Rule 30(b), at 9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/27 (1993). Under general U.N. practice, "private" meetings
are closed to accredited observers from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
Delegations that favor allowing NGO attendance suggested that the draft rule be amended or that it be
accompanied by an interpretive statement that the label "private" indicates that meetings are closed to
the public and press, but open to accredited observers. The INC will continue its discussions of the draft
rules of procedure at future sessions.
516. The Global Environment Facility was established in 1990 to help developing countries deal
with four global environmental problems: (1) global warming, (2) pollution of international waters, (3)
destruction of biological diversity, and (4) depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. The GEF provides
grant or concessional funding for technical assistance, pre-investment and investment projects, and, to
a lesser extent, research. Three implementing agencies share responsibility for the program: the U.N.
Development Program provides technical assistance and helps to identify projects through pre-investment
studies; UNEP provides environmental expertise and serves as the secretariat for the Scientific and
Technical Advisory Panel, which reviews proposed projects; and the World Bank chairs and administers
the Facility. See generally, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, Dec. 1991 (brochure issued by three
implementing agencies) [hereinafter GEF BROCHURE]; U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), The
Global Environment Facility, 3 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 137 (1991); The Global Environment Facility, OUR
PLANET, No. 3, 1991, at 10. The GEF's three-year pilot phase will end in December 1993. GEF
participants are currently discussing proposals to restructure the GEF beyond the pilot phase. GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, THE PILOT PHASE AND BEYOND (Working Paper Ser. No. 1, May 1992)
[hereinafter GEF PILOT PHASE].
517. This debate echoed the negotiations on the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol,
which led to the creation of an Interim Multilateral Fund. See BENEDICK, supra note 125, at 152-61,
183-88; Rene Bowser, History of the Montreal Protocol's Ozone Fund, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at
636-38 (Nov. 20, 1991); Lawrence, supra note 468, at 19; Patiis, supra note 449, at 182 (analyzing
Fund as specific financial mechanism and prototype for financial mechanisms for other environmental
problems). Since the GEF had not yet been created when the London Amendments were adopted,
negotiators debated whether the London Amendments should create a new fund or use the World Bank
as the financial mechanism for the Montreal Protocol.
518. At INC 4, the United States and the United Kingdom were the principal proponents of giving
full authority to the GEF. The European Community and a number of other Western countries,
including Norway and Switzerland, proposed creating a new fund within the GEF, administered by the
World Bank but under the general policy direction of the COP. In essence, this was the model of the
Interim Multilateral Fund established by the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, which
operates under the general policy direction of the parties, is governed by a 14-member executive body
comprised of an equal number of developed and developing country parties, and is administered through
the World Bank. See Bowser, supra note 517, at 638; Patlis, supra note 449, at 200-01. By the
February 1992 session, however, the EC and U.S.-U.K. positions converged, and the EC became a
strong proponent of the GEF. U.S.-EC Proposal, Feb. 27, 1992 (on file with author).
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financial mechanism. Consequently, channelling financial assistance through
existing development institutions such as the World Bank would be inappropri-
ate, because these institutions are dominated by the North. Developing
countries opposed use of the GEF in particular, arguing that its decision-
making is not transparent (since there is no right of access to documents and
meetings) or democratic (since the World Bank, which chairs and administers
the GEF, uses a system of weighted voting). They proposed establishing a
completely new institution that would operate under the collective authority
of the contracting parties.519
In the end, the North and South agreed on a compromise solution that
neither establishes a new institution nor conclusively designates the GEF as
the financial mechanism for implementing the Convention. Article 11 simply
"defines" a financial mechanism by setting forth the mechanism's general
characteristics and governance. The GEF is entrusted with the operation of the
financial mechanism only until the first meeting of the COP, 2' when the
COP will decide whether to make this arrangement permanent . 2' Although
it is likely the COP will continue the arrangement with the GEF, Article 11
permits the COP to authorize any other existing international entity or entities,
such as the UNDP, to operate the financial mechanism.5"
Article 11 contains several clauses that seem to be constructively
ambiguous or silent on certain issues."2 In designating the GEF as the
interim financial mechanism, the Convention states that the GEF should be
expanded so that it has "universal" membership (i.e., be open to all states)
and be "appropriately restructured."'524 Although these clauses appear to
refer to the requirement that the financial mechanism have "an equitable and
balanced representation of all parties, '"" it is unclear what that requirement
519. Elements Related to Mechanisms, INC/FCCC, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 2(b), at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.237/WG.Hl/CRP.9 (1991) (proposing International Climate Fund to be "distinct and independent
from other funds and international financial institutions"). In the UINCED Preparatory Committee,
developing countries made two proposals for a separate fund. China proposed the establishment of a
"Green Fund." Letter from Penmanent Representative of China, U.N. GAOR Prep. Comm. for
UNCED, 3d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 7, U.N. Doc. AICONF.1511PCI85 (1991). In
addition, Brazil and Argentina proposed the establishment of a Fund for the Promotion of Sustainable
Development, and suggested several methods for contributions to the Fund: compulsory contributions
(possibly based on consumption rates), issuance of bonds, and issuance of an environmental stamp.
Position Paper Submitted by Argentina and Brazil: Financial Resources, U.N. GAOR Prep. Comm. for
UNCED, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 2(c), at 3-4, 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/93 (1991).
520. There was considerable debate about how to effectuate the interim designation of the GEF as
the financial mechanism of the Convention. OECD states wished to do so in Article 11 itself, while
developing countries thought it should be done in a separate resolution. In the end, the parties created
a separate article on interim arrangements, which designates the GEF as the interim financial
mechanism. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 21(3). Although the location in the
Convention has no legal significance, developing countries for political reasons did not wish to refer
to the GEF in the financial mechanism article of the Convention.
521. Id. arts. 11(4), 21(3).
522. Id. art. 11(1), (4).
523. These issues have been the subject of continuing discussions at INC 6 and 7. See generally
Implementation of Article 11, supra note 454.
524. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 21(3).
525. Id. art. 11(2).
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entails. For instance, the United States contends that the present weighted
voting system of the World Bank is "equitable and balanced," while
developing countries prefer a system in which each party would have an equal
vote.
526
Another ambiguity involves the relationship between the COP and the
financial mechanism. The nature of this relationship would be particularly
problematic if the GEF continued to serve as the financial mechanism, since
it has a governance structure independent of the Convention. Developed states
wished to maintain the autonomy of the GEF, particularly in deciding which
projects to fund.527 In contrast, developing countries wanted the financial
mechanism to be under the "authority" or "supervision" of the COP. Article
11 resolves this difference by distinguishing between general policy guidance
and specific funding decisions. It provides that the COP is to decide on
policies, programme priorities, and eligibility criteria, but does not give the
COP decision-making authority in project selection. Instead, Article 11
provides only that the COP and the financial mechanism agree on modalities
"to ensure that the funded projects . . . are in conformity with the policies,
programme priorities, and eligibility criteria established by the Conference of
the Parties," as well as on modalities by which funding decisions may be
"reconsidered. "528 Article 11 does provide that the financial mechanism is
to "function under the guidance of and be accountable to the COP.t 5 29
Accountability seems to suggest something between "authority" and "guid-
ance," but the exact content of the financial mechanism's obligation under
Article 11 remains unclear. Some developed countries asserted that the
provision of reports would satisfy that obligation; however, nothing in the
language of Article 11 states that reports are sufficient to meet, and are not
merely consistent with, the requirements of accountability.530
526. One model of "equitable and balanced representation" is the Executive Committee of the
Interim Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol, where developed and developing states each have
seven representatives. A two-thirds majority, which must include a majority of the representatives of
each bloc that are present and voting, is required for decisions, giving each bloc a veto power.
MONTREAL PROTOCOL HANDBOOK, supra note 458, at 98.
527. Under existing procedures, independent experts initially screen and perform technical reviews
of all project proposals. Proposals that pass this hurdle are submitted to the GEF's Implementation
Committee, which consists of representatives of the three implementing agencies (the World Bank,
UNDP, and UNEP). Projects selected by the Committee are reviewed by the GEF participants at their
biannual meetings and then returned to the sponsoring agency for final approval according to the
agency's regular procedures. GEF BROCHURE, supra note 516, at 7.
528. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. l1(3)(a)-(b). At INC 7, most delegations
appeared to prefer elaborating these modalities in informal arrangements with the GEF, rather than in
a legally-binding agreement. But cf. Jacob D. Werksman, The Convention, Its Financial Mechanism
and the GEF: A Legal Agreement on Accountability (Foundation for International Environmental Law
and Development (FIELD) Working Paper, March 1993) (arguing for negotiation of agreement between
COP and entity operating financial mechanism).
529. Id. art. 11(1) (emphasis added); cf. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art.
21(1), 31 I.L.M. 822, 831 ("The [financial] mechanism shall function under the authority and guidance
of, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties"); London Amendments, supra note 262, art.
I(T) ("The Multilateral Fund shall operate under the authority of the Parties who shall decide on its
overall policies.").
530. Similar issues arose in the biological diversity negotiations and in meetings of the GEF
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Although Article 11 states that the financial mechanism is to provide
financial resources on a grant or concessional basis,53' it does not specify
the purposes for which financial resources may be provided. In particular, it
does not state whether the financial mechanism may be used to provide
financial resources to particularly vulnerable states for adaptation costs
pursuant to Article 4(4).532 Currently, the GEF is not authorized to make
grants for projects that have local rather than global benefits,533 and hence
could not provide funding for adaptation costs. The United States successfully
opposed AOSIS proposals to insert a phrase in Article 11 which would have
explicitly encompassed compensation for adaptation costs. This preserves the
position of donor countries that the GEF be limited to projects that have
global benefits, and that Article 4(4) transfers be made through bilateral,
regional, or other multilateral channels.534
Early in the negotiations, several delegations suggested establishing a
separate mechanism to coordinate, promote, and facilitate the transfer of
technology. Both Norway and Mexico informally proposed creating a
technology clearinghouse. 5 5 However, most delegations felt that it would
participants. On May 4, 1992, just before the end of the final session of the INC, the GEF participants
issued a statement on the future evolution of the GEF, including its relation to the climate change and
biological diversity conventions. The participants agreed that the parties' choices concerning policy,
strategy, eligibility criteria, and minimum funding levels would have primacy. Given that universal
participation is "key to the GEF's success," decisions would normally be made on a consensus basis,
although a voting mechanism that guarantees a balanced and equitable representation while giving due
weight to donor countries would be used. GEF Participants Statement on the Future Evolution of the
Global Environment Facility, para. 7 (May 4, 1992) (on file with author); see also GEF PILOT PHASE,
supra note 516, at 7. In the biological diversity negotiations, developing countries were more successful
than in the INC in providing for the primacy of the conference of the parties - one of several reasons
given by the United States for not signing the Biological Diversity Convention. U.S. Dept. of State,
Press Release on Convention on Biological Diversity (May 29, 1992), reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State
Dispatch, June 1, 1992, at 423.
Discussions about the relationship of the COP and the GEF continued at INC 6 and 7. At INC 7,
the G-77 reiterated its view that the COP should be the ultimate authority on funding issues (including
the amount of funding necessary to implement the Convention), that funding decisions should be
reconsidered on request by a party to the Convention, and that the Convention's Scientific and
Technological Committee should ensure conformity of projects with the COP's guidance and eligibility
criteria. The G-77 also renewed earlier proposals to create a special account within the GEF (referred
to as a "window") dedicated to financing the Convention, in order to facilitate the exercise of the COP's
authority over funding amounts and decisions. The separate "window" approach was opposed by
developed countries, which wished to maintain the GEF as a single fund (with allocations for particular
purposes such as climate change) rather than as an aggregation of funds. See Implementation of Article
11, supra note 454, at 11. The fate of this issue remains uncertain.
531. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 11(1).
532. See supra text accompanying notes 464-466. Similarly, Article 4(4), unlike Article 4(3), does
not refer to the financial mechanism defined in Article 11.
533. See GEF BROCHURE, supra note 516, at 5 ("Projects that are deemed to benefit the global
environment, as distinct from the local environment, qualify for funding under the GEF.").
534. But cf. Jacob Werksman, The Climate Change Convention and the GEF: Meeting the Costs
of Adaptation (Nov. 1992) (FIELD discussion paper, on file with author). Notably, the Convention does
not make the financial mechanism the exclusive means of making financial transfers pursuant to Article
4. Article 11 specifically provides that developed countries may also provide financial resources through
bilateral, regional, and other multilateral channels. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art.
11(5).
535. Under the Mexican proposal, which was presented at the December 1991 session in Geneva,
541
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be more efficient to have a single mechanism, and by the end of INC 4 they
had tacitly decided not to establish a separate mechanism for technology
transfer. Attention then turned to the role the financial mechanism would play
in technology transfer. Some proposals set forth extensive functions,536
including the receipt of both technological and monetary contributions."' As
with many other aspects of the Convention, however, a more skeletal
formulation was ultimately adopted in order to gain consensus in the limited
time available. Article 11 authorizes the financial mechanism to provide grants
for the transfer of technologies, but does not specify that the mechanism will
actually receive technologies or play a direct role in transferring them.
The INC also declined to adopt a proposal by AOSIS to create an
insurance fund (modelled on existing maritime insurance funds) for the
potential damage caused by a rise in sea levels.53 AOSIS had proposed that
the insurance fund would not be established immediately, but would come into
existence only if the rate of sea level rise exceeded an agreed upon figure.
Contributions to the proposed fund would be based primarily on a country's
gross national product, with an adjustment for its total carbon dioxide
emissions, and receipt of benefits from the fund would occur only if the
absolute level (as opposed to the rate) of sea level rise had exceeded a
specified figure. In light of the reluctance shown by states to establish liability
regimes in other areas, such as ocean dumping, 39 where both the scope of
potential damages and the uncertainties are much lower, no one expected that
the INC would actually establish an insurance fund. The insurance fund seems
to have been proposed by AOSIS as a bargaining chip and as the opening
round of a long-term campaign to begin to familiarize delegations with the
concept of insurance. Initially, a compromise formulation was suggested,
the technology clearinghouse would purchase environmentally sound technologies through a public
bidding process. One possible model for a clearinghouse would have been the Technology Information
Exchange (TIE) of the lEA, which facilitates the diffusion and exchange of technologies to reduce and
control the emission of greenhouse gases. Elements of TIE include a comprehensive directory of
information sources and electronic mail links among main information suppliers. lEA, CLMIATE
CHANGE POLICY INITIATIVES 19 (1992).
536. Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. VI(6) option 3(i)-(o); Cf. MONTREAL
PROTOCOL HANDBOOK, supra note 458, at 85 (discussing Montreal Protocol Interim Multilateral Fund,
which has authority to finance clearinghouse functions to facilitate technology cooperation, distribute
information, and hold workshops and training sessions).
537. Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art. VI(6) option l(c)-(d).
538. Insurance Proposal, supra note 463; Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235,
Annex V (Insurance Mechanism); see also MICHAEL WILFORD, INSURING AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES
OF SEA LEVEL RISE (CIEL-AOSIS Background Paper 4, June 1991).
539. See, e.g., Consideration of the Report of the Task Team on Liability, International Maritime
Organization (IMO) Doe. LDC 12/8 (Oct. 3, 1989). Similarly, a draft convention on liability and
compensation in connection with the carriage of noxious and hazardous substances by sea has been
under discussion in the International Maritime Organization for more than ten years, without any
conclusion. See Draft IMO Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the Carriage
of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Ad Hoe Group of Legal Experts on Dumping, IMO Doc.
LDC/LG 5/6 (May 5, 1991); see also Alfred Rest, Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation
Concerning the Carriage of Noxious and Hazardous Substances by Sea, 6 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 82
(1980) (discussion within Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization).
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directing the parties to consider establishing an insurance scheme.540 Even
this was not acceptable to many Western states. As a result, the Convention
refers to insurance only as one of the actions to which parties should give
"full consideration" in meeting the specific needs and concerns of developing
countries arising from the adverse effects of climate change.54
1
2. Mechanisms
The Convention's implementation mechanisms establish a limited form of
"pledge and review.""542 First, countries will communicate information on
their greenhouse gas emissions and implementation measures. While this
reporting requirement falls well short of a binding "pledge," it nonetheless
forces parties to state publicly what they are doing and may thereby serve as
a prod to national action. These national reports will then be subject to
international review at meetings of the COP.
In addition to the COP's periodic assessment of implementation issues, the
INC discussed a number of mechanisms to review individual parties'
compliance with the Convention. Bilateral dispute settlement has traditionally
served as a principal compliance mechanism in international agreements; the
Convention contains a boilerplate dispute settlement article, which provides
for negotiation, conciliation, and non-compulsory arbitration or adjudication.
In practice, however, states have rarely used bilateral dispute settlement to
address global environmental problems, both because no one state is
particularly affected by another state's lack of compliance and because states
generally seek to avoid adversarial proceedings with one another. Therefore,
the INC also considered establishing a multilateral mechanism, modelled on
the non-compliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol. This supplementary
mechanism, inelegantly styled a "multilateral consultative process to resolve
questions regarding implementation," would allow states to raise questions
about another state's implementation of the Convention in a non-adversarial
setting. The Convention directs the COP to consider establishing such a
mechanism at its first session.
a. Communication of Information (Article 12)
Reporting requirements promote transparency and thereby facilitate
international review of a country's performance.543 Initially, some developed
countries sought to include ambitious reporting requirements in the Conven-
540. Revised Text, supra note 238, art. 13, option 4.
541. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(8).
542. See supra notes 214-217, 221-222 and accompanying text.
543. See GAO, supra note 499, at 12 (arguing national reporting provides basis for public and peer
pressure); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in International
Regulatory Regimes, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED
LEADERSHIP 280 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991); Grubb, Assessment, supra note 6, at 541 (arguing
reporting encourages governmental analysis and learning and puts pressure on governments to develop
effective policies).
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tion, perhaps in a detailed annex setting forth the information that reports
should contain or directing the COP to adopt agreed common formats for
reports.'" Some suggested that the Convention require parties to nominate
a "national assessment body" that would prepare reports through a public
process, with review or comments by NGO's."45 All of these proposals were
eventually abandoned as the difficulty of setting even a simple reporting
requirement became apparent. Although many international agreements
include reporting requirements,5' some developing countries were reluctant
to accept such a requirement in this Convention, which, because of its
potential breadth, could subject virtually all economic sectors to a reporting
requirement. They argued that reports would be burdensome and intrusive and
should be voluntary rather than mandatory. 47 Some developing countries
even objected to the term "reporting," contending that it suggested an
intrusive, interventionist process.5 48 As a result, the Convention instead uses
the more neutral phrase "communication of information."" Against this
backdrop, the reporting requirements finally negotiated, though modest, 5 '
still represent a significant concession and open the way to the development
of more substantial requirements in the future.
The Convention sharply differentiates between the required content of
developing and developed states' reports. All parties must communicate
information on their national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions and
removals (to the extent their capabilities permit), as well as on the steps taken
or planned to implement the Convention.55 Developed states and econo-
mies-in-transition must also submit a detailed description of their policies and
measures to implement their specific commitments, and an estimate of the
544. The secretariats for other environmental agreements have generally specified common formats
for reports. See GAO, supra note 499, at 29.
545. Informal Papers I, supra note 189, at 3 (submission of Australia); Single Text, supra note
227, at 26. Several other environmental agreements provide for designation of national implementing
bodies. See, e.g., CITES, supra note 303, art. IX (requiring states to designate management authority
as well as scientific authority); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, art. VI, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (requiring each
party to designate authority or authorities to issue dumping permits, to keep records on dumping
activities, and to monitor condition of seas).
546. See GAO, supra note 499, at 23.
547. While it is difficult to see how a national report itself could infringe on a country's
sovereignty, it could potentially be used for that purpose by other states. In addition, reporting
requirements can be burdensome, and compliance with reporting requirements in other environmental
agreements has been mixed. See, e.g., id. (finding that close to one-half of reports submitted by
Montreal Protocol parties were incomplete).
548. This was partly a problem of translation, particularly into Spanish.
549. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, arts. 4(1)0), 12.
550. See Grubb, Assessment, supra note 6, at 541 (criticizing Convention's reporting require-
ments).
551. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 12(1)(a)-(b). The United States and United
Kingdom suggested that developing countries also be required to report on future trends of greenhouse
gas emissions, but India and China opposed this on the ground that it would impose an undue burden.




effect of these measures and policies on their sources and sinks." 2 Finally,
OECD countries and the European Community must report on their transfers
of financial resources and technology."5 3 While these reporting requirements
are extensive, they certainly are not exhaustive. For example, developed
countries must identify and periodically review policies that encourage
greenhouse gas emissions, such as tax subsidies or pricing policies,554 but
they are not required to report on such policies or to identify potential
abatement measures. Changes in the Convention's reporting requirements
would require an amendment or the negotiation of a protocol, since the INC
specifically declined to authorize the COP to elaborate additional reporting
requirements, or to include the reporting requirements in an annex, which
could be amended more easily.
The main issue regarding reports, apart from the question of whether they
should be required, was confidentiality. Some developing states wanted each
party to be able to determine what information it could withhold on the basis
of confidentiality; others felt that purportedly confidential information should
be communicated to the Secretariat, even if not made public, and should be
subject to a review process. The Convention reflects a compromise between
these views. States must include confidential information in their reports, but
if they designate information as confidential, the Secretariat is to protect that
information by aggregating it with other information - for example, by
combining information about emissions from several different sources.555 To
promote transparency and facilitate NGO review, reports are to be made
public when the Secretariat submits them to the COP. 56
The Convention provides some flexibility in reporting requirements.
Developing countries are given considerably more time to submit their initial
reports than developed countries: three years as opposed to six months. Least
developed countries may submit their initial reports at their discretion; the
COP will fix their schedule for subsequent reports. 7 Groups of parties,
including but not limited to regional economic integration organizations such
as the European Community, may file a report jointly, provided that (1) the
report includes information on each state's implementation of the Convention;
(2) the group gives prior notice to the COP; and (3) the report conforms to
the COP's guidelines for joint reports. 58 Finally, developing countries are
entitled to full financial support in preparing their reports, and can receive
technical assistance on request.5 59
552. Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b).
553. Id. art. 12(3).
554. Id. art. 4(2)(e)(ii).
555. Id. art. 12(9).
556. Id. art. 12(10).
557. Id. art. 12(5).
558. Id. art. 12(8).
559. Id. art. 12(7).
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b. International Review of Implementation (Article 7(2))
Because of the potentially high costs of climate change response measures,
many observers have argued that states will undertake strong commitments
only if adequate monitoring and verification procedures exist. 60 Such
procedures provide information to other parties about whether potential
competitors are complying with their obligations and help deter free riders
through public embarrassment. They can also facilitate international review
of a country's performance and serve as a trigger for the application of
sanctions. 561
Early in the negotiations, Working Group II considered a number of
ambitious verification procedures, in some cases modelled on procedures used
in other international agreements. The group considered placing responsibility
for monitoring in the hands of one or more international organizations such
as WMO or UNEP, 62 establishing a permanent review committee composed
of independent technical experts, 6 3 or using international teams of ex-
perts.564 Only remnants of these proposals remain in the Convention, partly
because the INC's failure to agree to any specific control measures made
monitoring and verification procedures less urgent. In addition, most
delegations worked from the assumption that parties would act in good faith,
and that failure to comply with the Convention would result from circumstanc-
es beyond a party's control, such as lack of financial or technical resources.
Thus, the INC's task was not so much to design verification procedures as to
develop mechanisms to help countries fulfill their obligations. Finally, the
entire question of monitoring and verification was extremely sensitive
politically for many developing country delegations. Indeed, some developing
countries objected to the use of such terms as "monitoring," "compliance,"
and "verification;" the first because it had too activist and intrusive a tone, the
last two because they suggested that countries might act in bad faith and
560. See, e.g., Grubb, Pragmatics, supra note 160, at 349 (finding it "unlikely that a climate
agreement which imposes significant costs will work if it contains inadequate monitoring provisions");
Jorgen Wettestad, Verfication of Greenhouse Agreements: A Mismatch Between Technical and Political
Feasibility?, INT'L CHALLENGES, Special Issue on Global Warming, 1991, at 41 (1991) (suggesting that
verification is necessary since one cannot expect full cooperation on climate change problems).
"Monitoring" generally refers to the collection of data, while "verification" refers to determining
whether a party has complied with its commitments.
561. See generally Jesse H. Ausubel & David G. Victor, Verification of International
EnvironmentalAgreements, 17 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T. 1 (1992); Barratt-Brown, supra note 488;
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 543, at 288-304 (discussing "free rider" problem and difficulty in
monitoring international agreements generally).
562. Single Text, supra note 227, at 25.
563. Id. at 32.
564. Id. at 24. This is similar to the approach taken in the nuclear proliferation area. The IAEA
uses inspection teams to verify compliance. IAEA teams theoretically do not need the consent of the
state concerned to make visits. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, July 29, 1957, art.
XII, para. 6, 8 U.S.T. 1095, 1106, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, 28, amended Oct. 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 135, 471
U.N.T.S. 334; LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, THE IAEA AND NUCLEAR WORLD ORDER (1987). The
International Labor Organization's Commissions of Inquiry also have the authority to make site visits,
See Barratt-Brown, supra note 488, at 559.
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wilfully violate their obligations. As a result, the Convention uses more
neutral, descriptive language: "monitor" was replaced by "assess," "compli-
ance" by "implementation," and "verification" by "resolution of questions."
As it became increasingly clear that the Convention would not establish
international monitoring or fact-finding mechanisms, attention focused on
international review of national reports. Delegations identified several
different types of potential review: (1) a procedural review to determine
whether a report has been submitted and whether it conforms to any formal
guidelines established for reports; (2) a technical review of, for example, the
methodologies used and whether particular national measures are likely to
reduce emissions by the stated amount; and (3) a more substantive review,
evaluating a party's compliance with its obligations under the Convention.
The Convention assigns the primary review function to the COP, which
has the mandate to "[a]ssess, on the basis of all information made available
to it in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the implementation
of the Convention by the parties, the overall effects of the measures taken
pursuant to the Convention, . .. and the extent to which progress towards the
objective of the Convention is being achieved. "565 Although this provision
does not unambiguously authorize review of individual countries' perfor-
mance, the provision as a whole suggests that the parties intended to permit
individual review. The use of the plural in the phrase, "implementation of the
Convention by the Parties," can be read to suggest that the provision is aimed
at review of implementation by the parties as a whole. However, such an
interpretation would make the provision redundant, since the following clause
("the overall effects of the measures taken") addresses collective implementa-
tion. If each clause is to be understood as a distinct mandate to the COP, the
former clause must be read to address individual review.
c. Multilateral Consultative Process to Resolve Questions Regarding
Implementation (Article 13)
To resolve questions regarding a party's compliance with the Convention,
many felt that a multilateral, non-adversarial procedure would be preferable
to traditional dispute settlement. Adversarial procedures were felt to be
particularly inappropriate because climate change is a global concern; non-
compliance would therefore affect all the parties collectively, not simply the
party challenging another for violating the Convention.566 Moreover, as one
commentator noted, a non-adjudicative mechanism would promote cooperative
relations by allowing questions to be resolved even before they have "ripened
into a full-blown legal dispute. "567
Although reservations by some developing states ultimately prevented
Working Group II from agreeing to establish a multilateral, non-compliance
565. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 7(2)(e).
* 566. See Joan E. Donoghue, Legal Dimensions of Compliance and Dispute Resolution in a Global
Climate Regime 10 (Apr. 4, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
567. Id.
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mechanism, a significant degree of consensus did emerge on this subject. For
example, delegations generally agreed that the mechanism should be forward-
rather than backward-looking: its main goal should be to help parties come
into compliance with the Convention rather than to adjudicate blame or
impose sanctions. In this respect, the mechanism would be similar to the non-
compliance procedure established under the Montreal Protocol.568 Two
primary alternatives were suggested regarding who should conduct the
procedure: ad hoc panels established by the COP (modelled on GATT panels)
or the Implementation Committee. Given the political nature of the non-
compliance procedure, some delegations questioned whether the COP would
agree to establish ad hoc panels; therefore, they preferred to entrust this
function to a standing committee, such as the Implementation Committee.
Others felt that if the Implementation Committee had a technical character, it
should not perform a quasi-political function such as non-compliance review;
alternatively, if it had an open-ended membership (as was ultimately decided),
it would be too unwieldy (and possibly too political) to undertake this type of
detailed review. Two other options - namely to establish a standing, semi-
adjudicative body, or to make the establishment of panels automatic rather
than dependent on a decision of the COP - were not extensively discussed
in the INC.
Rather than establish a multilateral non-compliance procedure immediately,
the Convention calls on the COP to consider the establishment of such a
mechanism at its first session.569 If the COP does choose to implement a
non-compliance procedure, it will need to decide whether individual parties,
the COP, subsidiary bodies of the Convention, international organizations,
and/or NGOs will be given standing to initiate the procedure. In addition, the
COP must consider whether to establish a system of penalties for non-
compliance.
d. Settlement of Disputes (Article 14)
Regardless of the outcome of the multilateral consultative mechanism
issue, most delegations believed the Convention should also provide for
traditional bilateral dispute settlement. In their view, the two mechanisms are
complementary rather than competing. As is often the case with respect to
568. Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 262, at Annex IV(5); see also Jeff Trask, Montreal
Protocol Non-Compliance Procedure: The Best Approach to Resolving International Environmental
Disputes?, 80 GEO. L.J. 1973 (1992) (criticizing Montreal Protocol's non-compliance procedure as too
inflexible). Under the Montreal Protocol's non-compliance procedure, a party may submit in writing
reservations about another party's implementation of the Protocol. The party in question has an
opportunity to respond, after which the matter will be reviewed by an implementation committee
consisting of ten parties elected by the Meeting of the Parties based on equitable geographical
distribution. The committee shall seek an "amicable resolution" of the matter and report to the Meeting
of the Parties. The parties may "decide upon and call for steps to bring about full compliance with the
Protocol, including measures to assist the Parties' compliance with the Protocol." Copenhagen
Amendments, supra.
569. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 13.
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dispute settlement provisions, the main questions were whether the procedure
should be mandatory or voluntary, and binding or non-binding. At one
extreme, some developing countries wanted purely voluntary, non-binding
procedures, under which states with disputes would engage first in negotia-
tions and then, if those failed, in non-binding conciliation. Alternatively, the
Working Group II Co-Chairs suggested the possibility of compulsory
arbitration if parties that have not accepted the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) are unable to resolve a dispute through negotiation or
conciliation. 7
Article 14 represents a compromise, modelled on the dispute settlement
provisions of other international environmental agreements. If a dispute arises,
the states concerned must first seek to settle it through negotiations or some
other peaceful means. If that is unsuccessful, either state may request the
creation of a conciliation commission, composed of an equal number of
members appointed by each party and a chair chosen by the other members
of the commission. The conciliation commission has the authority only to
make "recommendatory" awards, which the parties are to "consider in good
faith." 57' However, if both parties have accepted in advance the jurisdiction
of the ICJ or compulsory arbitration under Article 14(2), then these compulso-
ry procedures may be used.57 Annexes on both conciliation and arbitration
were proposed, modelled on those found in other environmental conventions,
but could not be adopted in the short time available. Article 14 thus calls on
the COP to adopt annexes on these subjects "as soon as practicable."573
F. Final Clauses
1. Amendments, Annexes, and Protocols to the Convention (Articles 15,
16, and 17)
Given the current uncertainties about climate change, it is important that
the Convention be able to respond to new knowledge and new concerns. To
permit this responsiveness, the Convention, like many other recent internation-
al environmental agreements, provides for a somewhat flexible law-making
process by allowing amendments to be made by a qualified majority. An
amendment may be adopted in this manner only if all efforts at consensus
have been exhausted and if three-quarters of the parties vote for and ratify
570. Revised Single Text on Elements Relating to Mechanisms, INC/FCCC, 4th Sess., at 39, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.237/Misc.13 (1991).
571. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 14(6).
572. Suggestions to allow the COP to request advisory opinions from the ICJ were ultimately
rejected, in part because of questions about whether the Convention could authorize such requests
without approval by the U.N. General Assembly pursuant to Article 96(1) of the U.N. Charter.
573. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 14(7).
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it.574 Even then, however, the amendment applies only to those parties that
affirmatively accept it.
Annexes can be adopted or amended more easily: a new annex or an
amendment to an annex does not require ratification or acceptance by states
to enter into force; it binds parties automatically unless a party notifies the
depositary in writing of its non-acceptance. Thus, although an annex or an
amendment to an annex, like an amendment to the Convention, cannot bind
a state against its will, the presumption is reversed in the two situations. An
amendment binds only those parties that accept it, whereas a new annex or an
amendment to an annex binds a party unless the party opts out. Because of the
comparative ease with which annexes may be adopted and amended, some
delegations sought to limit the permissible content of annexes, to ensure that
new legal requirements, which should be the subject of a protocol or a
Convention amendment, could not be placed in an annex. Consequently,
annexes are to be "restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a
descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural, or administra-
tive character." 575
States disagreed about the need for protocols setting forth specific control
measures. The INC did not call for the negotiation of any protocols, let alone
establish a timetable for doing so. Instead, this question is left to future
discussions, either in the INC or, after the Convention enters into force, in the
COP.
To maximize flexibility, the Convention does not specify the requirements
for entry into force or amendment of protocols. While framework conventions
rarely require particular procedures for protocols, they often provide default
procedures that apply unless a protocol otherwise provides. Such default
procedures save time by eliminating the need to renegotiate the same issues
over and over for each individual protocol. The INC considered specifying
default procedures,576 but ultimately decided not to do so. These matters will
instead be dealt with in each individual protocol.
577
574. Id. art. 15(4)-(5). Proposals were made to require acceptance by parties constituting a certain
percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions. Consolidated Working Document, supra note 235, art.
VII(3). However, these proposals, along with similar proposals for entry into force of the Convention,
were not adopted.
575. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 16(1). Such qualifications are common in
international environmental agreements. See, e.g., Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 13, art. 10(1)
("[A]nnexes shall be restricted to scientific, technical and administrative matters."); International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, Nov. 30, 1990, art. 14(8), 30
I.L.M. 735 ("An appendix to the Convention shall contain only provisions of a technical nature.").
576. For example, the United Kingdom draft convention presented at INC I - which grew out
of the work of the IPCC legal measures group - specified default amendment procedures for protocols.
Informal Papers 1, supra note 189, at 67.
577. This in part resulted from the experience of some delegates at the London Conference to
amend the Montreal Protocol. The Montreal Protocol had inadvertently failed to provide any procedures
for the adoption and entry into force of amendments, and was therefore technically bound by the default
rules set forth in the Vienna Ozone Convention, which require amendments to be ratified by two-thirds
of the protocol parties. This meant that, at the time of the London Conference, 38 states were needed
to amend the Montreal Protocol. The Conference, however, wanted the London Amendments to enter
into force more quickly, and specified that 20 ratifications were sufficient for entry into force. Although
Vol. 18:451, 1993
Climate Change Convention
2. Voting Rights, Signature, and Ratification (Articles 18, 20, and 22)
Because of the global nature of the climate change problem, the Conven-
tion allows any state to sign and become a party. Members of the United
Nations or of any of its specialized agencies may sign, as may parties to the
Statute of the ICJ. Regional economic integration organizations (REIOs) such
as the European Community are also eligible to become parties to the
Convention. The Convention includes what is becoming the standard provision
regarding ratification by REIOs, namely that REIOs, in their instruments of
ratification, must declare the extent of their competence on matters governed
by the Convention."78 REIO's will have the number of votes equal to the
number of their member states that are party to the Convention, but may not
vote on a matter if any member state exercises its right to vote.5 79
3. Entry into Force (Article 23)
Because the COP is responsible for adopting rules of procedure and
financial rules, establishing criteria for joint implementation, and approving
comparable methodologies for inventories, the COP's first meeting will be
especially important. Consequently, many states took particular interest in the
entry-into-force requirements of the Convention, seeking to ensure that they
would be able to ratify the Convention in time to be charter members. If the
requirements were too easy, then the Convention might enter into force very
early and only a small number of parties would be entitled to participate in the
first COP. On the other hand, if the requirements were too strict, then entry
into force might be substantially delayed. In the end, the INC decided to
require ratification by fifty states for entry into force,58 choosing the mid-
point of the various numbers proposed. s t
Some states suggested also requiring ratification by states representing a
minimum percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions, the approach used
in the Montreal Protocol.8 . and a variety of International Maritime Organiza-
tion marine pollution conventions. 83 A minimum emissions approach has
such post hoe procedure was contrary to the Vienna Ozone Convention, the London Amendments have
been accepted by the parties to the Vienna Ozone Convention and Montreal Protocol and by the United
Nations.
578. A rare exception to this general rule is the signature article of the recently adopted Volatile
Organic Compounds Protocol to the LRTAP Convention, which does not require REIOs to declare their
competence regarding the subject matter of the Protocol. See VOC Protocol, supra note 262, art. 13.
Declarations of competence can be politically difficult for the European Community, because member
states often have different views of the Community's competence.
579. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 18(2).
580. Id. art. 23(1).
581. Revised Text, supra note 238, art. 24.
582. Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 16 (requiring ratification by eleven states representing
at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption of controlled substances).
583. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 12 I.L.M. 1319, as modified by the 1978 Protocol,
Feb. 17, 1978, art. 5, 17 I.L.M. 546 (requiring ratification by 15 states, representing at least 50% of
gross world merchant tonnage).
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two related purposes. First, it gives a convention credibility by requiring
ratification by the states that contribute most to the problem, i.e., the big
greenhouse gas emitters. Second, it minimizes the risk of any one state being
put at a competitive disadvantage by accepting a convention, since it ensures
that the Convention will enter into force only if a critical mass of other states
also join. Use of an emissions formula was deemed unnecessary, however,
because the Convention establishes only general obligations which will not
impose high costs on parties initially.
4. Reservations and Withdrawal (Articles 24 and 25)
Like the Montreal Protocol5 and the Basel Convention on the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes,585 the Climate Change
Convention does not allow reservations." 6 This "no reservations" rule, an
increasingly common feature of international environmental treaties, is
intended to ensure uniformity of obligations among the parties and to
minimize free riders. However, if a party is sufficiently dissatisfied with the
Convention after three years, it may withdraw from the Convention by giving
written notice, effective one year from the date of receipt by the
Depositary. 587
G. Interim Arrangements (Article 21 and Resolution INC/1992/1)
In early 1992, as it became clear that the INC would have difficulty
finalizing any convention, let alone a convention with teeth, attention turned
to the possibility of continuing work on convention-related issues in the time
between the Convention's adoption and its entry into force. The delay between
adoption of conventions and entry into force is often a problem in internation-
al environmental law, particularly when that delay is substantial. 88 It is
especially problematic when a convention establishes only a general frame-
work for future work and leaves many of the controversial issues to a
conference of the parties. In such a case, if the effect of adopting the
convention is to put a temporary halt to discussions pending the convention's
entry into force, it may be better to delay adoption of the convention and
continue working towards a more substantive agreement.
The optimal solution, of course, is to accept the convention and to
continue both substantive work to achieve the purposes of the agreement and
legal and institutional work to further develop and implement the convention
pending its entry into force. In the climate change context, this became known
584. Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 18.
585. Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Mar. 22, 1989, art.
26, 28 I.L.M. 657.
586. Climate Change Convention, supra note 6, art. 24.
587. Id. art. 25(l)-(2).
588. For example, the Montreal Protocol took two years to enter into force, and the Basel
Convention took three years. Cf Robin Churchill, Why Do Marine Pollution Conventions Take So Long
to Enter into Force?, 4 MAR. POL'Y & MGMT. 41, 41-49 (1976).
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as the "prompt start." It was promoted by several academics who organized
a conference in Bellagio in January 1992 attended by many of the key INC
negotiators.589 During the prompt start, the signatories to the Convention
would begin working on the tasks assigned to the COP, such as developing
comparable methodologies for greenhouse gas inventories, and preparing
guidelines for joint reporting and joint implementation. Because these interim
activities would be undertaken prior to the Convention's entry into force, it
was decided to elaborate them in a resolution rather than in the Convention
itself. The resolution was initially drafted by the Canadian co-chair of
Working Group II and was adopted at the final session.590
Although many delegations had supported the prompt start idea at earlier
sessions, in the end the resolution was a partial victim of the fall-out from the
OECD compromise on specific commitments. Some developing countries,
dissatisfied with the failure of the OECD to accept a firm target and timetable,
objected to a strong prompt start resolution and progressively whittled away
much of its substance. Even in its skeletal form, however, the resolution
retains the key element of the prompt start - continued meetings during the
interim period - although it does not elaborate in detail what those meetings
will do. Early drafts of the resolution characterized these sessions as meetings
of the signatories to the Convention. The resolution eventually adopted calls
for a continuation of the INC itself, thereby allowing states that have not
signed the Convention to participate.59 The resolution requests an initial
meeting "to prepare for the first session of the Conference of the Parties," and
provides that the U.N. Secretary-General make recommendations to the
General Assembly regarding arrangements for further sessions.592 The
resolution also invites the Secretary-General to enable the INC Secretariat to
continue its activities until the COP designates a permanent secretariat.
Finally, the resolution invites states to share information about measures they
have taken which conform to the Convention prior to its entry into force.
Pursuant to this resolution, in December 1992 the INC held a meeting to
organize its work during the period pending the Convention's entry into
force.593 It decided to organize itself into two working groups: one to
consider issues related to commitments (for example, methodologies for
greenhouse gas inventories, criteria for joint implementation, and review of
adequacy of commitments); and the other to consider issues related to the
589. Abram Chayes & Eugene B. Skolnikoff, A Prompt Start: Implementing the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Bellagio, Jan. 28-30, 1992 (Mar. 15, 1992) (conference report, on file
with author); see also Abram Chayes, Managing the Transition to a Global Warming Regime or What
to Do tit the Treaty Comes, in GREENHOUSE WARMING, supra note 156, at 61.
590. Draft Resolution Proposed by the Chairman: InterimArrangements, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC,
5th Sess., 2d Part, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/L. 15 (1992) [hereinafter Resolution on Interim Arrangements].
591. Id. at 2. As it turns out, states that have not signed the Convention are very few in number,
since the Convention has already been signed by more than 160 states. See supra note 7.
592. Resolution on Interim Arrangements, supra note 590, at 1.
593. See generally Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of Its Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR INC/FCCC, 6th Sess.,
U.N. Do. AIAC.237124 (1993).
Bodansky
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
financial mechanism, technical and financial support for developing countries,
and procedural, institutional and legal matters (for example, rules of
procedure, financial rules, designation of the permanent secretariat, and
establishment of the non-compliance procedure). The INC also requested its
secretariat to explore organizing a clearinghouse for the exchange of
information and experience on relevant technical and financial cooperation
activities, including greenhouse gas inventories and country studies. Additional
meetings of the INC are scheduled for August 1993 and February and August
1994. With ratifications proceeding at a relatively brisk pace, many observers
expect the Convention to enter into force by the end of 1993, and states have
already begun planning for the first meeting of the COP in Germany in early
to mid-1995.
In addition to these arrangements for the period pending the Convention's
entry into force, the Convention contains an article dealing with the period
between entry into force and the first meeting of the COP. Article 21 provides
that the INC Secretariat will continue to carry out secretariat functions during
this period, and that the GEF is to be entrusted with the operation of the
financial mechanism.
V.. EVALUATION OF THE CONVENTION
At the outset of the INC, many governments and commentators had very
high, perhaps unrealistic, expectations for the Climate Change Convention.
They assumed that it would be able to build on the progress achieved in
international environmental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol. Indeed,
given the gravity of the global warming problem, many believed the
negotiations could go beyond existing environmental agreements - for
example, by providing for semi-continuous negotiation rounds;"'4 establish-
ing a system of tradeable emissions permits; or providing for monitoring,
investigation, and reporting by independent experts. A more limited but novel
suggestion was that even if the Convention did not contain targets and
timetables initially, at a minimum it should set a baseline for future emissions
control requirements.9s
Compared to these ambitious proposals, the Convention is a modest
achievement. Indeed, it falls short of existing agreements such as the Montreal
Protocol and London Amendments. 96 For example, the amended Montreal
Protocol establishes stringent control measures, requiring a phaseout of most
ozone depleting substances within a decade, while the Climate Change
Convention does not even include a clearly binding stabilization commitment.
594. See supra note 260.
595. Sebenius, supra note 74, at 135.
596. The implementation mechanisms of the amended Montreal Protocol have themselves been
criticized by some commentators as very weak compared with other international instruments. See, e.g.,
Barratt-Brown, supra note 488, at 570 ("mhe Montreal Protocol, held out as the greatest accomplish-
ment of the international environmental regime, is light years behind the human rights, labor and
nuclear nonproliferation regimes in its structural capacity to implement its obligations.").
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While the Montreal Protocol contains innovative implementation mechanisms,
including trade sanctions against non-parties and a multilateral non-compliance
mechanism, the Climate Change Convention imposes no sanctions for non-
compliance and calls on the parties merely to consider -establishing an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The Montreal Protocol permits its
control measures to be adjusted by a two-thirds majority, binding even on
dissenting parties; the Climate Change Convention, on the other hand,
requires a three-quarters majority vote and allows parties to opt out of
amendments to which they object. Finally, the Montreal Protocol amendments
established a new financial mechanism in which developed and developing
countries have an equal say, whereas the Climate Change Convention relies,
at least initially, on an existing financial institution and contains only vague
language about the need for "equitable and balanced" governance.
However, while the Climate Change Convention contains little that is new
from a legal standpoint, it is inappropriate to hold it to the achievements of
the Montreal Protocol. The Montreal Protocol was accepted only following
the adoption of the Vienna Ozone Convention and was the culmination of a
decade of international work.597 The international community is at a much
earlier stage in addressing the climate change problem. Moreover, the climate
change problem is considerably more complex and politically sensitive than
the ozone issue, making international agreement especially difficult to reach.
In the voluminous literature appearing prior to the climate change
negotiations, 5s commentators identified several criteria for a successful
convention. First, it should be politically acceptable to a wide variety of
states, given the global nature of the climate change problem. 59 9 Second, it
should be equitable, that is, it should encourage burden-sharing and treat
developing countries fairly.6" Third, it should promote economic efficiency,
by encouraging states to consider the cost-effectiveness of measures to address
climate change.6"' Fourth, and perhaps most critical, the convention should
be flexible.6"2 Flexibility is essential, given the long-term nature of the
climate change problem and current uncertainties about both scientific
597. UNEP convened the first international meeting on the ozone problem in 1977. The
negotiations on an ozone agreement began in January 1982, when UNEP convened the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Preparation of a Global Framework Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer. BENEDICK, supra note 125, at 40-42.
598. See, e.g., GREENHOUSE WARMING, supra note 156; Grubb, Targets, supra note 156;
Sebenius, supra note 74; Victor, supra note 260.
599. See Victor, supra note 260, at 451. Governments agreed initially on the need to negotiate a
climate change convention that is acceptable to the "largest possible number and most suitably balanced
spread of countries." IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 143, at 261. Some commentators,
however, have taken a different view, arguing that since consensus will be difficult to reach, groups of
countries should consider making their own collective arrangements. See, eg., Sebenius, supra note 74,
at 144 (suggesting negotiation of small-scale, expanding agreement, starting with OECD members other
than United States); Patterson & Grubb, supra note 167, at 307 (suggesting creation of "green alliance"
across North-South divide).
600. Victor, supra note 260, at 452.
601. Scott Barrett, Economic Instruments for Climate Change Policy, in OECD, RESPONDING TO
CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED ECONOMIC IssuEs 51, 54-58 (1991).
602. See, e.g., Grubb, Targets, supra note 156, at 69; Victor, supra note 260, at 451.
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predictions of global warming, and the costs and benefits of response
measures.6 3 Fifth, it should lay a foundation for future work by reducing
uncertainties, promoting consensus, and building a base of information. 6 4
Finally, it should establish targets and timetables for greenhouse gas
limitations.605
The INC succeeded in negotiating a convention that was politically
acceptable to a wide array of states by avoiding firm targets and timetables,
which were opposed by the United States; limiting the obligations of
developing countries and requiring that they be provided financial and
technical assistance; 'and focusing attention on the climate change problem,
which the European states and AOSIS certainly preferred to no convention at
all. Ultimately, the proof was in the pudding: at UNCED, the Convention was
signed by 154 states. 6" Of course, political acceptability came at a price;
in order to make the Convention acceptable, it was progressively diluted by
the INC. If other countries had been willing to proceed without the support
of the United States, the Convention would likely contain firm targets and
timetables - in all probability, a commitment to stabilize emissions of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol at 1990 levels by
the year 2000. The question is, how meaningful would a climate change
convention have been without the United States, the single largest emitter of
greenhouse gases? Are we better off with a Convention that includes the
United States but not firm targets and timetables, or one that contains targets
and timetables but not the United States? 7
The Convention scores relatively high in terms of equity, as defined by the
needs of developing countries. Although developing countries did not achieve
all that they wanted with respect to financial transfers, the Convention
repeatedly recognizes the developmental priorities of the South and the need
for economic growth. It exempts developing countries from any quantitative
emissions limitations, and provides them with relaxed reporting requirements,
which will be paid for by developed countries. The Convention does less well
in dealing with OECD countries, since it treats them all more or less alike,
despite their very different circumstances. Turkey, for example, is subject to
the same commitments as other OECD countries, including the provision of
financial assistance to developing countries, some of which may be consider-
ably richer than Turkey. Understandably, Turkey is one of the few countries
that has not signed the Convention.
Because the Convention does not call for specific control measures, its
exact regulatory approach has not yet been defined and cannot be evaluated
in terms of the third criterion, efficiency. However, by endorsing the
603. As one observer remarked, the only thing that is certain regarding climate change is that our
current knowledge will be obsolete in 10-20 years.
604. See Chayes, supra note 589, at 61.
605. See Wirth & Lashof, supra note 267, at 13, 19.
606. See supra note 7.
607. See Patterson & Grubb, supra note 167, at 308 (too early to tell whether agreement without
United States would be effective).
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comprehensive approach and joint implementation, the Convention lays the
groundwork for cost-effective response measures, allowing parties to focus on
those greenhouse gases and locations where limitations can be achieved most
economically.
The Convention does preserve a certain degree of flexibility for the new
climate change regime. On the positive side, the COP may establish new
institutions or change the mandate of existing ones. Amendments, annexes,
and amendments to annexes may be adopted by a three-quarters majority vote.
In addition, the specific commitments on sources and sinks will be reviewed
regularly for adequacy, with a view to their possible amendment. On the other
hand, the Convention does not specify decision-making rules for the COP,
where most important decisions will be made. If the rules of procedure
adopted by the COP require consensus decision-making, this could lead to
policy gridlock. More important, the Convention does not define a regulatory
process for the adoption and amendment of emissions control measures that
the parties may eventually decide are warranted. Because annexes are limited
to descriptive material, the adoption of control measures would require an
amendment to the Convention or the negotiation of a separate protocol, either
of which would be cumbersome. Even with respect to annexes, the Conven-
tion does not establish any amendment or adjustment procedure like that of the
Montreal Protocol, under which changes may be imposed by a qualified
majority. 0 ' Nor does it provide for periodic rounds of renegotiation similar
to those that take place under the GATT." 9
The Convention does somewhat better in meeting the fifth criterion, laying
a basis for future work. By requiring parties to develop greenhouse gas
inventories, formulate national strategies and measures, and cooperate in
scientific research, the Convention promotes national planning and will
generate a better information base for future negotiations and decisions.
Moreover, the newly-created scientific and implementation bodies will help
the parties decide how to proceed. Nevertheless, the Convention falls short in
several respects, all of which may impede timely responses to global climate
change. For instance, the Convention does not establish in advance a baseline
for possible future targets and timetables.10 This may make countries
reluctant to take immediate actions to reduce their emissions or enhance their
sinks for fear that they will not receive credit for these actions and will
instead simply face a tougher starting point should the Convention later
establish targets and timetables.6 ' Moreover, the Convention does not
establish any timetable for the negotiation of protocols containing specific
control measures. 1 2 Nor was agreement reached, even informally, about the
608. Montreal Protocol, supra note 73, art. 2(9) (under London Amendments, adjustments to
Annex A require two-thirds vote representing majority of both developed and developing countries).
609. See Victor, supra note 260, at 454.
610. See Sebenius, supra note 74, at 135 (recommending a baseline).
611. It is possible, however, that states will view the reference in Article 4(2) to 1990 emissions
levels as the de facto baseline for future control measures and will therefore not be dissuaded from
taking action now.
612. In contrast, at the conclusion of the Vienna Ozone Convention in 1985, states adopted a
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amount of money that will be made available to developing countries for
national planning and mitigation purposes.
Finally, the Convention's failure to include strict targets and timetables
was, for many, the greatest disappointment. Clearly, the inclusion of targets
and timetables would have been a moral and political victory for supporters
of stronger global warming policies and, as such, would have encouraged
stronger national measures. It is unclear, however, how serious the omission
of targets and timetables is as a practical matter. The most commonly
proposed target and timetable, to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at 1990
levels by the year 2000, would have been largely symbolic. To illustrate,
environmental groups estimate that the United States will meet this target
anyway, as a result of measures already planned.6"3 Indeed, that was a
principal argument why the United States should have been able to accept
such a target. By the same token, however, if the United States will achieve
stabilization even without any international commitment, then the practical
significance of the target and timetable is reduced. Instead, it is important
primarily because it signals that more stringent measures may be on the way
and that business will not continue as usual. That message is implicit in the
Convention even without a firm target and timetable, and a cautious
government or business should already be thinking about how to limit or
switch away from its use of fossil fuels.
If scientists are right, the climate change problem will be with us for a
long time. As first steps in addressing the problem, we need to reduce
uncertainties about the basic science, develop an information base about
national conditions and options, fnd establish a strong institutional structure.
While immediate emissions stabilization would be desirable, establishing a
dynamic international process is more important for the long-term. The U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change makes a definite, albeit tentative,
start along that road.
resolution calling for negotiation of a control protocol by 1987. See Benedick, supra note 125, at 45.
613. See Daniel A. Lashof & David D. Doniger, A Climate for Investment: How the U.S. Can
Stabilize CO2 Emissions Through Profitable Measures the White House Already Supports (Mar. 19,
1992) (Natural Resources Defense Council Issue Paper, on file with author); see also Kelly & Granich,
supra note 6, at 2 (many countries will have little growth in greenhouse gas emissions even without any
government action).
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